Illusion of control
The illusion of control (English illusion of control ) is the human tendency to believe that they can control certain operations that are not demonstrably influenced.
The basic work on the illusion of control is Ellen Langer's study The illusion of control (1975). Langer showed that people often act as if chance events were manipulated. For example, people overestimate their chances of winning the lottery a higher when they themselves have selected the numbers as if they were assigned. She observed that their subjects rather then behaved as if they controlled the random event when the experimental set-up so-called skill cues contained. Skill cues ( such as: signs of skills) are according to Langer elements that are usually associated with certain skills: selecting, compete to become familiar with a process and make decisions.
A simple form of this thinking error is seen playing dice: players tend to throw more if they want to achieve high numbers and softer for low numbers. In the experiment, subjects were convinced that they can influence a completely random coin toss. Participants who successfully predicted a series of throws began to believe that they were actually very good rater, and that their success rate would decrease if the distraction.
Taylor and Brown (1988 ) argue that positive illusions are useful by increasing motivation and perseverance. Albert Bandura supports this position with his view that " optimistic self-assessments, not unreasonably deviate from what is possible can be advantageous, while truthful assessments may seem self-limiting " ( Bandura, 1989, p 1177 ). His reasoning is concerned basically with the efficiency of optimistic assumptions about control and success in situations that are controllable - not with imaginary control in situations whose processes do not depend in reality on individual behavior. Bandura has also suggested that " in activities with narrow margins of error, where missteps expensive or harmful consequences, the most careful assessment of impact has its own well-being best served " (1997, p 71).
Taylor and Brown hold positive illusions to adapt performance, because, according to studies in normal, mentally healthy individuals occur more frequently than in depressed individuals. On the other hand, believe Pacini, Muir and Epstein (1998) that depressed people overcompensate for a tendency to incorrect intuitive thinking by themselves monitor exaggerated rational even in trivial situations; and they conclude that the difference to the non- depressed people disappears in momentous situations.
Other empirical found that it can hubris be a mismatch in some circumstances. In a scenario study with a targeted unsuccessful course of action Whyte et al showed. (1997) that those participants who have high self-assessment had been suggested to increase significantly more likely their commitment. Knee and Zuckerman (1998) criticize Taylor / Brown's definition of mental health, and they claim that people without illusions rather non- defensive, adaptive, progress-oriented personalities are, with less ego - attachment to their results. Knees and Zuckerman's work suggests that subject self-conscious individuals these illusions often.
Fenton O'Creevy et al (2003 ) argue, as Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989 ) that control illusions indeed increase the aspiration, but do not contribute to error-free decisions. The illusions can immunize against feedback, inhibit learning processes, and predispose to greater objective risk (because the subjective risk assessment falls). In a study among investment bankers found O'Creevy Fenton et al (2003, 2004) that traders fared much worse with a strong illusion of control in analysis, risk management and profit contributions. They also deserved much worse.
An important explanation for the illusion of control may lie in the self-regulation. People who pursue the self-imposed target to control their environment, always trying against chaos, uncertainty and stress to regain that control. They do not succeed, they could withdraw to deal with on the defensive insinuation of "control" - with the result an illusion of control (Fenton O'Creevy et al, 2003).