CSX 8888 incident

When CSX 8888 incident, also known as "Crazy Eights " ( German Make Crazy ), rolled on 15 May 2001 an unmanned train carrying dangerous goods under two hours at a speed of up to 82 km / h 106 km far by the American state Ohio. The event served as the basis for the movie Unstoppable - Out of Control.

Course

On 15 May 2001 a few minutes before 12:35 clock ranked the train driver, the diesel locomotive No. 8888 type EMD SD40 -2 freight train Y11615 of CSX Transportation rail yard in Stanley Yard in Walbridge at Toledo. The train should be parked in the Ausfahrgruppe the station. The 2944.5 -ton train consisted of a locomotive and 47 freight cars, of which 25 were empty. In two tank cars of the train toxic and corrosive phenol was in liquid form.

It was intended to stop during the Rangiermanövers in front of a still to be converted into end points, which due to wet rails and the mass of the train but failed. The brakeman and conductor of no were on the train. The engineer left at a speed of around 13 km / h to 12:35 clock the cab to pass to run on the moving locomotive to the points and convert them.

To slow down, he activated the locomotive brake fully and wanted to also switch the dynamic brake - which he did not. However, since he assumed that he had the dynamic brake of the locomotive activated, he had set the power controller to the highest setting. This would - by reversing the engines to generators - to a maximum braking effect, however, so the engine got full drive at the same time fully -acting mechanical brake. As the same time the locomotive brake was fully activated and a correspondingly lower pressure in the brake line was present, the dead-man ( to switch off the engine) was disabled. The air brake system of the train was, as usual, during shunting, not connected. As the train driver noticed that the train was constantly faster, instead of stopping, he succeeded because of the damp climbs and handrails not more, to draw on the rolling vehicle. After he was dragged 24 meters, he let go. He suffered minor injuries.

The train driver immediately notified the head of the marshalling yard. Then the train on the track leading to the south " Toledo Branch ". Since this route decreed system through a Traffic Control, ongoing control of the train was possible. The brakeman of the train and another train workers followed the train and tried unsuccessfully to jump up at a railroad crossing. Since they did not know that the train driver had jumped, they suspected that he had suffered a heart attack. At 12:38 clock the local authorities and the police were informed about the runaway train.

The attempt to bring the train at Galatea with a mobile derailment device to stop, failed. Also unsuccessful were the attempts of the police to trigger by shooting the Kraftstoffnotabsperrventil. The oncoming train Q63615 was passed onto a side track in Dunkirk. The train crew ( a train driver with an operating experience of 31 years and a conductor with one year experience) this turn instructed it to continue with their locomotive the through train. They managed to dock at milepost 67. The train was at this time 82 km / h With the dynamic brake 's own locomotive succeeded the two railwaymen, the speed of the train at 18 km / h decrease. This allowed a Zugmeister jump and the locomotive off at 14:30 clock south of Kenton.

For further deceleration of the train was provided south of Kenton another locomotive to put in front of the train. However, this considerably dangerous maneuver was no longer necessary.

At follow-up of the locomotive, it was found that the brake blocks of the locomotive were completely consumed.

Evaluation of the incident

Through the U.S. regulatory authority, the Federal Railroad Administration ( FRA ), the incident was investigated. It was placed on primarily a focus, whether the event had occurred by the unfortunate chain of circumstances or whether such an incident could occur perhaps more frequently. The investigation of the FRA came to the conclusion that the event had no systemic cause, but lay in individual misconduct of the employee. So the engineer had the speed is not sufficiently observed in the shunting movement, he left the moving locomotive, he took advantage of the dynamic brake, although this is not suitable at low speeds, and he believed that through the use of the air brake to improve the effect of the locomotive brake. The coincidence of so many errors is relatively unlikely.