Knowledge and Human Interests

The font of knowledge and interest is a 1968 published book by Jürgen Habermas. Its basic intention is the " analysis of the relationship of knowledge and interest " and the support of the assertion that "radical critique of knowledge only as a theory of society is possible" ( Jürgen Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1968, p 9; afterwards. all of the following parenthetical page references, emphasis in each case as in the original ).

The occasion of writing formed the so-called positivism dispute of German sociology, inflamed at the Tübingen Working Meeting of the German Society for Sociology with the two papers by Theodor W. Adorno and Karl R. Popper in October 1961. Preceded the writing was the identical Frankfurt inaugural lecture, which Habermas held in 1965.

Content

Habermas is based on the finding that modern philosophy is essential epistemology. These have been instrumental after Kant the scientism of Sciences, the " no more than one form of possible knowledge science " means, but " knowledge of science to identify " wants (p. 13). Habermas wants to show how this view has prevailed over time and the possible alternatives in order to develop a social theory that the scientific model escapes and pursues an emancipatory interest.

For a critique of traditional and acting up today epistemology draws on Habermas Hegel's critique of Kant. The traditional theory of knowledge is a kind of knowledge ahead as normative, as it is given approximately in mathematics and physics. This knowledge refers to Hegel as " appearing knowledge" (p. 24), but its activity is not a begriffenes knowledge. In addition, the traditional theory of knowledge is based on the " assumption of a finished subject knowledge " from which is used as in Kant as "the Court " and not problematized. Hegel, however, " sees through " that the subject of knowledge " itself is not transparent" (p. 25) and " bother with the result of his self-assurance given " (p. 26).

Marx's critique of Hegel is at the " subject of the world constitution" one. This was "not a transcendental consciousness in general but rather the specific human species that reproduces their lives under natural conditions " (p. 38). The human subject is thereby conceived by Marx, in contrast to Hegel much as a " natural being " (p. 45). Nature is doing in " subjective nature of man " and " objective nature of its environment" distinction (p. 39). Habermas criticizes this to Marx's concept of nature that this relationship with nature than on the "interest of possible technical control over natural processes " restrictive (p. 49). The knowledge of man should be so to a " procedural knowledge ", "allowing control of the process of social life " (p. 65 ), which refers to Habermas as " positivist colored demand for a natural science of man " (p. 63).

Habermas continues at the beginning of the second main chapter ( " positivism, pragmatism, historicism ," p 88-233 ) with the positivism of Comte and Mach apart. " Positivism refers to the end of epistemology ", in their place now a "theory of science " occurs. The " transcendental- question of the conditions of possible knowledge ", which also was a question of " sense of knowledge in general " is cut off. Instead, go to positivism only to the " methodological question according to the rules of the construction and verification of scientific theories " (p. 88). This positivism lose the " synthetic performance of the knowing subject " out of sight, so that the " problem of the constitution of the world " will covert: "The meaning of knowledge itself is irrational - in the name of strict knowledge" ( p. 90). With the positivism also a philosophy of history is related to Habermas, for the scientific and technical progress receives an overwhelming importance. Its investigation " takes the place of the reflection of the knowing subject to himself" ( p. 93).

Habermas sets positivism against the pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce. Peirce put the " collective of researchers " at the center, " to try their common task to solve communicative ". The " reality as an object of the sciences " konstituiere is only when their practice. Habermas rejects Peirce with a " ontologization of facts " (p. 121): "We can not think of such a thing as uninterpreted facts usefully; however there are facts that do not go up in our interpretations "(p. 124).

Habermas joins later in the pragmatic concept of truth from Peirce to. The " sense of the truth of statements " can no longer even be defined by Kant as produced by the " forms of intuition and categories of the understanding " " objectivity of knowledge." Rather, there is truth " only from the objective life context ". The research process of Sciences is the function of the " stabilization of opinions ", the " elimination of uncertainty " and the " recovery problematic beliefs " to. A " conviction is defined in that we base our behavior to her " (p. 153). " Applicable beliefs are universal statements about the reality that [ ... ] can be transformed into technical recommendations " (p. 154). They may be confused by " resistances of reality " (p. 153). It will then create "new ideas " found " the re- stabilize the disturbed behavior " (p. 154), Habermas formulated following Peirce.

"The system of science is [ only ] one element in an overall context of life " (p. 179). This is called " object field of the humanities " (p. 179) rather only interpret this in a broad sense. Habermas comes later in the second main chapter on Wilhelm Dilthey and to speak this special status of the humanities. Its central theme is the hermeneutic that " in the last instance refers to the colloquial language ". Habermas understands with Dilthey language as the " ground of intersubjectivity on which each person must have already gained taken before it can be objectified in the first expression of life - be it in words, attitudes or actions " (p. 198).

Both the hermeneutic as the empirical-analytic sciences are guided by cognitive interests. Both disciplines it comes to the "fundamental conditions of possible reproduction and self-constitution of the human species " (p. 242). While the empirical-analytical sciences, however, are embedded in the life contexts of the " instrumental" action and look at reality from the perspective " of possible technical control ," the interest of the hermeneutic sciences the " communicative action " and of " intersubjectivity of understanding applicable in the colloquial communication and action under common standards "(p. 221).

The technical interest of the nature and the practical interest of the humanities can only by " self-reflection science " be properly understood what had been missed by Peirce and Dilthey. The basis of both interests makes for Habermas ' emancipatory cognitive interest "(p. 244). Its goal is the " liberation from dogmatic dependence" is (p. 256). The " only tangible example of a methodically acquiring self-reflection in claim science" is for Habermas, psychoanalysis (p. 262). She is a " meta-theory " and thus self-reflexively, as she reflects on her own status as a science.

Effect

The book unfolded after its publication, a far exceeding the professional philosophical debate effect. The diverse criticism of his work prompted Habermas five years later to an extensive epilogue, in which he clarified his arguments, but also some of his theses revised.

Expenditure

• Jürgen Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1968.
• Jürgen Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests. With a new epilogue. [ 2 Ed ] Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1973, ISBN 3-518-07601-9 ( Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Science, Vol 1).
• Numerous other editions by the same publisher, for example, 6th ed 1981, 9th edition 1988, 13th edition 2001, special edition, 2003.
• Jürgen Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests: In the Annex: " After thirty years. Comments on knowledge and interest, " Meiner, Hamburg, 2008, ISBN 3-787-31862-3

Translations

• French: Jürgen Habermas: Connaissance et interet. Translated by Gérard Clémancon, Gallimard, Paris, 1968.
• English: Jürgen Habermas: Knowledge and human interests. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971, ISBN 0-8070-1541-5/Heinemann, London 1972, ISBN 0-435-82382-5.
• Spanish: Jürgen Habermas: Conocimiento e interés. Taurus, Madrid 1982, ISBN 84-306-1163-0.
• Arabic: Yūrġin Hābirmās: al- Ma ʿ rifa wa - 'l- muṣliḥa. Translated by Ǧūrǧ Kittūra, Beirut, 1998; Al- Ma ʾ as new rifa wa - 'l- Maslaha. Translated by Ḥasan Saqr, Cologne 2001.
• Hungarian: Jürgen Habermas: Megismerés és Erdek. Translated by János Weiss, Jelenkor, Pécs 2005, ISBN 9-789636-763657.