Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

The organization of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban (English: Comprehensive Nuclear - Test -Ban Treaty Organization, CTBTO) is a not-yet active International organization who take their work with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT ) and then the compliance will monitor this contract.

CTBTO Preparatory Commission

Until entry into force of the CTBT, the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (CTBTO Preparatory Commission, CTBTO PrepCom ) is commissioned Austria, headquartered in Vienna since 1997 to build up a global monitoring network. The Preparatory Commission is housed in the Vienna International Centre. The Hungarian-born Tibor Tóth directs the organization.

Also operates the Preparatory Commission, two working groups:

In addition, the Preparatory Commission comprises the Provisional Technical Secretariat ( Provisional Technical Secretariat, PTS), which is the precursor organization of a technical secretariat until the CTBT enters fully into force.

The Preparatory Commission was established by resolution of the States signatories to the CTBT on 19 November 1996 and enjoys the status of an international organization. Despite close relations with the United Nations, it is not a UN specialized agency. With the entry into force of the CTBT and the establishment of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission which is dissolved.

Tasks

Monitoring

The International Monitoring System (IMS International Monitoring System) should consist of the following four global monitoring networks:

• 50 primary and 120 secondary seismological stations whose technology is able to distinguish nuclear explosions from earthquakes or other shocks. Primary stations constantly provide this data, while secondary stations on request only transmit data.

• No longer perceived as sound pressure variations are measured by highly sensitive barometer of the human ear through a network of 60 infrasound stations. Each station to be provided with at least four barometers, which are distributed over an area with a diameter of about 2.5 kilometers. Every single barometer registered nor pressure differences as small as one-billionth of the normal atmospheric pressure. The spatial distribution of these extremely sensitive barometer even the weakest signals can still be detected. Sound waves generated by supersonic aircraft when piercing the sound barrier can be clearly distinguished from atomic bomb tests.

• 80 stations with Radionukliddetektoren capture special, only with atomic bomb explosions released radioactive particles, 40 of these stations also monitor the concentration of radioactive noble gases

All data is merged, stored and analyzed in Vienna at the International Data Centre ( IDC).

Up to May 2012 ( about 85 %) were already fully installed and functioning on 280 of a total of 337 stations. With the establishment and maintenance of seismological and acoustic infra facilities in Germany, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources ( BGR) is commissioned in Hanover; radiological monitoring station on the Schauinsland is operated by the Federal Office for Radiation Protection.

North Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009

On the morning of October 9, 2006 North Korea conducted in the north- east of the country by a nuclear test. The International Monitoring System of the CTBTO detected the explosion with 22 seismic stations. Within two hours, the CTBTO Member States received initial information about time, place and strength of the explosion. Two weeks later, recorded a radionuclide monitoring station in Yellowknife, Canada, traces of a radioactive isotope of the noble gas xenon in the air. With the help of atmospheric transport calculations North Korea could be limited as the only possible origin of the noble gas. The presence of radioactive xenon is evidence of an atomic explosion.

North Korea conducted on 25 May 2009 by a second nuclear test. Significantly more seismic stations of CTBTO - 61 - recorded the event compared to 2006, partly due to the stronger explosion and the other by the progress in building the stations. The area for a potential on-site inspection was therefore able to pinpoint: In 2009, this area 264 km ² was compared to 880 km ² in 2006.

Commercial applications

The measurement data of the IMS are also available for civil and scientific applications, in addition to the actual purpose of the contract, interesting. Due to the highly sensitive monitoring systems and their own data transmission network, the CTBTO can provide valuable data for tsunami warning organizations, in particular seismic data. A decision to regulate these data disclosure was made in 2006. Due relevant agreements currently have tsunami warning centers in 8 countries mostly Indo-Pacific direct access to relevant CTBTO measurement data (as of May 2012).

During the Fukushima nuclear disaster in the spring of 2011 about 40 CTBTO radionuclide stations covered the global spread of radioactive isotopes from the damaged nuclear power plant in Japan. Also, the airburst of Meteor in Chelyabinsk from February 15, 2013 could be detected by infrasound monitoring stations. CTBTO measurement data are all 183 member states accessible. Currently make over 1200 scientific and academic institutions in 120 countries of this offer.

CTBTO measurement data can also be applied in a variety of areas, including in the civil aviation and shipping, in the exploration of the oceans, volcanoes and climate change.

Site investigations

The Provisional Technical Secretariat ( PTS) is also preparing possible on-site examinations, so-called on-site inspections, in order to examine the nature of suspicious events after the entry into force of the Treaty on suspicion of a breach of contract. Using different methods can then within a short time on site for the traces are being sought by nuclear testing, but different contractual requirements are complied with.

The Technical Secretariat itself decides on infringements, but is mandated to provide Member States with all data and evaluations for assessment of possible events are available. If they fail to consider that there is an infringement, they can recommend appropriate measures in the framework of international law, and refer the case to the United Nations. These rules shall be valid only after entry into force.