Signalling theory

The term signaling communication between individuals is studied. A central question here is, under what circumstances signals can be honest or dishonest.

Signalingtheorien also find application in economics, see Signalling ( economics).

History

Early behavioral biologists such as Nikolaas Tinbergen assumed that honest signals in nature are widespread and natural selection produces honest and cost- low-level signals. This was the dominant view, to Richard Dawkins and John Krebs in 1978 argued that honest signals would have to be rare, since the interests of two individuals never match exactly. Signals might instead be the result of an arms race between manipulative transmitters and receivers suspicious. This idea was very influential. In contrast, Amotz Zahavi 1975 had proposed that honest signals are possible if they are associated with high costs for the transmitter (handicap principle). Zahavi's theory has been controversial; next to Dawkins and cancer a few years earlier had already argued Maynard Smith on the other hand. Many biologists were skeptical of Zahavi's theory, as frugal individuals could dispense with costly signals and instead use resources for reproduction.

In biology, this controversy continued for some time. The economics, meantime, was far ahead due to the use of models. In the 1970s, for example, could the plausibility of Thorstein Veblen's idea of ​​the validity of consumption, a costly and therefore honest signal are shown. Jack Hirshleifer hit 1977 before importing the model of costly signaling in biology. Biologists Count Alan, Charles Godfray and Andrew Pomiankowski later proven that Zahavi's approach could work.

However, honest signals need not be expensive. Maynard Smith showed that if sufficient interest overlap no reason for dishonest signals would. However, even in cases of conflict may be evolutionarily stable honest, cost low-level signals.

Examples

When a male is courting a female, its signals are a reliable indicator of its quality, or he is exaggerating, to win the females for himself, that would be gained from honest signals of another male?

If an animal is in a conflict of aggressive signals to the strength of these signals is a reliable indicator of the likelihood of the attack, or is it an exaggeration to deter the other animal?

If a descendant of the parents begging for food, this reflects its actual needs, or he exaggerates to get more food?