Pseudoscience

Pseudoscience (Greek ψεύδω, pseudo, " I pretend " ) is a term for assertions, teachings, theories, practices, and institutions that claim to be science, but do not meet standards of science. The term is used both analytical- descriptive and pejorative.

Many popular proposals for a rough definition come in at least two points coincide:

Both these two conditions as well as its further indications, however, are controversial. Such a minimal definition allowed but at least the demarcation to different kind of ideas or theories, for example:

The further specification of the criteria of valid research methods is a question whose answer options were discussed controversially in the epistemological debate in recent decades. Be performed in the field, for example, institutionalized research criteria such as: falsifiability, intersubjective verifiability or openness to correction options. On criteria for the award of pseudo-sciences are discussed, for example: systematic foreclosure of refutation and criticism, not rationally justified selectivity against empirical data Represented a closed alternative instead of a gradual extension of existing theory and research practice.

• 4.1 Reference Books
• 4.2 Reference
• 4.3 popular science fiction books
• 4.4 Article

Conceptual history and philosophy of science proposals to the definition

Emergence of the concept

The the term " pseudoscience " corresponding English term " pseudoscience" can be already found in English publications in the first third of the 19th century. An early use of the term is also found in a French text at the physiologist and member of the Paris Academy of Sciences François Magendie. He described 1843 phrenology as "a pseudo-science of today." " Scientific and pseudo - Scientific Realism" and " Science and Pseudo- Science" - - 1887, the term of Thomas Huxley in two essays is used. Huxley, an ardent defender of Darwinian theory of evolution and at this time a former president of the Royal Society, continues in these essays critical of certain non-causal conceptions of the nature of scientific laws apart. Such views were expressed by opponents of the theory of evolution, but also in the book Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation - an early, before Darwin published " On the Origin of Species" publication that were represented in the evolution of ideas. For Huxley such a non-causal law of nature theory is connected with pseudo-science: law within the meaning of some active " Indeed, the continued use of the word " " almost the signing of a pseudo - science. Such usage is characteristic of the writings of those who adhere to the outer shape of the science, but have no idea of their being. "

Karl Popper: Nichtfalsifizierbarkeit and reinforced dogmas

The coinage of the term in the discussion of the philosophy of science of the 20th century goes back to Karl Popper. Popper had occupied himself by his own admission in 1919 with the issue of pseudoscience. It was him doing it, to characterize the science in regard to the question of what distinguishes it from pseudoscience. His answer was that anyone who proposes a scientific theory should give an answer to the question under what conditions he would be willing to admit their untenability. He did not consider the question of the truth of priority. Also lack of exactness or measurability were not his main problem. It has rather felt intuitively that there theories, who performed as a science, but had in fact more in common with myth than with science. As examples of pseudoscience Popper called Marxism, psychoanalysis, individual psychology and astrology, as a counterexample Einstein's theory of relativity. Only later extended Popper this demarcation criterion on the general problem of demarcation between on the one hand the empirical- scientific and other, especially the metaphysical, but also the philosophical, mathematical, mythological, religious and pseudo-scientific statements.

Thus, the criterion of demarcation treated at Popper only the advantageous features of scientific statements - their empirical falsifiability - a feature that is absent of pseudoscience. William Warren Bartley saw but in terms of Popper's concept of pseudo-science is a second criterion, which accounts for their significant adverse property: the criterion of enhanced / intensified dogmas or the " reinforced dogmatism ". It characterizes theories - not only to questions of science, but also to questions of ethics, politics, etc., include the built-in strategies for automatic immunization against criticism. What such theories make attractive, is above all their seemingly comprehensive explanatory power for everything that was in their viewing room. The study of such theories have the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation. The reader seemed to the eyes to new truths to open that remained hidden " uninitiated ". "Infidels " appeared as people who refused to acknowledge this truth. A particular characteristic of such theories describing Popper, that there was a steady stream of verifications for them. Each new case is read in the light of previous " experience " and thus seen as further evidence of the correctness of the theory. This makes it clear that the apparent strength of these theories - the all-encompassing explanatory power - in truth was their weakness.

Popper treated in his major work The Logic of Scientific (1935 ) only the Falsifzierbarkeitskriterium; the problem of the characterization of the pseudo-science comes in not available. For the philosopher Hans Jürgen Wendel yet metaphysics and pseudo-science with regard to the distinction to empirical sciences appear in a commentary on the logic of research " at least related, partially perhaps even identical, and therefore to be problematic for similar reasons. " He is of the opinion that happened narrowed down to the problem of metaphysics primarily due to the discussions with the Vienna Circle, the publication took place in its environment. Popper later admitted that he had gone out in the transcript of the " logic of research" assumes that nichtfalsifizierbare theories can not be discussed rationally, and admitted that he had changed his mind on this point.

Criticism of the falsifiability criterion

After widespread positions pseudo science is always accompanied with a non- scientific, non- scientific turn with a lack of falsifiability: Empirical findings can not make it appear as a false theory. And the various epistemological currents of analytic philosophy is the demarcation of science partially reference is made to one adapted to the particular epistemological direction version of the concept of " falsifiability ".

The philosopher of science Imre Lakatos refused such a falsifiability criterion to distinguish between science and pseudo-science, but rather a practical, since on theoretical grounds. Usually, it is considered an exegetical mistake to ascribe such a falsifiability, Karl Popper. The usability as a criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo- science is exegetical and thematically questionable, since the criterion can only distinguish between empirical- scientific and non - empirical- scientific theories. (In Karl Popper's Supercritical rationalism on the other hand, as explained, a theory pseudoscientific when it appears from the appearances forth as a scientific theory, but includes reinforced dogmas. This means that there is no way to criticize the doctrine as it to is designed to re-interpret any criticism in their favor or to reject. a possible form of such strategies are conspiracy theories that reject any criticism as a forgery and propaganda of the conspirators. way each analytical result, each empirical result, any criticism only as a corroborative evidence be considered such a thesis. During any theory can be immunized by unscientific approach with ad hoc hypotheses, forcing increased dogmas so even for immunization when they are placed in a scientific, critical and rational context. )

Larry Laudan holds the criterion of falsifiability to be appropriate as it was too indulgent: This would make any outlandish assertion of astrologers, creationists or whomever scientifically as long as would only specify which observation they would acknowledge as a refutation of their theory. For Richard McNally, the falsifiability criterion is also useless to accrual purposes, since a large number of those considered pseudo-scientific theories is quite falsifiable, already refuted. On the other hand, met some established scientific theories are not the Falsifikationskriterium or other demarcation criteria. Contradiction to receive such reviews, for example, by Michael Ruse. Ruse criticized in a reply to L. Laudan, that in such counter-arguments, the falsifiability criterion will misunderstood. Neither it was intended as the sole criterion, but always together with other methodological criteria, and also the falsifiability is also only of empirical sciences required, but not, for example, mathematics and logic.

Not testability

Other proposals make reference to the notion of " verifiability ", which is more in the tradition of Rudolf Carnap. However, Carnap himself has noted that empirical verifiability only a necessary, but does not constitute a sufficient criterion for science. It only limit potentially scientific and cognitively meaningless sentences from each other. The latter is meaningless to him, and can therefore neither false nor true ( in Carnap's diction also " pseudo-statements ", " metaphysical propositions "). Typical pseudo-scientific hypotheses about from astrology, Carnap, however, considered as a cognitive sense, but not scientific.

In this direction go also proposals to keep the simple impossibility of empirical confirmation as a criterion for pseudo-sciences. Conversely, the confirmation of a theory by evidence and the expertise of the researchers criteria for good science, for example, Martin Gardner.

The definition of pseudoscience by injuring those criteria for the confirmation ("Test " ) scientific theories are constitutive is directed inversely to the problems to work out a manageable and theoretically precise notion of confirmation. Especially since the 1960s, an attempt is already wissenserweiternder of David Hume classically formulated problem syllogisms (so-called problem of induction ) to supply a satisfactory answer. Numerous science theorists consider this problem in the form provided for unlosbär, keep it but replaced by the question of a pragmatic or statistical elaboration of the concept of confirmation of a theory (see also abduction, closing to the best explanation ). In addition, the wide variety of methodologies are proposed for the theoretical reconstruction of scientific knowledge and methods.

For example, even disputed whether a "conservative" attitude of just conducting theory is justified with respect, even when many verification attempts fail. Thomas Samuel Kuhn had very prominently, that the history of detachment of different theories is not just influenced by rational arguments, but "Strategies of Massenüberredung " and that this should be necessary so as an objective comparison of competing theories Plausibiltität is often impossible in principle, because these theories themselves associated inter alia with different conventions about what can be considered a confirmation or refutation ( the bundle of all of these factors is well with Kuhn in the term " paradigm "). As part of the so-called epistemological structuralism, as he was drafted by Sneed et al, Stegmüller has attempted to reconstruct central shares this view. Since theories in this methodological framework is not understood as a set of sentences, a failed verification test is not in direct contradiction to a theory, but can be treated, for example so that the system to which the theory has been applied, just not in the quantity of this theory " intended applications " part. Since theories are linked by inter- theoretical relations with each other in the epistemological structuralism ( " theory of networks"), a rational comparison between different theories according to a scientific revolution at least take place retrospectively, by " block matching " the structure of nuclei even in the case when one expression -to -term comparison because incommensurable between the individual expressions of the different theories is no longer possible.

In any case, however, as stated, the reverse is not everything by an overwhelming majority opinion of what such scientific theoretical elaborations of the terms relates to checking, confirmation of scientific rationality or methodology, already pseudo-science, but must this example, with the aim of science occur or any additional criteria. meet

Criteria pluralism

Paul R. Thagard suggests the presence of factors theory, research community and historical context in order to characterize science. His proposed definition is: " A theory or a discipline that purports to be scientific if and only pseudo-scientific, if it has made ​​less progress for a long time as alternative theories and faces many unsolved problems, but if the community of practice working scientists little attempt is taking to further develop the theory that solves these problems, and if that community does little concern to evaluate the theory against alternative theories for comparison, and if that community is very selective about what they consider as affirmations and what Bust considered. "

Vaguer definitions: family resemblance of Sciences

To some extent, the distinction between science and non-science by means of sharp criteria, which are both necessary and sufficient for actual or declared impossible in principle. A moderate alternative to such Präzisierungsversuchen is to stick to the term, but to capture its vagueness by being understood as based on the model of family resemblance relations or as a range of a spectrum with only clearly definable extremes.

Science is then alternatively interpreted for example as a generic term which can only be described by the concept of family resemblance. This term originates from Ludwig Wittgenstein and tries to respond to the problem of vagueness of type terms. If three objects a, b, c are only " family -like", including the case may be, that there may be common features between a and b and between b and c, without that there must be common features between a and c. Wittgenstein's examples thereof include the very divergent types of games: It's hard to name features board games, board games, etc. are jointly necessary and to be sufficient to individuate games as such. This has a certain resemblance to the so-called prototype semantics, according to which we understand, for example, as a bird, which is similar to what we have come to know as a typical example for birds ( say, a sparrow ). Analog could it behave for science: there is, in the extreme case, neither necessary nor sufficient Kritieren that something counts as science, but relations of the family resemblance between individual sciences or close to typical prototype.

Sven Ove Hansson, the Swedish philosopher understands the term pseudoscience within a spectrum, the "scientific" " unscientific " by over to " pseudo-scientific " and "non - scientific" enough. Unscientific in this context means the conflict with the recognized facts, non- scientific waiving any rational and empirical claim. From pseudo-science can only speak according to this understanding, if a lesson is presented, which is in conflict with a research oriented to rational and empirical criteria. In this case, individual elements easily take scientific findings, or at least presented as such. When teachings that do completely without rational- scientific knowledge, it is, however, to non-science. Examples thereof include Hansson's religion or esoteric. The part of the spectrum, which describes a conflict with the recognized theories, can receive very different phenomena: fakes, technically inadequate science or unorthodox and even innovative theories, but in the scientific community can not prevail.

Alan Sokal defines pseudoscience as an idea or complex reasoning that:

These include, according to Sokal's definition also statements about the world that are part of the doctrines of many religions. Also, would Sokal some - but not all - of pseudo-sciences:

• Describe yourself as being scientifically;
• Their claims to the real science socialize, especially on the latest scientific findings;
• Up is not an isolated statement, but rather a complex and logically coherent system, which claims to explain a variety of alleged phenomena;
• Their " experts " a long process of training and accreditation undergo.

Similar Hansson and Sokal Philip Kitcher sees a continuum between evidence-based science and pseudoscience; fixed demarcation criteria are unnecessary anyway.

Indeterminacy of the term

The philosopher of science Larry Laudan criticizes the concept of pseudo-science. It will be used mainly for the purpose of classification and exclusion, but do not sound rational or intersubjectively. A specific definition is possible. When these but only serve to justify the inclusion or exclusion of certain disciplines, so this is a science of other purpose. Therefore, a clear dividing line between science and non-science or between science and pseudoscience admit it actually has not, because no proposal " would obtain the consent of a majority of the philosophers ." Laudan calls to no longer use the term pseudo-science. He was a " hollow phrase ," the only expressions of our feelings.

The British psychology professor Richard McNally (Harvard, Newcastle), which addresses itself to the criticism of marginal therapeutic approaches, the concept of pseudo-science deems useless to clear demarcations in advance. The term has little analytical content. To define the concept by the falsifiability he considers for the reasons stated for unusable. Concrete doubted theories should be simply tested for logical or empirical weaknesses and, where appropriate criticized.

Some thought that speaking out against the fact that crisp criteria are be specified and conclude to give up the notion of pseudo-science, are accused by some opponents of inconsistency, because it will indeed denied that one could use a judgmental term as pseudo science, but it would nevertheless, qualitative assessments made. Let us try some to avoid a slide into relativism by 'll distinction between " good " and " bad " science. GA Reisch argues that, in a judgment of " bad science " ultimately implied a demarcation would be arranged. This would be an over demarcation criteria, but rather a so-called Netzwerkdemarkation as they had already been proposed by Otto Neurath.

John L. Casti is in his book loss of Truth ( Original: Paradigms Lost, 1989) the following characteristics of pseudo-sciences, which are also cited by Massimo Pigliucci in his book Nonsense on Stilts (2010):

• Anachronistic thinking. Pseudo-scientific theories are often long since been disproved by science.
• Search for secrets. Subject of pseudo-scientific theories are often bizarre phenomena like UFOs, yetis, spontaneous combustions, etc.
• Relying on myths. The older a fairy tale, the more probative value it has.
• Careless handling of the evidence. Confirmations are cited, ignored rebuttals.
• Irrefutable hypotheses. Pseudo-scientific hypotheses are often not verifiable, because nothing can speak against them (example: creationism ).
• Apparent similarities. Pseudo-scientific theories often use items was accepted, occupied theories and interpret them in order (example: biorhythms ).
• Statement by scenario. Instead of facts to design possible scenarios, design pseudo- scientists often scenarios without evidence base ( for examples, see Immanuel Velikovsky ).
• Research by interpretation. Pseudo- scientists like to claim any scientific statement of fact is a matter of interpretation.
• Refusal of Audit. Pseudo scientists consider it mistaken for a sign of quality that their theories over a long time remain unchanged. The reason is that they are immune to criticism.

Demarcation

The para-science differs from pseudoscience by the fact that only legitimate doubts about the scientific nature exist with her. Most of them relate to unclear, rare and controversial anomalies, which are indeed explained by a scientific theory, the theory, however far-fetched after the state of research and implausible appears. Often there are phenomena for which no established explanations have yet been found.

In junk science in contrast to pseudoscience a conscious and deliberate deception is carried out and represented a lesson from political, religious or financial intentions. This is interest-driven arguments of Nimbus and the credibility of the scientific method are given. It also often taken data out of context or even falsified or other dishonest methods are used to represent one's own position advantageous or otherwise devalue positions.

Most religions or esoteric or "spiritual" teachings make no ( unredeemed ) scientific claim. Their teachings and philosophies are therefore extent this is the case, not commonly referred to as pseudo-sciences (unlike eg Sokal, see above). A borderline case is when religious statements are content in direct conflict to scientific theories, without itself being supported by scientific methods ( but rely, for example, to a higher authority as divine revelation or enlightenment experiences).

" Cargo Cult Science " is a term coined by Richard Feynman. The term is meant a lack of scientific integrity label that occurs as opposed to pseudo-science in the scientific enterprise itself. This refers for example to the uncritical citation of foreign research results and the unexamined presupposition of their correctness, or on the acquisition of a partial result, but essential conditions for its occurrence are ignored. The term is a metaphorical parallel education to the ethnological concept of cargo cult, he is a practical feature which, while working methodically correct or superficially delivers consistent results, but has become meaningless.

Proto science or advance science called theories that have no scientific nature, their representatives, however, such an aim and try to rectify the problematic elements so that scientific statements in the future be possible. At the opening of an entirely new field of research is this generally a period of time in this state.

Some scientific theories that are now accepted, was accused by the then scientists to be pseudoscientific, irrational or obviously wrong. Today recognized sciences so often went through a precursor as proto- science. Often was actually a potentially viable core science with pseudo-scientific, religious or ideological elements interwoven, so that only gradually began to crystallize a scientific core. It is essential to distinguish between pseudoscience and science Proto that the latter has the potential to evolve according to all criteria of each acknowledged state of the science. Examples of theories that were described by contemporaries as pseudo-sciences, include the theory of the big bang or black holes, continental drift, the electromagnetic fields, germs as pathogens, meteorites or modern psychiatry.

The term in the skeptic movement

Since the 1960s there - mainly in industrialized countries - the so-called skeptics movement that has popularized the term. A popular use of the term is found in its related authors such as Richard Dawkins, Mario Bunge, Carl Sagan and James Randi. These authors consider pseudoscience to be harmful and understand advocacy as a discharge of political interests or as deliberate deception for financial gain. In extreme cases, they see a health and safety hazard posed by the proliferation of these theories and practices; for example in the case of a medical or psychiatric treatment or in the assessment of security risks.

Even within the skeptic movement, the term " pseudoscience " controversial. The sociologist Edgar Wunder, a founding member of GWUP and temporary executive editorial director of the magazine published by her " skeptics ", turned sharply against tendencies towards 'actually existing ' Skeptiker' Movement ". In a text entitled " The skeptics syndrome " he criticized the pejorative connotation of the term " pseudoscience ": " The chosen in terms of discourse are for those ' skeptics ' are also typical: it is judgmental from the start to defamatory terms (for example ' superstition ', ' Humbug ', ' pseudo-science ', ' charlatans ', ' sects ', ' PSI exponent ' - as a term for parapsychologists - and many others), not to largely descriptive- analytic terms [ ... ]. "