Eurotrain

Euro Train was a joint venture between GEC -Alsthom and Siemens for the marketing of high-speed trains and routes on non-European markets.

The company was founded in 1996 and later, after the failure of several community projects dissolved.

History

The company was founded in March 1996 by Siemens and GEC -Alsthom. Both groups posted in each case a representative to the Board of the new company. The company was seen as more of a marketing company, because as a comprehensive operation; the operating business was still managed by the seats of the two partners. Also there should be neither a common nor a manufacturing technology exchange. The proportion of GEC -Alsthom in the joint subsidiary was 60 percent, the. Siemens at 40 percent

Interested parties should this future can assemble trains from ICE and TGV components as required. The sales cooperation focused on the Asian market and did not apply to Europe and North America where both train systems still had to compete. Among the projects for which an application was sought, was one of the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail in Taiwan, and a high-speed line between Beijing and Shanghai.

A key objective of cooperation also to improve margins in a highly competitive market existed. As in 1993, GEC -Alsthom -enforcing against a Siemens offer in Korea, with a total order volume of around 13 billion euros, the Siemens CEO of Pierer later ( 1995) spoke of a competition, the " well advised not to repeat " itself should.

Application in Taiwan

Initial success

After many years of studies had the Bureau of High Speed ​​Rail ( BOHSR ), one of the Taiwanese Ministry of Transportation and Communications ( MOTC ) under its authority, in October 1997 the project Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail, a 345 km long new railway line between the Taiwanese capital of Taipei and the port city of Kaohsiung, as a concession by the Build Operate Transfer - operator model (BOT) tender. In addition to building ( about five years to build ) should also be guaranteed the operation of the line over 30 years. Then, after about 35 years, the project should become the property of the state.

In August 1997, deals were two candidates before: the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail Consortium ( THSRC ), a consortium of five Taiwanese companies and the Evergreen Group, the Euro Train chose itself as a technology partner; and the Chungwa High Speed ​​Rail Consortium ( CHSRC ), which allied itself with the Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium ( TSC), relied on by the Mitsui Group supplier of Japanese Shinkansen technology. The offer of THSRC amounted to 11.77 billion U.S. dollars far below the 18.48 billion of CHSRC. THSRC also promised to carry out the project without any net cost to the government, and from 10 % of its revenue to finance transport systems. Although the competitor was politically favored THSRC was declared " because of the much better funding proposals " on 25 September 1997 for " preferred provider," and began BOHSR negotiate negotiation of the concession contract. In May 1998, the consortium changed its legal form to a joint stock company, and changed his name to Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail Corporation ( with constant abbreviation); the realignment THSRC gave its technology partner Euro Train the status of " promoters".

The BOT concession involved the construction of the track and its operation for 35 years. Accounted for the construction of the track, the electrical systems and trains for around four billion dollars to the European partners. As trains favored THSRC a mixture of Siemens power cars for 300 km / h and double-deck intermediate cars by GEC -Alsthom, Trains should, inter alia, a German catenary type Re 330 and the train control system LZB obtained while on the French side, the interlocking equipment should be supplied.

The train concept from Euro Train consisted of two power cars, which would be derived from those of the ICE 2, and from 12 intermediate cars with Jacobs bogies, which would be modeled on the middle cars of the TGV Duplex, with a total length of 271.8 m. The train 190 seats were provided in the first and 670 seats in the second class. In addition, a dining car and telephone and fax facilities should be offered. For the intended concept of operations ( headways of up to three minutes) about 70 Euro Train trainsets should be required.

During the negotiations THSRC and Euro Train organized a presentation ride with a compiled specially for the occasion test train to convince BOHSR on the technical feasibility of the ICE TGV train hybrid (see # presentation ride in Germany ).

The ICE misfortune of Eschede on June 3, 1998, the chances of THSRC (and thus of Euro Train) not reduced for the final contract: although the BOHSR of Germany awaited detailed information about the causes of accidents, has been recognized by the authority that the when Eschede - train broken special type of wheel does not come with tires at euro Train apply. Government and THSRC have finally signed the concession contract on 23 July 1998.

Presentation ride in Germany

On 4 May 1998, the Euro Train- test train was officially launched in Göttingen. On the same day the Euro Train reached on the high-speed line Hannover -Würzburg, between Hanover and Göttingen (north of Orxhausen ), a speed of 316 km / h The presentation ride on the provisionally assembled train should be preceded by the signing of the Taiwan High Speed ​​Rail Project. The trip took place under green wave, which led to schedule shifts in regular traffic.

The train consisted of the ICE 2 power cars 402042-6 and 402046-7 and eight intermediate cars of TGV set 224 The 200 m long train received some technical changes. The power heads the high-voltage roof line of the TGV power cars connected to each other via the - So were - because due to the short length could not travel both power heads with raised pantograph. Have been newly mounted on the roof two fiber optic cables and two 110- volt lines to connect the power heads. To feed the TGV intermediate car ( 550 V DC ) from the power heads (1000 V ac ) was in a middle car installed a rectifier. The central buffer couplings of power heads have been replaced by an adapter coupling to be coupled with the TGV cars can who possessed a train - and - shock device according to UIC standard. The brakes of the intermediate cars were driven pneumatically, without the usual at ICE electropneumatics (ep).

For the presentation of the driving power cars had been convicted on March 9 in the Siemens plant in Krefeld -Uerdingen to obtain mechanical adjustments for the TGV car at the rear. On April 2, the car federation was transferred to the depot Munich West. He had previously received the additional rectifier in GEC -Alsthom factory in La Rochelle. In Munich, the cars were united with the ICE power cars that had already arrived on March 27 in Munich. After assembling the train the train was, stuck for several days with a new design. After static tests, the train started on 9 April 1998 for the first time for test drives in motion. Then the train was equipped with monitoring devices. On 25 April 1998, at 7:30 clock, the train left Munich and drove over Ansbach to Würzburg, where he was eventually transferred to 250 km / h over the speed line and to Minden. On April 27, Hochtastfahrten began with velocities 250-280 km / h On April 28, 310 km / h were achieved. On April 29, followed by further sea trials with 300 and 310 km / h It also pressure measurements in the train (comfort aspects) and noise measurements were taken at the track. On May 3, the train was transferred to Hamburg, where he was presented 100 invited guests from politics and business as well as 100 media representatives in the framework of a dinner. On May 4, started the train, according to various speeches from Göttingen Train to Hannover.

According to media reports, the Taiwanese delegation traveled to the presentation trip to France, where they had been invited to the trains to order completely in France.

Leaving the project

As a result of the Asian crisis had concession winners THSRC difficulties to compile the financing of the project. In May 1999, the Government of Japan promised to grant the consortium subsidized loans, if it is changed over in return for the Shinkansen technology. Even the president of the defeated CHSRC consortium, which was a main sponsor of the ruling party Kuomintang, promised help. THSRC was in the same month to realize that the choice of the technology supplier was open, and then officially launched the new tender on 15 June 1999. Both Euro Train as well as TSC gave off offers.

To compensate for the supposed financial benefits of the offer of TSC, Euro Train offered in September 1999 to buy a share of 10 percent to THSRC. ( The following year, TSC also signed a contract for the purchase of 10 percent of the shares. ) Candidates were also political support: the above- described intervention by the Japanese government was a letter from the Federal Trade Commission of the European Union towards. A visit of France's transport minister was canceled only because of the frigate scandal, which led to speculation that even Euro Train had connections to the interest group in the center of the scandal. Shortly before the decision came, however, planned both France and Germany still further visits at ministerial level.

After the two candidates had submitted their final offers on 3 December 1999, THSRC said on 28 December, surprisingly, they wanted to take the Euro Train Consortium negotiate with the Japanese TSC Consortium signed a final agreement. A comparison of the tenders was, according to a spokesman of the operator revealed that the Shinkansen technology, the European solution in the aspects of technology, price, financing and maintenance was superior. So the Japanese consortium had submitted more flexible maintenance concepts. Japanese banks announced that they would support the project with a loan for the route and the necessary traits in the equivalent of 5.6 billion DM. THSRC has also highlighted the role of the expected exchange rate fluctuations, and noticed that TSC have offered a newer Shinkansen, as previously in the losing concession application of CHSRC.

According to reports in Taiwanese and German media the motives behind the change of course above all a political nature were: The choice of technology provider should pave the way for an official trip to Japan of the former Taiwanese President Lee Teng- hui. THSRC has denied these reports. The media reminded but the fact that Lee - strongly made ​​for the Japanese technology - in an article published in May 1999: Book: He wrote a small price advantage of Euro Trains, which, however, in terms of safety, the memory of Eschede accident and in point of political considerations hopes to support Taiwan by the Japanese government were faced.

Litigation

Euro Train understood the terms of its agreement with the predecessor of the operating company THSRC 1997, is named in the Euro Train as a preferred provider when binding contract, which has now been violated by the THSRC why Euro Train a lawsuit against the decision submitted by the Taiwanese dishes. Siemens CEO Heinrich von Pierer also asked President Lee Teng- hui is to intervene in the matter, but this was rejected. Meanwhile visited the Trade Representative of Germany, France and the UK President of THSRC order to ask them about the award.

The lawsuit filed by Euro Train against the award was established in early February 2000 rejected at first instance. The court emphasized that the plaintiff consortium has not identified sufficient facts for the desired injunction. The appeal before the Supreme Court failed to Taiwan in June the same year. After lengthy negotiations THSRC and TSC finally signed on 12 December 2000 the contract for the supply of technology.

In proceedings brought in March 2001 civil suit before the International Court of Arbitration in Singapore, the two Konsortialunternehmen demanded a compensation of 1.7 billion DM for losing a contract. THSRC as defendants in turn, has insisted that the decision was purely business, and only " price, financial planning and maintenance" tipped the scales. After a long dispute resolution process, the court decided in March 2004 to the charges for compensation payments in millions 32.4 million U.S. dollars for the development expenses of EUR Train, and another 35.7 million dollars for unjust enrichment. In November 2004 THSRC has finally pledged 65 million U.S. dollars (with interest 89 million U.S. dollars) payable to Euro Train.

Aftermath

Despite award at the Taiwan Shinkansen Consortium THSRC insisted on the use of some European standards, technologies and specialists that emerged from the collaboration with Euro Train, so that in the end resulted in a mixture of Japanese, German and French technology.

  • The of THSRC required, opposite the Shinkansen larger tunnel cross-section with two-sided escape routes, and over the Shinkansen stronger bridges correspond to European standards.
  • THSRC has prescribed European standards and for the track created by the Japanese farmers part of the superstructure.
  • The operating plan concept of THSRC looked way working before after European model, in contrast to the strict directional operation, to design on the Shinkansen, which TSC compelled a new train control system.
  • Again, for the way working delivered Rail One of Germany turnouts with movable core on a solid track for higher speeds.
  • Moxa, Taiwanese suppliers of integrated with the communication system scheme to monitor the environment and equipment and to control the latter (Environmental Control System), relied on Siemens components. In July 2010, after unsuccessful attempts to solve a persistent problem with the motion sensors of the switch to THSRC turned to Siemens to find the root problem.
  • THSRC sent his Japanese trains with 40 French and 13 German train drivers in regular operation. The plan was to replace it in 18 months by newly trained local drivers.

Other projects, the end

Was Angedacht to offer the Euro Train technology for the 1300 km long high-speed Beijing- Shanghai. However, this did not materialize.

Following a meeting between the freshly placed DB CEO Hartmut Mehdorn and SNCF CEO Louis Gallois on 17 December 1999, both called on the European rail industry to develop a common high-speed train in order to realize cost savings. The spokesman for the DB pointed to the creation of the Franco-German joint project Euro Train and asked, "Why should not that be possible in Europe, which is already practiced in Asia? "

The in the media as " Euro - Train" designated proposal was initiated as a joint project of European national railways and manufacturers, and after September 2000, only the Euro Train partner Alstom and Siemens remained in the latter. The project was officially named High Speed ​​Train Europe ( HTE ), and Italy FS was recovered as additional rail carrier partners. After review of 10,000 detailed questions but remained 500 left, in which the partners were able to find a compromise, which is why the project HTE was laid in September 2009 on ice.

The Euro Train joint venture, which was already not directly involved in HTE, was also dissolved.

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