Knowledge argument

Mary's room is a philosophical thought experiment that Frank Cameron Jackson has presented in his 1982 article epiphenomenal qualia and expanded in his essay What Mary Did not Know 1986. The argument that will be underpinned by this thought experiment is often referred to as the knowledge argument against physicalism called, that is, against the view that everything existent, even intellectual, is purely physical.

• 3.1 Frank Jackson
• 3.2 Daniel Dennett

The thought experiment

The thought experiment was originally formulated by Frank Jackson as follows:

In other words, we imagine a scientist who knows everything there is to know in the science of color perception, but has never experienced color. The interesting question raised by Jackson is: Learn this scientist something new when she first has a color perception outside their black and white prison?

Conclusions

If Mary learn something new when she has her first color perception, this has two important implications: the existence of phenomenal (mentally experienced ), qualitative characteristics, aspects or levels of consciousness that can only be experienced so-called qualia. Since qualia so closely related to intellectual experience and just not reducible to physical explanations are (otherwise would Marys optical specialization sufficient to colors " really know " ), this is also an argument for the existence of the mental (specifically for knowledge of mental facts ) and thus against physicalism ( sometimes called knowledge argument).

Qualia

Firstly exist when Mary learns something new after a color experience, qualia ( the subjective, qualitative properties of experiences ). If we consider the thought experiment to be valid, we believe that Mary wins something - that it acquires knowledge about a particular entity, which they did not previously possess. This knowledge, Jackson argues, is knowledge of the qualia of seeing red. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to certain qualia and one that does not have this access.

The knowledge argument

Secondly, if Mary learns something new wrong for a color experience, physicalism. Especially the knowledge argument is an attack on the assertion of physicalists that a physical explanation of mental states is complete. Mary likes to know everything about color perception what science can know about it, but she knows how it is the color red to see if she has never seen this color? Jackson claims that she learns by experiencing something new and hence that physicalism is false.

But it is important to note that in Jackson's article physicalism refers to the epistemological doctrine that all knowledge is knowledge of physical facts, and not the metaphysical doctrine that all things are physical things.

Reactions

Frank Jackson

Frank Jackson himself initially supported the antiphysikalistischen conclusions of the thought experiment of Mary's room. Jackson believed in the full explanatory power of physiology, mind that all of our behavior of any physical forces caused. In contrast, the thought experiment seems to be the existence of qualia, to show non- physical spiritual entities. So if, as argued Jackson, this is both true, then epiphenomenalism is true, ie mental states are caused by physical states, they have but conversely no causal influence on the physical world. (Lit.: Jackson 1982 & 1986)

When he designed the thought experiment, Jackson was so Epiphänomenalist. He later rejected the epiphenomenalism from it. (Lit.: Jackson 2003) This is how he discussed the fact that Mary "Wow" says when she sees red for the first time, which is why it must be Mary's qualia that makes them say "Wow". This contradicts the epiphenomenalism. Since the thought experiment of Mary's room evokes this contradiction, something must be wrong with him. This position is often referred to as, " there must be a reply ' reply" ( " there must be a response geben' - response " ) referred.

At the end of Mind and Illusion ( 2003) Jackson proposes that follows only under false assumptions about sensory perceptions that Mary acquires new knowledge. With the correct theory, namely a representationalist, this does not follow. Only if representationalism is believed also the most convincing response can be developed to the example: inter alia proposed by Nemirow and D. Lewis that Mary acquires a new skill ( ability ). Thus, physicalism can be maintained.

Daniel Dennett

The philosopher Daniel Dennett refers to the thought experiment of Mary as an " intuition pump", as a thought experiment that is easy to understand and intuitive catchy and encouraged us to misunderstand its requirements too easily and easy to lapse our intuition that the outcome of the thought experiment " obvious " is that Mary will learn something new on their first experimentation with color. In his monograph " Consciousness explained " Dennett writes:

We may therefore, as Dennett, of our present knowledge and of our need for the closure of the explanatory gap, not close disparagingly on the knowledge of Mary. We can at the moment not imagine how such knowledge looks like, but if we really grant Mary to know everything that can be available to physical knowledge, we may us someone who has absolutely everything there is, not as imagine someone who is simply "just" filthy rich. Dennett is firmly in mind that it is " obvious" is that Mary learns in their first color perception something new; this would be one suggested by the way in which the thought experiment will usually presented. He suggests to the viewer instead before, imagine how Mary is presented with a yellow and a blue banana after her release, in order to test it, and that it passes this test with flying colors. It is less important, as it does in detail, but only that it does. This alternative outcome of the experiment, as Dennett would not prove that Mary learns nothing new, but that the usual close down outcome of the experiment would not show necessary that they should learn something new. For Dennett Jackson's thought experiment is therefore a

This position was supported by Dennett in "What RoboMary Knows" (lit.: Dennett 2003) shown.

The debate, which was triggered by this thought experiment was last contents of a collection of essays - There's Something About Mary ( 2004) - with responses leading philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, David Lewis, and Paul Churchland.