German federal election, 1998

• SPD: 298
• Union: 245
• Green: 47
• FDP: 43
• PDS: 36

The 1998 election was held on 27 September 1998. The result of the elections to the 14th German Bundestag meant a first in the history of the Federal Republic: the first time a federal government was completely dropped, while changed with the change of government in 1982 the " senior partner " (SPD to the CDU / CSU) and 1969 of the former junior partner SPD took over the role of Seniors. With the SPD for the first time won a party has more than 20 million votes, while giving them the first time the parties that traditionally classify themselves as " left of center ", more than 50 percent of the vote.

Chancellor candidate of the CDU / CSU was the sixth time (five times in a row ) after 16 years in the office of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. First appeared on the then Prime Minister of Lower Saxony Gerhard Schröder for the SPD.

The SPD were able for the first time after 1972, to become the strongest parliamentary group. CSU and SPD added reached its worst result since the parliamentary elections in 1953, based on the entire electoral area from 1998., The FDP was no longer involved after the election for the first time in 29 years of government. The PDS won the first fraction status in the German Bundestag.

As a result of the election, a Red-Green coalition, which first made ​​at the federal level.

• 3.1 Organization within the parties
• 3.2 Political positioning
• 3.3 campaign

• 5.1 election result ( detailed)
• 5.2 Regional differences
• 5.3 Social and structural differences

Topics

The dominant substantive theme of the campaign was the economic policy and in particular the fight against unemployment. Representative surveys of the research group elections after the main problems in Germany (multiple answers were possible) showed a large majority of unemployment as the main topic. Values ​​ranged throughout the year 83-91 % of the Germans. The runners followed by far the topics Asylum / Aliens ( 8 to 16 %, 14 % in September ) and pensions / age (9 to 12%, 9% in September).

In contrast to the federal election in 1994, when a short-term economic recovery of the former Kohl government helped with the re-election, increased the number of unemployed in Germany since 1996 steadily. The government introduced an economic reform package, which provided, among other tax cuts and reductions in non-wage labor costs. However, the SPD - dominated Bundesrat blocked a part of the law. The accusation of the federal government, especially at the former SPD chairman Oskar Lafontaine, the SPD Outsmart destructive, found among voters Surveys little response. The Alliance for Work, should participate in the government, among other things, trade unions and employers' associations, failed after a short time without being able to produce concrete results.

While the attempts at reform were criticized by most economists as a "half-hearted ", they were rejected by large segments of the population. In particular, cuts in sick pay in case of illness led to extensive protests. The summer of 1998 was marked by large demonstrations against the attempts to reform the government. The people feared among other cuts in the health and pension insurance.

An incoming parties

Eligible hopes to be elected to parliament, only could make the parties that were already represented in the Bundestag: CDU / CSU, FDP, SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens and the PDS. Both between the CDU and FDP as well as between the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens, there was already an early commitment to a common coalition after any election win.

Government parties

The government parties wanted to continue the path taken by them. For 16 years in the government, they felt their policy to be successful and promised to maintain this. Having succeeded with this strategy to win the general election in 1994 against the backdrop of the then economic boom, the work of the past years should essentially be continued unchanged. Only the question of whether Helmut Kohl or parliamentary leader Wolfgang Schaeuble should stand as a top candidate, provided for discussion within the party.

Kohl decided the question without authorization by, declared its intention on 3 April 1997, his 67th birthday, to run as candidate for chancellor.

Immediately after the Leipzig congress of the CDU in October 1997, however, he presented Schäuble unabgesprochen as his eventual successor. The tactical move by large masterly quality should make clear within the party that only certain Helmut Kohl on the person and the time of his successor. He reduced so Schäuble on a candidate from Kohl's grace. In addition, Kohl had to now defend themselves against the accusation of being a chancellor nurmehr on demand. However, he wanted to definitely stay in office until 2002, by which he committed Schäuble on a five-year Crown Prince shank.

Opposition

While the government parties were able to build on the work of previous years, the situation looked particularly at the SPD different. 1994 also failed at their own disunity and internal struggles grave, Oskar Lafontaine had taken over the party chairmanship in a surprising crucial vote in 1995. It has long been unclear whether he or Gerhard Schröder would stand as a candidate for chancellor. Both stood for a different orientation of economic policy: Lafontaine for a more demand-driven " classic social democratic " approach, Schröder for a continuation of the Yellow-Blacks program in more moderate version. The constellation in which the SPD finally took - Schröder as chancellor candidate, Lafontaine as finance minister - promised to address both traditional voters and swing voters from the political center. The content as well as personal conflicts of this constellation came to light only after the formation of a government.

Election programs

The public perception was based on a directional decision between two different camps, which was reflected in the election campaign. Even in the two manifestos two contradictory policies were pursued. Although both parties demanded tax cuts and other changes to the income tax, but the CDU wanted to reach a much larger net reduction than the SPD, which mostly wanted to finance on the elimination of tax expenditure, tariff reductions. Both parties wanted to limit the national debt by they wanted to reduce public spending and subsidies. The CDU wanted to fight unemployment by requiring " that create employment collective agreements ", " create jobs by stimulated economic growth," the SPD. Both parties wanted to reform the German citizenship law, although the SPD went here with a demand for a simpler Dual citizenship a step.

The Greens approached in their program very social democracy. Had made in March still the demand of Magdeburg caucus after a long-term increase in the green tax on 5 DM per liter of petrol for harsh reactions, the traditional green issues were oriented environmental protection and international cooperation on compatibility with the social democratic program in the final program design. So in the program was the section on "preventive policing " is longer than the participatory democracy.

The program of the PDS was ambivalent. On the one hand took the specific interests of East Germany a significant role. Topics of the New Left, as their representatives traditionally the Greens were seen, were often more pointed in the PDS program, but also set often less detailed. Ultimately, the PDS program differed significantly from that of other parties. As a socialist party she sat here on approaches of the traditional left: " A redistribution from top to bottom ", which must be accompanied with a "real policy change" and " no mere change of government ."

Electioneering

Organization within the parties

The CDU was not known who belonged to the inner circle of the campaign organization. In spring 1998, Helmut Kohl appointed the former chief editor of Bild Zeitung, Hans -Hermann Tiedje his personal adviser and occupied the position of the government spokesman with Otto Hauser new. In press and political science is well established that in addition to the two Friedrich Bohl, Anton Pfeifer, Andreas Fritzenkötter, Willi Schalk ( advertising agency McCann Erickson ), Renate Kocher included (Institute of Allensbach ) and Peter Hintze strategic center of the CDU - election campaign. Whether Roland Koch was also one of this county, is still not known for sure, but has been adopted by some newspapers.

Of these persons, however, had only Bohl and Pfeifer reliable access to the person cabbage. In fact, this met almost all the important decisions alone, the Electoral Commission blessed this usually only retrospectively from. In addition to the decision-making center to carbon were within the CDU two important groups that have been involved with planning and coordination of the campaign: first, the office of the party under Peter Hintze, should submit the proposals and implement decisions. Between Geschaftsstelle and strategic center have led to many coordination problems, which to the outside world the impression of an unprofessional and not very coordinated campaign did so arise. On the other formed by the then Group Chairman and designated successor, Wolfgang Schäuble, Kohl's another strategic center, but on many points another line pursued as cabbage and this also made public. The Union election campaign seemed so still uncoordinated in itself. This became clear, for example, that carbon a possible grand coalition consistently declined, while Schäuble held this publicly possible.

During the election campaign the CDU revolved around the person Kohls, formed in the SPD three largely independent centers, but who were able to work the whole campaign through coordinated. They pooled around the chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder, the party chairman Oskar Lafontaine and the SPD federal party and chairman of the country's largest membership association of North Rhine- Westphalia Franz Müntefering. All three possessed considerable power within the party, but were also instructed to collaborate in order to win the election can. Lafontaine knew that the SPD 's popularity Schroeder in the political center as needed as Schröder Lafontaine position of power within the party. Münterfering was busy with the practical implementation of the campaign. He, or his confidant Matthias Machning, founded the Kampa '98, the concentrated first time in the party's history, large parts of campaign planning and organization outside of the actual party committees.

Political positioning

While the CDU / CSU ( "Union" ) and SPD hardly be distinguished programmatically, both presented very different political topics in the center of its political position in the election campaign. The Union stressed the success of the tried and tested. Helmut Kohl and with him Affiliated took a major role in the election campaign of the party communication. She followed this two baselines. First, they tried a polarization of the election campaign, on the other hand they turned and especially the carbon dar. person as a guarantor of stability, the central campaign slogan of the party was safely in the world of tomorrow.

The Union tried to score with Kohl's person and his successes as the reunification of Germany or the European Monetary Union. They also pointed to the economic progress accomplished so that it does not apply to jeopardize out. The central slogan was coined to carbon world class for Germany.

Decided on 2 May 1998 Heads of State and Government of the European Community ( including carbon ) in Brussels, the introduction of the euro. In a 2013 interview become known ( from March 2002) Kohl said: In one case, [ the euro ] I was like a dictator. He was aware that he was acting against the will of a large majority of the population, and that this would cost him votes.

The presentation Kohl appeared problematic: Gerhard Schröder led in all the polls for the best Chancellor Kohl far ahead. The Chancellor was in the polls even after the values ​​of the Union parties. The themes of German unity and monetary union barely reached the voters. These made rather worried about their future and especially about their jobs. In addition, it was difficult to find a candidate who was controversial within the party and has been intensively discussed his succession to provide a safe bastion.

The Union sought to conjure up the image of stability and safety by an offensive run negative campaign against a possible red-green government. The Union tried to give the impression that red-green would cause a political shift to the left in the company under the guise of a civic election campaign. The campaign message of the party tried to give the impression that it was a matter of whether Germany is led into the next millennium by a coalition of the center of the CDU and FDP or a leftist coalition of the SPD, the Greens and the PDS. Peter Hintze pointed this at the Bremen federal party congress of the CDU to Our motto is: black, red and gold instead of red, green and dark red. Part of the campaign was to let you action does not tap into the Union would benefit from the eco-tax plans, particularly the Greens. Hintze they reasoned thus: " The example of the Greens call for a fuel price of 5 dollars per liter to the citizens out nationwide in mind would be what anti- people projects in Germany expected, should red-green come to power. "

How should show up on election night, were the messages that were to convey only the core voters of the party. While the FDP in their programs quite drew a wider and more picture of liberalism, their campaign communication was limited largely to the neoliberal conceived as point ' tax cuts '.

The SPD tried to give up using various topics an image, which built both to maintenance of achievements as also represented the party as a competent modifiers. Your campaign revolved around the issues of economic policy, in which the SPD had his own words for Innovation and order, and social policy, in which they wanted to score with social justice; she wanted to be a lawyer for the families and strongly emphasized the importance of youth and the future. The SPD wanted to use it to appeal to a broad political spectrum, in which everyone can find should.

Electioneering

The CDU was from about 50 million in respect of the federal election campaign. Compared to previous election campaigns focused on three major points were determined to do: The CDU sat particularly strong on the medium of television. Compared with the general election campaign of 1994, she switched over twice as many spots ( 559 compared to 254), compared with the SPD (88 election commercials ), it was even six times as many, which is remarkable, since the SPD overall had a significantly higher campaign budget. From June 15-July 10 turned on the CDU also on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays large format ads, which contained short slogans that style strongly emulated the style of the usual headlines of Bild-Zeitung. Finally, the party specially produced for choosing the New Federal States Illustrated (NBI ), in the name and layout leaned heavily on the popular in the GDR New Berlin Illustrated, printed in an edition of 6.5 million units and to all households in East Germany was distributed. It contained the already known from the old NBI yellow press themes and contests and should also call the citizens of the former GDR progress after eight years of reunification under Helmut Kohl to mind.

The SPD commissioned before the election, the Empirical Social Research Centre polis with a detailed panel study, which ran from January 1996 to the end of 1997. Based on this study and its analysis, the party focused its campaign on four specific groups of people who were seen as particularly important for the choice:

• Men 45 years and older, often skilled workers, actually a classic regular voters potential of the SPD, which turned away in previous years by the party and the CDU had chosen. These voters should be recovered in particular with promising recipes to combat unemployment.
• Younger men in professional good position. They should be recruited mainly from the Greens to achieve by what the SPD tried that it presented itself as a competent actor against welfare cuts and the economization of society.
• Younger women in good employee or official positions. These were for the politically undecided swing voters, often referred to in the election campaign Neue Mitte. Also, they should be obtained that the SPD positioned itself as a party against welfare cuts and economization. In addition, the Social Democrats promised them a more "contemporary " family policy than would be possible with the opposition parties.
• The insecure, which lean towards any party. They make up about 10 % of the electorate. The SPD they wanted to achieve by it took on its concrete everyday concerns and tried to run entideologisierte policy.

The SPD began the campaign compared to the usual procedure before a general election early. Already in 1997 the first billboards were stocked in April 1997 began the so-called innovation campaign, whose first motive was the indication that we made strong economic growth. directly followed by could look like in 2002 Germany. In the summer of 1997, the so-called double-head campaign, in which the two positions Innovation and Social Justice joined together and the two people Gerhard Schröder and Oskar Lafontaine were assigned began. In the summer of 1998, eventually followed the subjects campaign, whose aim was to combine key issues of the election campaign with positive messages and hope. In this way could even highly stressed, angst-ridden issues such as unemployment credible and positive in effect be ( optimistic ) addressed. In the last four weeks, finally it came to the candidates campaign in which mainly the popularity projection Schroeder should be exploited before carbon.

In the medial election campaign, the SPD bought less time in the mass media, but put it to spread their campaign messages about the editorial content of the media. The aim was to make the campaign so professional and interesting that the media reported on it.

On the one served to several large billboards that were placed directly in front of the SPD party headquarters and were filled with changing posters since the spring of 1997. Target to the advertising agency was to make these posters so varied that the television media reported on it. This was achieved in 80 % of cases and was an outstanding success. Messages on the posters referred often to the person Helmut Kohl, which must be replaced, together with the central SPD election campaign slogan We are ready. Examples were a poster to Dortmunder major event in the central electoral period in August 1998 with the motive Helmut Kohl and the inscription invitation to the farewell tour. Kick off on August 23 in Dortmund or previously, in January 1998, glued posters:

• Scene 1: A snowman. Inscription: In a few months he's gone
• Scene 2: Helmut Kohl. Inscription: He also
• Scene 3: SPD logo. Inscription: We are ready

The other key advertising medium, which in turn attracted a wide media coverage by itself, was the so-called warranty card end of June 1998. On her central campaign messages of the party were distributed, they should, in particular to counteract the image, a future government Schröder would be arbitrary and without obligation. Through concerted action for work, innovation and justice - on both their general policy approaches such as more jobs were. Unemployment can be combated shown as relatively concrete measures such as Germany as an idea factory - doubling the investment in education, research and science in 5 years.

Media coverage

The event drew himself for a parliamentary election an exceptionally intense coverage in the media. This was especially the uncertain election outcome, or how the Bild newspaper headline on September 19: Gaaaanz scarce. On September 26, headlined image Every vote counts, today opened with election fever: Who tomorrow ahead and the RTL News with head-to -head race. Only the Lewinsky affair was still able to compete for headlines, while the same occurred in the weeks before the election in more than 50 % of all articles in the main news programs in July and August. Record holder was about RTL, over 70 % of all contributions, which were significantly longer than in the rest of other policy issues, working for the newscast with the choice.

Substantive issues of reporting here were mainly economic policy, in particular measures against high unemployment, followed by the foreign policy and reporting on the future of the welfare state. Other formerly important issues such as education, homeland security, the environment and infrastructure hardly played a role in contrast. Also, significant differences between the media could be identified: While ARD and ZDF brought about 50% of contributions to substantive issues, this took at RTL and Sat.1 only 31 % and 38% of coverage. The messages to campaign appearances and opinion polls had contrast a much higher value in the private channels.

While it succeeded Helmut Kohl to play off the bonus of the Registrar by he showed up more often in the media ( in 37 % of all political reports) as his challenger Gerhard Schröder ( 26% of all reports), could also booked these successes. When Schröder appeared in a report, has given him much more time ( on average 30 seconds) to bring his statement to the man than Helmut Kohl was possible ( on average 19 seconds ). The party representatives of the CDU / CSU and FDP as a whole ( 89 % and 37 %) also appeared frequently in the media as the SPD (67%) and the Greens ( 34%). Posts on the PDS accounted for only 14%. The most significant difference here was again between RTL and ARD: RTL focused most on the big issues ( chancellor candidates and major parties ), while the ARD admitted this in relation the least space.

Election result

The turnout was 82.2 %.

A total of 669 seats, including 13 overhang seats (all for the SPD).

Of the parties who did not made ​​their way into the Bundestag, the Republicans (1.8%), the DVU were ( 1.2%) and the per DM (0.9% ) over the 0.5 % threshold and thus received election campaign expenses.

Election results ( detailed)

Regional differences

The SPD had their regional strongholds in Saarland - certainly attributed this to the back in the day exceptionally high popularity Lafontaine - and in Bremen, in both countries, it reached over 50%. In Bavaria, they did not even reach despite gains only 34.4 %, in Saxony despite gains 30 %, in which case the CDU 48.0 crashed to 32.7 %. The Greens were particularly successful, especially in the city states of Berlin and Bremen, each with 11.3%, weakest countries were with them Mecklenburg- Vorpommern and Saxony- Anhalt.

The Union was in its stronghold Bavaria clearly strongest force, remained there but with 47.7 % under the expected 50 X% of the votes cast. As a result, said Theo Waigel his resignation as Chairman of CSU. Best CDU country was 39.1 %, the homeland of Helmut Kohl, Rhineland -Palatinate. Especially bad cut the CDU in Berlin ( 23.7 %) and Brandenburg (20.8% ) from. The FDP had in their home countries Baden- Württemberg and Hesse with just under 9 and almost 8 % of the votes, the best results, in Brandenburg ( 2.8%) and Mecklenburg- Vorpommern (2.2% ), it was, however, very weak.

In the PDS very clear differences between East and West Germany showed. While they reached 20% or more anywhere in East Germany, she came into the West German countries not more than 2.4 % ( Bremen) addition, in the area countries do not even have 1.5% (Schleswig -Holstein and Lower Saxony). In Berlin, her result was 13 %, slightly above the arithmetic mean of Eastern and Western countries.

The right-wing parties achieved in Baden- Württemberg comparatively the most votes, which was probably due to the strong position of the Republicans who were at that time in the forthcoming state, as well as in Berlin, where Republicans and DVU were almost equal. Your best election result achieved, the DVU in Saxony- Anhalt. Low voter response had the two parties in Schleswig -Holstein and Lower Saxony.

Social and structural differences

The basic lines of social conflict ( cleavages ), which are typical of the German electoral behavior were also evident in this election. The Social Democrats achieved their best results in union -bound workers, the Christian Democrats at their previous church regularly Catholics. In both groups of voters each party reached about two-thirds of the votes. Striking in comparison to the general election in 1994 was that the SPD was able to win in all social groups voters: this was particularly pronounced for employees and self-employed in East Germany, which were both primary objectives of the new middle - election campaign. In terms of employment, the Social Democrats, however, had continued their strongest support among the workers. Only West German farmers and East German officials remained so loyal union as before. Among the West German farmers, the share of Union voters as much as 10 percentage points to 75 %.

With the exception of the Greens and the CDU in eastern Germany, which suffered massive losses in comparison with first-time and young voters, the election decisive voter walks were played out mainly in the age group from 35 years. The SPD won here much everywhere, the PDS in Eastern Germany, the CDU lost. In East Germany, the party could not even keep their traditional strongest position in the over 60 -year-old, in West Germany, this was the only age group in which she was still in front. Striking differences in the gender distribution of the votes were not observed.

Consequences of the choice

The result led first to a red-green coalition at the federal level, which included Gerhard Schröder as chancellor and Joschka Fischer as foreign minister and vice-chancellor. Gerhard Schröder was elected by the Bundestag on 27 October 1998 with 351 votes for Chancellor, although only 344 MPs of the coalition were present.

Helmut Kohl declared yet on election night his resignation from the CDU presidency, which he had held since 1973. He was succeeded in office since 1991 the CDU / CSU parliamentary group chairman Wolfgang Schäuble.

Also his resignation said the CSU chairman Theo Waigel. He was succeeded by the Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber.

To succeed Bundestag President Rita Süssmuth was elected to the inaugural session of the 14th German Bundestag on 26 October 1998 with SPD Vice Thierse first time an East German in one of the high offices of state of the Federal Republic.