Intergovernmentalism

As intergovernmentalism (also Intergovernmentalismus, from Latin inter, "between", and French gouverner to "rule " ) is called in international law, European law and political science, the principle of intergovernmental cooperation between states within an international organization. Examples include the United Nations or in part, and the European Union, where there is the principle of intergovernmentalism in the area of ​​common foreign and security policy. That is, the decision-making authority rests with the States, and decisions must be unanimous. Thus, in intergovernmental organizations, each state has a de facto veto.

International legal significance

In the teaching of international law intergovernmentalism means that countries, even though decisions together, but even remain sovereign. This intergovernmental cooperation is typical of most of today's international organizations such as the UN or the OSCE.

That the decisions taken in the supranational EC been taken by the EC institutions autonomously antonym for intergovernmental cooperation, the notion of supranationalism, which has become a key concept of the European Community, under international law, and for all Member States are binding. This is true since the Treaty of Lisbon for the European Union. Even within the EU there are, however, areas such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy ( CFSP), which are based on intergovernmental cooperation of governments.

Intergovernmental elements in the European Union

The Council of the European Union, part of the EU institutions triangle next to the Commission and the European Parliament, prevails in the area of ​​foreign and security policy, the principle of intergovernmentalism. Only with joint actions and positions, the Council shall act by a qualified majority. However, individual states can make important national grounds of appeal, so that the Council only decide whether the request will be submitted to the European Council for unanimous decision (see article 31, paragraph 2 sub-para 2 TEU. ); this variant is considered modified special form of the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. unanimously as a resolution applies, however, even if they contain individual members. These members are not required to implement the decisions or accepting the resulting costs (constructive abstention). However, the member is containing accept that the decision commits the Union is binding and it should not hinder the approach of the Union within the meaning of Decision.

In contrast, the principle of supranationalism, which states that the results summarized in an organization states delegate sovereignty in favor of this organization areas; the organization of the associated institutions can make decisions binding on then for the individual states. Thus, the EU Member States have ceded powers to the EU in many areas and are bound by decisions that come about by the so-called Community method. In this independent of national governments EU institutions like the European Commission and the European Parliament appear much with. The individual States are also concerned about the Council of the EU in these decisions, but have since no veto.

Normative dimension

In addition to describing intergovernmental manifestations and decision-making mechanisms in the EU's institutional system, the political science intergovernmentalism also referred to as a desirable or normative goal of a mindset in the integration process of the European Union. The ideal model of such a division of responsibilities is the Europe of nations. Intergovernmentalism then means ( according to demand ) maintaining national sovereignty, in contrast to the mindset of supranationalism, which calls for an expansion of competences in favor of supranational institutions and bodies.

In the history of the European Union, there were influential representatives of intergouvernementalistischen school that have helped shape the political system of Staatenverbund crucial. Thus, the European policy orientation of the former French President Charles de Gaulle is often cited as an example of intergovernmental negotiation and decision-making mechanisms. France remained from July 1965 to January 1966 because of his resolute rejection of the imminent introduction of qualified majority voting as a mode of the meetings of the Ministers remote, which thereby was for months a quorum. That person, the empty chair policy of not negotiating tactic resulted only after heavy use of informal negotiation channels in the Luxembourg compromise, which unanimity principle (and thus a de facto right of veto for each member country) foresaw. De Gaulle had thus set an example of self-assertion of sovereign rights for France; earlier, he had failed in his Fouchetplänen 1961/1962.