De interpretatione

Teaching ( ἑρμηνείας ancient Greek Περὶ, peri hermeneias, over the phrases, latin De interpretatione ) of the sentence is the title of a writing of the philosopher Aristotle.

It is one of the six logical works of Aristotle, which are collectively known as the Organon.

The central theme of Scripture are logical statements. The Organon is " to the whole from the part " based on the principle:

Content

Preliminary definitions ( 1st to 4th chapter)

Epistemological requirements ( Chapter 1 )

At the beginning of Aristotle speaks of some basic epistemological assumptions. Thus, there are things ( on a different translation would be: objects). Of these things, there are images in our souls ( psyche ), which Aristotle called ideas ( pathematon ). A sound (phone, also with " word" translatable ) is a character ( symbola ) for such an idea. And something written ( graphomena ) is again a sign of sounds.

• Things
• Ideas in our souls
• Sounds (or words Spoken ) (these are the subject of further investigation )
• Written

Statements to related words ( Chapter 1 )

Aristotle is now a closer look at the sounds or words. A word like "man" or " white ", without the connection ( Synthesin ) and separation ( diairesin ) is pronounced, is neither true nor false. Only in combination or separation pronounced words like "Man is white " are either true or false. This outspoken in conjunction words called logical statements.

The noun ( 2nd chapter )

In the first chapter, Aristotle explains what he means by the term " sound" or " word" (phone ) and has also within the words distinguished the main words ( onomata, also onoma ) of the time words ( Remata ).

He now defines the noun as "a sound that means something conventionally without including a time and without one part of it a meaning in itself has ." By " conventional" wants to point out that the linguistic signs point to their meaning according to a human agreement, and not because of a natural context (such as measles spots " mean " ) Aristotle. The clause " without a time trap " intended to define the main words of the time words. With the addition of " without a part of him has a meaning for " Aristotle will probably distinguish nouns from larger linguistic units such as sentences whose meaning is composed from the meaning of its constituents. In contrast, the word " mouse " contains the word " from " just as loud, not as meaning component.

The verb ( Chapter 3 )

A verb is here defined by Aristotle as "a word that the time displays, never mean something whose parts for themselves and to always get something to understand what is true of another. ". That verbs " Show time with " Aristotle explained as follows: In contrast to the noun " health " expresses the verb " is healthy " from that health is in the present. What puts the verb, but is considered " by another ," namely from the subject, which is healthy.

The ( continuous ) speech ( Chapter 4 )

Speech is according to Aristotle, " a sound which conventionally indicates something from which an individual part separately displaying something ." In the sentence " Socrates is running" for example, have the parts " Socrates " and "runs" each a significance that contributes to the meaning of the whole. Not every speech a subject, a predicate attributed to or, ie not every speech is true or false. An opposite example is the request. However, Aristotle wants to be covered in this discussion of truth -enabled speech, the statement limit, since the other types of speech belong in the realm of poetics and rhetoric.

The statement ( 5 to 9 chapters)

Definition of the statement ( Chapter 5 )

Here Aristotle explains a statement as a " sound, intended to show the existence or non- existence of a thing with distinction of the times." Each statement contains a verb and therefore a temporal determination. Through the verb a subject is something to or denied, ie Exists or not displayed. A speech may in turn be composed of several simple statements.

Affirmation and negation ( Chapter 6 )

" Affirmation " is, according to Aristotle, " a statement, a slightly ascribes the ", " negation " analog one that " one denies something." Affirmation and negation are contradictory opposites, provided that none of the terms involved is homonymous needed. For example, the statement " Socrates is a fox " and " Socrates is not a Fox" not opposed, because it is used in the first statement, " Fox" in the transferred meaning " clever man."

Chapter 7: General and One ( Chapter 7 )

Aristotle distinguishes here between a " general " such as " man," which is " naturally from multiple, " testified, and a " detail ", eg " Socrates ", which "can not be predicated from multiple, ". From something universal now a general statement "Every man is righteous " can again be taken as in this case " everyone " is in fact of the general term " person" means the quantifier made ​​a general statement. One general statement is the statement that the ratio does not apply generally, contradictory opposite, for example, the statement " Everyone is just " the statement " Not every man is righteous ." Exactly one of these statements must be true that is. The affirmation of the universal and its negation, however, are merely contrary as in " Every human being is righteous " vs. " No man is righteous ." This could affect both, but not both be wrong true. Negates these last two statements, one obtains statements true but can not be wrong together in common: " Not every man is righteous " " At least one man is righteous ." Such statements have been later referred to as " subcontrary ".

Chapter 8: homonymy ( Chapter 8 )

Aristotle points out that in cases of homonymous terms also affirmation and negation are ambiguous. If one namely "horse" and " man " are both denoted by the word " coat", so it was with the statement " The coat is white " is not a simple, but actually a complex statement, namely, the statement " The man is white and the horse is white ".

Chapter 9: Statements about the future ( Chapter 9 )

Chapter 9 is the attention of the later philosophy of most of the " doctrine of the sentence". Here the natural philosophical questions of determinism and the time on the one hand, the logical problem of the so-called touch " law of excluded middle ", on the other hand are. According to Aristotle, forward-looking statements are neither true nor false, for it ie the set of excluded middle does not apply. Aristotle argued here as follows "If it was always true to say that something ... will be, it is not possible that such ... will not be. What it is impossible that it will not, that must be. So is everything that is in the future, it is necessary .... " So if we assume that forward-looking statements are true before they occur, as follows, according to Aristotle, that the future is already determined before they occur. This consequence, however, is unacceptable, "because we see that some Future has its basis in the fact that you think about something and does ... ". In contrast to statements about the past and the present are therefore their statements about the future, " not necessary from each opposite affirmation and negation, the one true and the other false."

Famous is the example chosen by Aristotle here the battle. If tomorrow a naval battle will take place, is the statement that it will take place tomorrow, already true; if they will not take place, this applies to the statement " The Battle will not take place ." Since only these two possibilities, one of the two statements must now correspond to the truth and not the opposite. But if this is the case, we can do nothing that would bring about the opposite of the already that apply. The inference, since this holds for every future event, give a strict determinism. However, Aristotle rejects the determinism. Therefore, it is contingent on future events (Latin contingentia futura ) on the law of excluded middle.

Statements with adjuncts ( 10 to 14 chapters)

Private ions ( Chapter 10 )

Aristotle examines the negated terms - the so -called " privations " - such as " unjust" ( " fairly" ). It provides inferential relations between sentences with negated and non- negated terms that: From "Every man is unjust " follows " No man is righteous " and from "A person is just" follows " Not every man is unjust ."

Combination of predicates ( Chapter 11 )

Aristotle notes that you can combine two predications to circumstances and that this is not allowed in other cases, . Thus, if one can say of a certain man that he is a sentient creature and bipedal, infer that he was a biped sense beings. Is not he, however, Schuster and well, it follows necessarily that he's a good cobbler. Aristotle turns out that the truth of the predication (also called " predication per se " ) in the first case results due to a definition: " two-footed " and " sentient creatures " are included in the definition of "man." In the second case ( predication " per accidens " ) based on a random truth ( empirical ) context. Therefore, the association is to a single predication here is not always permitted (although they can sometimes be admissible ).

Modalbegriffe ( Chapter 12 )

Aristotle here deals with the Modalbegriffen " wealthy ", " necessary" and "impossible". For him includes " to be wealthy " Whatever, " wealthy not to be" one. What can go, for example, can not always go well. It clears the denial of Modalbegriffe: The negation of " to be necessary " is " not to be necessary " and not " necessary to not be" (similar it is " wealthy " and with "impossible" ). If you want to, for example, "God necessarily exists " deny, one arrives at "God does not necessarily exists " not "God necessarily exists not ."

Modal conclusions ( Chapter 13 )

Aristotle examines inferential relations between propositions with Modalbegriffen. Thus, for example, follows " to be wealthy " both " not to be moderately wealthy " and "being unnecessary " from. After modern modallogischer view would only the first but not the second of these conclusions are valid (from " it is possible that p " follows " it is not the case that it is not possible that p", but not " it is not necessary that p "). The reason for this is that to be " wealthy " for Aristotle, as I said always " wealthy not to be" includes. Thus, the subject may not be necessary, then it would no longer have the ability not to be. Aristotle himself points out that with this understanding of " wealthy " from " being necessary " does not follow " to be wealthy ", a conclusion which is valid according to the modern view. According to Aristotle, there is, however, another reading of " wealthy " after this conclusion is valid, this would be more in line with the modern conception.

Privation and Kontrarität ( Chapter 14 )

In the last chapter it goes again to the already treated in Chapter 10 privations and the known from Chapter 7 term " contrary ". Thus, for the set to "Everyone is just" appear to form two contradictory statements " No man is righteous " and "Everyone is unjust ." According to Aristotle, the first sentence in the proper sense is contrary, the other only " mitfolgend ", ie indirectly.

Reception

There are numerous Latin translations of the teachings received from the sentence, the first of Boethius (6th century). The first modern German translation is by Karl cell from the year 1837.