Bryan Caplan

Bryan Caplan ( born April 8, 1971) is an American economist. He is a professor at the Department of Economics at George Mason University in Fairfax (Virginia ) and free research fellow at the Cato Institute. He is best known for his theory of irrational voting behavior in a democracy, which was presented with The Myth of the Rational Voter (2007) to a wider audience.

Life

Caplan graduated in 1993 his B. A. in Economics at the University of California, Berkeley from. His Ph.D. He graduated in 1997 from Princeton University. Since then, he has been a professor at George Mason University.

Work

Caplan focuses on Public Economics, Public Choice, behavioral economics, public opinion research, household theory, and the Austrian School. He also made ​​contributions to the theories of the market economy and of anarcho capitalism. Caplan operates on its website Anarcho Capitalism FAQ and a museum of communism, in which it historically, economically and philosophically analyzed communism and its documented human rights violations and crimes.

The Myth of the Rational Voter

Important parts of his previous work processed Caplan 2007 on the book The Myth of the Rational Voter. In it, he uses the concept of rational irrationality, in conjunction with empirical findings to widespread in public systematic misperceptions of economic issues to explain policy failure. Based on the results of a survey of 1,510 U.S. citizens and 250 doctoral economists Caplan identifies four types of systematic misconceptions economy less scientifically educated people:

  • The tendency to underestimate the economic benefits of labor savings ( make- work bias)
  • The tendency to underestimate the economic benefits of interaction with foreigners ( anti -foreign bias)
  • The tendency to overestimate the severity of economic problems and underestimate the economic performance of the past, present and future ( Pessimistic bias)
  • The tendency to underestimate the benefits of the market mechanism ( anti -market bias)

Caplan shows that the views of economists have neither political nor acquis -preserving reasons. Caplan calculated econometrically that instead significantly reduce the systematic misjudgments a longer or economics education of the average voter. Since the chance to influence the election with one voice, is extremely small, and under the assumption that people have preferences for certain views, regardless of their veracity, resulting in a democracy suboptimal economic decisions. The logic can be divided into the following inequality summarized as follows:

(Benefits of an economically correct choice decision) x (probability that one's vote decisively influenced the election results ) <( benefit of maintained by voting psychologically satisfying systematic misjudgment )

Other policy areas, where public opinion systematically differs from that of experts (eg natural sciences) were, according to the same logic also negatively affected. Without making concrete proposals for implementation, Caplan concludes that more decisions from the policy should be outsourced, because people as producers and consumers of rational and responsible behavior than as voters. The inequality sees the actor on the market different than in the election:

(Benefits of an economically correct decision) > (benefits of action according to the psychologically satisfying systematic misjudgment )

Reception

The Myth of the Rational Voter was described by journalist Nicholas D. Kristof of the New York Times as the best political book of the year. The Financial Times it was one of the best books of 2007.

  • Selfish Reasons to Have More Kids: Why Being a Great Parent Is Less Work and More Fun Than You Think. Basic Books, 2011. ISBN 0 - 465-01867 -X.
  • The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton University Press, 2007. ISBN 0-691-12942-8.

Scientific Publications

  • "The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations. " April 1999. Southern Economic Journal 65 (4), 823-838.
  • " Rational Irrationality: A Framework for the Neoclassical - Behavioral Debate. " Spring 2000. Eastern Economic Journal 26 ( 2), 191-211.
  • " When Is Two Better Than One? How Federalism Mitigates and Amplifies Imperfect Political Competition. " April 2001. Journal of Public Economics 80 ( 1), 99-119.
  • " Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality. " 2001. Kyklos 54 (1), 3-26. ( Editorial )
  • "Has Been Leviathan Bound? A Theory of Imperfectly Constrained Government with Evidence from the States. " April 2001. Southern Economic Journal 67 ( 4), 825-847.
  • " Libertarianism Against Economism: How Economists Misunderstand Voters and Why Libertarians Should Care " Spring 2001. Independent Review 5 ( 4), 539-563.
  • " Rational Irrationality and the Micro Foundations of Political Failure. " June 2001. Public Choice 107 ( 3/4), 311-331.
  • "Probability, Common Sense, and Realism: A Reply to Hülsmann and Block. " Summer of 2001. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 4 ( 2), 69-86.
  • "Standing Tiebout on His Head. Tax Capitalization and the Monopoly Power of Local Governments " July 2001. Public Choice 108 ( 1/2), 101-122.
  • " What Makes People Think Like Economists? Evidence on Economic Cognition from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. " October 2001. Journal of Law and Economics 44 ( 2), 395-426.
  • " How Does War Shock the Economy? " 2002nd Journal of International Money and Finance 21, 145-162.
  • " Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: . Robust Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy " April 2002. Economic Journal 112 ( 479), 433-458.
  • " Sociotropes, Systematic Bias, and Political Failure: Reflections on the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. " June 2002. Social Science Quarterly 83 ( 2), 416-435.
  • " Stigler -Becker versus Myers -Briggs: Why Preference -Based Explanations Are Scientifically Meaningful and empirically Important. " April 2003. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 50 ( 4), 391-405. ( Editorial )
  • " The Logic of Collective Belief. " May 2003. Rationality and Society 15 ( 2), 218-42.
  • " The Idea Trap:. The Political Economy of Growth Divergence " June 2003. European Journal of Political Economy 19 ( 2), 183-203.
  • "Probability and the Synthetic A Priori: A Reply to Block. " Fall of 2003. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 6 ( 3), 61-7.
  • " Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Cooperation. " ( with Edward Stringham ), December 2003. Review of Austrian Economics 16 ( 4), 309-26.
  • " Is Socialism Really ' Impossible '? " 2004th Critical Review 16 ( 1), 33-52.
  • " Do We Underestimate the Benefits of Cultural Competition? " ( with Tyler Cowen ) May 2004. American Economic Review 94 (2), 402-7.
  • " Mises, Bastiat, Public Opinion, and Public Choice: What's Wrong With Democracy" ( with Edward Stringham ). January 2005. Review of Political Economy 17 ( 1), 79-105.
  • "From Friedman to Wittman: The Transformation of Chicago Political Economy. " April 2005. Econ Journal Watch 2 ( 1), 1-21. ( Editorial )
  • " Rejoinder to Wittman: True Myths. " August 2005. Econ Journal Watch 2 ( 2), 165-85.
  • "Toward a New Consensus on the Economics of Socialism: Rejoinder to My Critics. " 2005. Critical Review 17 ( 1/2), pp.203 - 20th
  • " Terrorism: The Relevance of the Rational Choice Model. " July 2006. Public Choice 128 ( 1/2), 91-107.
  • " The Economics of Szasz: . Preferences, constraints, and Mental Illness " August 2006. Rationality and Society 18 ( 3), 333-66.
  • "How Do Voters form Positive Economic Beliefs? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy. " September 2006. Public Choice 128 ( 3/4), 367-81.
  • " Behavioral Economics and Perverse Effects of the Welfare State " (with Scott Beaulier ). November 2007 Kyklos 60 (4):. 485-507.
  • " Mises ' Democracy - Dictatorship Equivalence Theorem. " March 2008. Review of Austrian Economics 21 ( 1), 45-59.
  • " Privatizing the Adjudication of Disputes " (with Edward Stringham ). 2008th Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (2): 503-528.
  • " Reply to My Critics. " 2008. Critical Review 20 ( 3), 377-413.
  • " Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the Miracle of Aggregation. " Winter 2009. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 ( 1), 198-211.
  • "The Literature of Nonviolent Resistance and Civilian -Based Defense. " In 1994. Humane Studies Review 9 ( 1), 1-7, 10-12.
  • " Autocratic Ghosts and Chinese Hunger: A Review Essay of autocratic tradition and Chinese Politics by Zhengyuan Fu and Hungry Ghosts by Jasper Becker. " 2000th Independent Review 4 ( 3), 431-38.
  • "? Have Been Weighed the Experts, Measured, and Found Wanting " ( Review Essay on Philip Tetlock 's Expert Political Judgment: ? How Good Is It How Can We Know) 2007th Critical Review 19 ( 1), 80-91.
  • " Economists Versus the Public on Economic Policy, " " Rational Ignorance, " and " Rational Irrationality " in Rowley, Charles, and Friedrich Schneider ( eds. ): 2004, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. . Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • " Frederic Bastiat, " "Competition, " " Libertarian, " " Fascism, " and " Ayn Rand " in Syed Hussain (ed. ): 2004 Encyclopedia of Capitalism. . NY: Facts on File.
  • " Ayn Rand and Public Choice: The Obvious Parallels, " in Edward Younkins (ed. ): 2007th Ayn Rand's "Atlas Shrugged ": A Philosophical and Literary Companion. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, pp.225 -34.
  • " Communism " and " Externalities " in David Henderson ( ed.): 2008, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.. Indianapolis, IN, 66-9, 169-72.
  • "The Totalitarian Threat " in Nick Bostrum and Milan Ćirković (eds. ): Global Catastrophic Risks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 504-519.
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