Intentionality

The concept of intentionality means the ability of consciousness to refer to something (for instance to real or only imagined objects, properties or facts ). The concept can be attributed to ancient, medieval and early modern theorists and goes into the modern debate usually back to the philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano. This had re-introduced the concept in his work Psychology from an Empirical positions. Through the work of Edmund Husserl intentionality became a central concept of phenomenology.

In today's philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind, intentionality is often understood as a specific feature of the mind: Is there intentionality, so there is mental - and not only the material and scientific writable. The assumption of intentionality is, therefore, just as phenomenal consciousness or qualia, represents a problem for materialism

• 2.1 Heidegger's critique of Husserl 2.1.1 transcendence of existence
• 2.1.2 sentiment as a non- intentional relation to the world

Intentionality according to Brentano

Intentional non-existence

The concept of intentionality is a philosophical technical term and not with the everyday concept of intention as an intention, nor with the semantic notion of intension synonymous. The classical definition is Brentano:

The thesis of Brentano is that, in the intentionality is a property of the mind, which can be described "in a content relationship " or " toward an object " with the phrases. An example may clarify this relationship: The idea that there is milk in the fridge, refers to the objects fridge and milk and the fact that there is milk in the fridge. This reference to a situation, the idea can be true or false.

After Chrudzimski Brentano said to have developed this theory in his lectures to a more complex " mediator " theory. After 1900, Brentano is said to have regretted the introduction of the term " intentional inexistence ".

Intentional definition of the mental

Brentano also expressed the view that intentionality is the defining characteristic of the mental. There were no non- mental entity that possesses the feature of intentionality, and conversely, not a mental entity that does not possess the feature of intentionality. This assertion is challenged in today's philosophy often.

Namely, it is argued that there are also non-intentional mental states. For example, a general malaise or a general euphoria was entirely mental, but would not refer to anything. However, all these non-intentional mental states would have the feature of qualia. So today is often proposed as follows: intentionality and qualia are each sufficient but not necessary for the existence of the mental. Each mental state must, however, at least have intentionality or a qualitative sense as a property.

According to Husserl, intentionality

Heidegger's critique of Husserl

Transcendence of existence

Martin Heidegger rejected Husserl's concept of intentionality. Intentionality can only be based on as yet presented objects. When Husserl speaks of it namely, that sensory perception in the "present " is, then at the moment of perception is just turned off any time. This, according to Heidegger, must also appear so if one starts from a intentional approach because this does not allow later to include the time in the understanding of a phenomenon. Heidegger, however, revolves around the relationship and gives the temporality of existence, the priority: the relationship between existence ( man) and the world is always a time. Only subsequently can waive this fundamental relationship and then come to an intentionality that no longer contains the time.

Heidegger's critique of the concept of intentionality is related to his criticism of traditional ontologies, if divorced from their context, reference these objects under consideration. ( This reference context, which is determined inter alia by basal end relationships, Heidegger calls world. ) What is for example a hammer, determined only through this relationship. (Heidegger speaks of to - covers, of handiness instead of presence- and by a at hand stuff instead of an actual thing. ) In this context only is the hammer comprehensible as such: as a stuff which is used for hammers to build such a house and as protection against bad weather has to offer. This whole world is nothing, the assembling may only become apparent from individual parts, but it is the thing at hand ahead ontologically, by assigning them to speak their mind in advance. Flipped existence is always relative to this whole thing, if it accepts a single thing. Because it is the individual always exceeds Heidegger speaks also of the transcendence of existence. Exceeding the individual object with respect to the whole thing is at the same time time as well as semantically to understand. It is a condition that individual beings can meet and understood. The intentional capture of a being is therefore only possible on the basis of this transcendence - intentionality is a " special case " of the transcendence of existence. Heidegger indicates as a thesis of how the wrong heading of intentionality as the primary reference could arise to the world that here still resonates with the idea of a subject that recognizing faces in the world and perceives individual unconnected objects in space and time.

The example of the hammer, however, shows that things are involved in a referential context and this can only be understood in time: the hammer can only be understood in consideration for a future use. But this future is not "something" that no object in the world, on which one can be addressed. The future is not a "thought". This, too, would objectify them, so you could be based on them as an object. The "world" itself is done as an interweaving of present and future in human existence. Heidegger characterizes this structure context of the world and existence by being the existence as a concern and so the practical dealings with the world in the foreground, where a theoretical- only intentional follows.

Mood as a non- intentional relation to the world

Similarly, a phenomenon like the boredom - as Husserl generally postulated this for all objects - be seen as an object in the stream of consciousness. While we are when we 're bored, to things (ie objects ) " directed that pass the time. But the distress does what we feel in boredom, so, just do not understand Heidegger as directedness to an object. Much more are here moods at work. Heidegger presents the concept of intentionality, therefore, a sentiment contrary, that is, the fact that the human being is always already referred the mood and to the world as a whole. Just because we are opposite always somehow voted the world then our and the individual ( intentional detected ) things in something. Only from the whole gets a single "incident " a meaning that concerns us something and not as brute fact.

The Japanese phenomenologist Shinji Hamauzu defends Husserl against Heidegger through the inclusion of aspects that Heidegger has in his opinion overlooked in Husserl.,

Intentionality as a problem for reductionist theories

In the current philosophy of mind the phenomenon of intentionality is particularly discussed as a problem for materialism. Materialist theories assume that mental states are nothing more than physical states. Now, however, mental states have the property of intentionality, and it seems to be unclear how a physical condition can have precisely this property. An example: The idea that Herodotus was a historian, is intentional, as it relates to Herodotus and the facts that Herodotus was a historian, relates. The idea is also true, since Herodotus was actually a historian.

An attempt is now in materialist theories, due thoughts about a particular neural occurrences. But if the thought of having a brain process should be identical, so this same process must be intentional. Critics of materialism argue against the fact that this is exactly very implausible. No process in the brain seems to refer to Herodotus. Also, it seems problematic to call a neural events true or false; how should the transmission of nerve signals can be true?