Tragedy of the commons

Tragedy of the commons (English tragedy of the commons ), tragedy of the commons, Allmendeklemme or the Commons refers to a social science and evolutionary theoretical model, according to the freely available but limited resources are not used efficiently and are threatened by over-exploitation, which also threatens the users themselves.

• 2.1 Elinor Ostrom
• 2.2 Game Theory and Social Psychology

Conceptual history

The literal term tragedy of the commons is attributed among other considerations by William Forster Lloyd (1795-1852) on population growth. It goes back to the rights of the commoners - individual farmers, who jointly managed the Kroneigentum (especially shepherds who pasture used together ). The German translation is derived from the well-known since the Middle Ages economic form commons.

Garrett Hardin

The ecologist Garrett Hardin microbiologist and extended the term in 1968 in an essay for the journal Science under the title The Tragedy of the Commons. The tragedy of the commons is an inevitable fate of humanity for which there is no technological solution according to Hardin. H. Scott Gordon wrote in 1954 on the example of fishing: "No one measures a property that is free for all, a value at, because everyone who is foolhardy enough to wait until he comes to the series, finally finds that another has already taken away his part. " Hardin, as it sees itself in the tradition of Robert Malthus, the notion of extended metaphor for overpopulation and demanded, among other things, a global birth control.

According to Hardin will, as soon as a resource to all people available without limitation, any attempt to generate income for themselves as much as possible. This works as long as the item is not exhausted. However, once the number of users rises above a certain level, grab the tragedy of the commons: everyone still trying to maximize his earnings. Now the Good but not more rich for all. The costs that would be incurred by the over-exploitation, the community wear. For the individual, the instantaneous profit is much higher than the long term only obvious cost. But ultimately everyone wear at both the own and the ruin of the community. "Freedom in the commons brings ruin to all ," said Hardin's conclusion.

Joachim Radkau

Joachim Radkau finds the terminology in a number of writings that discussed an alleged or actual Allmendeproblem since the 18th century. Radkau names the almost proverbial used " dry Allmendekuh " the Aristotelian polemic against the Platonic polis as a continuous argument of the agrarian reformers. So he quotes Aristotle as saying that " the good that is common to the greatest number, the least care bestowed is " to abolish the traditional peasant communal ownership.

According Radkau the use of the commons has to do in economics with the actual, well -functioning and ecologically interesting little commons. The main motivation in economics he sees in the early days as an ideological turn against traditional forms of common property and an increasing, based on private property rationalization of agriculture, later reversed in the demand for international rigid restrictions on the use of resources.

Theory of evolution

Finally, the model is also used in evolutionary theory application as a possible explanation for Evolutionary Suicide.

The model in economics

Goods, their use of other potential buyers are not excludable, but rival the use of claims of customers are referred to in economics as common goods.

Standing in a world of scarce resources rival goods completely free, so at a price of zero (→ commons ), so rationing during the waiting period is set in the rule. The result is a resource- consuming appropriation competition where everyone is trying to be the first.

Examples of the problematic use of natural resources, where no exclusive property rights are defined:

• Overfishing of the oceans
• Looting of wild animal populations and forests, especially in developing countries ( exploitation )
• Use of the atmosphere as a sink for air pollutants with air pollution as a result.

A solution to this social dilemma consists in the definition of property rights under state control or regulation of scarce resources, such as by catch quotas or emission rights trading.

Elinor Ostrom

Elinor Ostrom looked at in a much-publicized book Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action ( German Title: Governing the Commons Beyond state and market. ) The tragedy of the commons from an institutional economic perspective. According to her, working solutions of Allmendeproblems at local common pool based often that the affected individuals manage the resource through an appropriate institution that is based on the self-organization of those involved. For the realization of a corresponding agreement on both a credible commitment by the parties involved as well as the establishing of effective control options is necessary. Such institutional arrangements at the community or co-operative level are often more successful than central government control or privatization resulting from market mechanisms, because could be used locally available knowledge.

There are from Ostrom's view, therefore, more solutions to the Allmendeproblem, as Hardin, but also the traditional economic theory has generally been proposed. In particular, should the scope of the theory, which was conceived out of Hardin's article, are being reassessed. Between the extremes of state model (with a " benevolent dictator " ) on the one hand and business model ( with a profit-maximizing entrepreneur ) on the other hand, there is in reality a variety of collective forms of use, which are taken into account.

Game Theory and Social Psychology

Examines this behavior pattern is also from the game theory. It will be investigated, among others, the question of why individuals despite the high cost of individual social norms stabilize in many cases by altruistic sanctions. Social psychology also shows maxim -based, so do not purpose- confidence as a possible solution.