Critique of Practical Reason

Critique of Practical Reason ( KpV ) is the title of the second major work of Immanuel Kant; it is also called " second review " means ( according to the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Critique of Judgment ), and first appeared in 1788 in Riga.

The KpV contains Kant's theory of moral reasoning and is still regarded as one of the most important works of practical philosophy at all.

Practical reason

The concerns of KpV is the answer to the second major question of reason: What should I do? - The Practical Philosophy of Kant has in contrast to the question of what we can know, the question of doing good to the object.

First, Kant proves that freedom and autonomy are possible. Although the idea of ​​freedom at the beginning of the thought process can not be "recognized", it is still useful to "accept " freedom. In the course of reasoning is shown by the provisionally adopted freedom then that it has a basis in the moral law.

If the will is not determined autonomously, man is not free, since it is then passed through instincts and passions (or domination ). This difference between duty and inclination is central to the KpV. The moral duty is the basis of freedom.

The categorical imperative

Kant derives the principles of morality directly from human reason from, rather than from a divine provision. The core of the KpV is the doctrine of the categorical imperative, which embodies a mark of morality strict generalizability of personal principles of action ( maxim ). The categorical imperative is described by Kant as a moral law or moral law, in the KpV he calls him " fundamental law of pure practical reason" and formulated:

" Act so that the maxim of your will at any time could also be considered as a universal law. "

Morally good action is, according to Kant, acting according to the categorical imperative. Man is free as rational beings and can act according to principles of reason. This ability is able to overcome the instinct - driven activity and pleasurable as well as an act of pragmatic or tactical motives.

Derivation of the moral law

The principles of practical reason are either subjective maxims that can claim to own will be valid or objective laws that are relevant to every rational will. Specifies the reason itself completely the will of the derived therefrom objectively necessary principle is a categorical imperative.

Subjective intent provisions of desire have empirical character, because their basic formation is the desired subjective relation to the object of reality. In accordance with these provisions will, it is not possible to prepare for every valid undertaking in the form of a general law. Practical universal laws of pure reason, whose objective necessity a priori is recognized, therefore, can refer only to a merely formal determination of will. The pure reason compels the freedom of all causality will to undertake a general law, the moral law. The mere form of general legislation therefore determined the autonomous will.

Man has an autonomous rational beings the ability of immediate knowledge of his will and rises in the practical reason of his empirical character and its dependence on the outside world. He is free in his actions according to moral principles.

Important issues

• Immanuel Kant: Critic of practischen reason. Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, Riga 1788, and digitized full text in German Text Archive. (292 pp., reprint Erlangen 1984).
• Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. In: Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. Critique of Judgment. Edited by Paul Natorp. Georg Reimer, Berlin 1908 ( = Kant's collected writings. Published by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 1st Division, 5th band ), pp. 1-163.
• Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. Edited by Joachim Kopper, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1961, passim ( = Loeb Classical Library No. 1111-13, later No. 1111).
• Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason. Edited by Horst D. Brandt and Heiner F. clamp, Meiner, Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3-7873-1650-7 ( = Philosophical Library 506).