Compatibilism

Called compatibilism, and "soft determinism ," is a theory which states that free will and determinism are compatible. One of the best-known representative is David Hume. According to Hume does not mean " free will " the ability to take a different decision under exactly the same internal and external conditions, respectively. Rather, he means a hypothetical ability to make a different decision if the man would have been psychologically predisposed differently by different desires or beliefs. According to Hume, all free actions are caused by decisions that are made ​​on the basis of desires, beliefs, and character traits. It disassociates itself from Immanuel Kant, who assume that the free will would be caused to non -recognized way by himself. In Hume's notion of determinism although there is a decision-making process, but that it is determined by a causal chain of events. So for an example of the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus a tethered to a cart dog, the "free" decides that follow is " determined " by conditions (eg car), which were already present when the decision was made.

Some compatibilists see in determinism even a necessary condition for the existence of free will. Since free actions and decisions are free only if they are made for reasons that free will requires determinism, namely determinism by reasons. According to this argument, it is paradoxically the determinism that supports the freedom of the will and not the indeterminism. This argument is called Intelligibilitätsargument by Daniel C. Dennett and commented as follows:

" Determinism is the friend, not the foe, of Those Who dislike inevitability "

Incompatibilism is the opposite view that free will and determinism are incompatible. Called the " pessimistic " version, sometimes "hard determinism ", stating that neither determinism nor indeterminism allow free will. According to Hume the above view, there is no free will without determinism. In contrast, the inkompatibilistische position assumes that "free will " refers to real ( absolute, ultimate ) alternate ways of desires, beliefs or actions and that such opportunities do not exist in compatibilist definitions. Only this absolute conception of freedom can be, therefore, with the notion of individual responsibility. Compatibilists respond that such absolute alternative options may be caused only in random, which reduced the responsibility of the individual.

There are views which are not so easy to categorize. In Libertarianism, the position is taken that the experience of free will presupposes a non- deterministic world. Some representatives of this view assume a determinism in the " physical " world, postulate, however, that there are no limits for " spiritual " events.

A concise description of the two terms can be found in the " Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy " (see Related links):

William James, the American philosopher and co-founder of philosophical pragmatism, coined the term "soft determinist " in an influential essay entitled The Dilemma of Determinism. He was of the opinion that the importance of the question of determinism does not lie in personal responsibility, but in hope. He assumed that uncompromising determinism either lead to bare pessimism or a degenerate subjectivism in moral judgments. It follows that the solution to this dilemma, to accept the role of chance. According to James can be dispensed with entirely the concept of "free will " in this context, he would rather debating on matters of substance than names.

Texts

  • Peter Bieri: The Craft of freedom. About the discovery of one's will in 2001, Hanser
  • Daniel Dennett Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, 1984, Bradford Books / MIT Press
  • Daniel Dennett Freedom Evolves, 2003, Allen Lane Publishers.
  • Harry Frankfurt The Importance of What We Care about. Philosophical Essays, 1988, Cambridge University Press
  • Hans Jonas, power or impotence of subjectivity? - The mind-body problem in the run-up to the principle of responsibility, in 1987, Suhrkamp
  • Michael Pauen illusion of freedom? Possible and impossible consequences of brain research, 2004 S. Fischer
  • Julian Nida- Rümelin Structural rationality. A philosophical essay on practical reason ( = universal - Bibliothek, Bd 18150 ), 2001, Stuttgart.
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