Naïve realism

Naive Realism ( also Classical realism, direct realism, even common-sense realism by engl. Commonsense realism ) is a specific position in the philosophical theory of knowledge, specifically the theory of perception. According to her, the things are substantially as they appear to us. The yellow color comes about to an object itself and is not an effect of our perception. Figuratively speaking, the perceiver adopts a passive-receiving role, while the functions to impose things were.

Naive Realism in the 20th and 21st centuries

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Naïve realism was hardly represented in philosophy, because, inter alia, Bertrand Russell had come in the wake of Berkeley and Hume convincing arguments acting against him.

Variants of the naive realism were, inter alia, represented by John Dewey, William James, Austin, Searle, John McDowell, partly Husserl and Wittgenstein and Putnam.

Searle speaks of a genetic fallacy: So many constructivists are of the opinion that a causal explanation for the genesis of perception, the complicated brain processes describes the naive realism refute. But: " The fact that our knowledge / idea / image of reality of human brains is constructed in human interactions, that the reality of which we have knowledge / idea / image, created from human brains in human interactions were not followed, is. ( There is also a problem with the human brains and human interaction itself Shall they, too, have been constructed by human interactions? ) The final of the collective neurophysiological causal explanation of our knowledge of the external world is on the non-existence of the external world just a non sequitur, a genetic fallacy. "

George Edward Moore is often mentioned in the new philosophy as a prominent representative of the flow; he summarizes the naive realism so on: "I can now, for example, prove that two human hands exist. How? By high I raise both hands, with the right hand make a certain gesture and say, 'Here is a hand ' and then adding, where I make a certain gesture with the left hand, Here's one more '. And if I, by doing so, have ipso facto proved the existence of external conditions, you will all understand that I can do it on a variety of other ways; it is superfluous to amass more example. "