Category mistake

A category mistake is made by a speaker if he uses a linguistic expression in a way that does not correspond to the logical type of the expression. The logical type of an expression is the class of its logically correct usages. This class can be used as a set of sentences are considered which provide a framework for the establishment of linguistic expressions. Such a framework may have about the form: " Aristotle was a Greek ... ". Possible substitutions in the "..." marked space include " Philosopher ", " poet ", " sculpture ", " politicians ", etc. Although not all of these substitutions result in true statements, but there are meaningful sentences. Insertions such as " Planet ", " syllogism " or "thought", however, lead to meaningless sentences. An expression that yields meaningful sentences when substituted into related set of frames, belong to a category, they are of the same logical type. The fact that a category mistake has been committed, it can reveal that the establishment of an expression produces a nonsensical sentence.

Ryles category error analysis

The term " category mistake " or " category confusion " ( category mistake ) leads Gilbert Ryle in his major work The concept of mind as an analytical tool in support of his thesis one that philosophical problems that attach themselves to concepts such as mind, will or consciousness, wrong from a use of these terms result. A prominent example of this is the mind-body problem. With his analysis Ryle wants to show that such philosophical problems on closer inspection are no problems. Ryle therefore sees the task of philosophy is to " replace Category habits by Category discipline."

In The concept of mind is Ryle numerous examples, with which he tries to explain the concept of a category error. So he's talking about from a visitor of the University of Oxford, where the various facilities such as lecture halls, seminar rooms, laboratories, cafeteria or library are shown. The visitor is dissatisfied after his tour because he wanted to see the university and instead you show him various spaces and places. When the visitor asks the question: "Where is now actually the university," he commits a category mistake. He uses the term "university " as if he belonged in the same category as " auditorium", " laboratory " or " cafeteria " at. Another example is the following: Suppose someone reported it to have bought a new pair of gloves and would get it answered: "I see you do a left and a right glove, but where is the pair of gloves that you speak of? " The questioner makes the mistake of the phrase " a pair of gloves ," the same category as " right glove " and "left glove" assign.

Background

Ryle is in the term of the mind itself is no formal definition of the category error. In its determination of the category as a logical type of a linguistic expression and the proposal to define categories as a set of sentence frames, but with significant borrowings from the studies of Bertrand Russell can be identified. This called predicative sentences of the form "x is a φ " as set functions. Insertions for the set function phi.x occurred after the bivalence of classical logic either true or false. The set of all x -establishment, for the phi.x of a true statement is called extension area. Russell defines the extension area of ​​a set function as a logical type. Even before Russell Ryle stated that the problems arising from terms such as mind, matter, consciousness or will, due to the vagueness and ambiguity of these terms. He, too, saw the task of philosophy in the " criticism and clarification of concepts that can be easily viewed as fundamental and accepted uncritically ". Ryle's notion of category error is, therefore, in a sense, an analogue of Russell 's concept of type error. However, Russell believed that none of the problematic terms could be made type- determined and thus is also in no exact science of meaning. At this point, go Russell and Ryle's views apart. As much as Ryle himself is still in the tradition of neo-positivism and its bonds are unmistakable at Russell's logical atomism, direct its "over- logical approach" according to Ryle in the same plight back, from which he was supposed to lead out. He makes the logicians the accusation, even to commit a category mistake. Linguistic expressions could not be " in a pre- register logical classes or types Enter ", this also applies to philosophical concepts. The category mistake of the logician is to Ryle in the fact that they used the concept of analysis, such as the concept of seeing. However, analyzing the philosophical sense hot reasoning. "But the fact that the ability to use an argument that the ability brings with it the implication seeing ' [... ] does not mean that it [ ... ] is causally necessary just before or during [ the ] use of an argument of such an act, seeing ' run. " By proposing an informal logic as a field of work of the philosopher Ryle therefore makes formal logic their philosophical claim dispute. The concept of category error is thus a good example of the turn, which was completed by the philosophy of ordinary language within the turn to language.

Criticism

Ryle has self-critically acknowledged that he was " amateurish " and " inexact " use the term category and without explanatory claim. His approach to look only in the logic of language, a definition of category errors is insufficient, and the improvement attempts by other authors can be considered as failed. It lacks criteria for determining whether a sentence is meaningless or not.

" The syntax of the categories as a criterion determination by no means sufficient, but must be supplemented by the criterion of semantic meaningfulness and absurdity. "

Ryle has not dealt with the Kategorialforschung of Nicolai Hartmann and their methodologies. Hartmann analyzed, at different organizational levels ( systems theory ) to adequately describe the operations required new and independent categories (" categorical novelty " ), for example, the processes of consciousness ( awareness ) against the neuronal processes ( neurophysiology ). Fundamental category error occur when about the concept of substance in the sense of a transcendent soul introduced in the empirical psychology or the value and moral concepts are transferred to the science, rather than on the thinking and actions of scientists.

In a counter-movement to the Ryles limited linguistic logic interpretation of category errors could Hartmann's studies " categorical transgressions " in a "post - analytic " philosophy again be up to date. In particular, the biology and psychology are dependent on a thorough discussion, which separate categories are adequate for these scientific fields to address a unilateral reductionism, ultimately reducing to the categories of physics.