Lufthansa CityLine Flight 5634
Flight 5634 was a scheduled flight of Lufthansa City Line from Bremen to Paris - Charles de Gaulle Airport on January 6, 1993. The flight was performed by the Stuttgart airline Contact Air under the Lufthansa flight LH 5634.
The proposed runway 27 in Paris was closed after a Boeing 747 of Korean Air had the web contacts with one engine. After a failed swing -over maneuver, the plane crashed at 19:20 local time clock 1.8 km before the runway threshold of runway 28, there were 4 of the 23 occupants were killed.
General
The accident aircraft was a turboprop aircraft from Bombardier Dash 8-311 with the registration D- BEAT, powered by two Pratt & Whitney PW123 engines. The aircraft made its maiden flight on 14 August 1990 and was delivered on 26 August to Contact Air, which the machine initially for the German Air Transport Society ( DLT), the predecessor of Lufthansa CityLine, operation .. Unfortunately the time the aircraft had 5,973 hours of operation. According to the flight documents the permitted payload were not exceeded and to comply with the center of gravity.
Had the 54 -year-old captain for disaster time for about six years, his ATPL and a flying experience of 11,924 hours, of which 2,003 on this type of aircraft. The 25 -year-old first officer, who was responsible for the disaster time point for the control, had his ATPL since one and a half years and a flying experience of 500 hours, including 293 on this type of aircraft.
Unfortunately time prevailed on the runway 28, a southwest wind from 190 to 200 degrees with 10 to 14 knots of wind speed. Visibility was 700-1400 meters and the cloud base was between 200 and 600 feet with a humidity of 100 % and a temperature of 9 degrees Celsius.
The later scheduled examination showed that both ILS localizer used were fully operational.
Misfortune course
The aircraft took off at 17:30 as scheduled from Bremen Airport and rose to its cruising altitude of 24,000 ft ( 7,315 m). 25 minutes before the accident, the crew initially received permission to leave them in order finally to 4,000 ft ( 1,219 m ) to host the ILS glide slope for runway 27, which removes at 19:14 clock, 14 miles from the runway, happened.
Shortly thereafter, touched a Boeing 747 Korean Air landing at runway 27 with an engine the ground on which this runway was blocked by the air traffic control until further notice. The air traffic controller finally asked the crew of flight LH 5634, whether you can run a left turn to 28 accommodate the ILS glide path of the parallel and 15 meters long runway ( SwingOver ), which is responsible for communication captain confirmed: "of course we can ". The air traffic controller gave him the for the southern runway Competent further, who told the crew that they 1.5 miles were in before the runway threshold and asked her if visual contact there with the runway, which the crew replied in the negative and stated, still in of that day very dense cloud cover to find. The air traffic controller they pointed out to keep the current tax rate and hinted that the crew eventually had to carry out a missed approach procedure: " Ok you continue present heading it would ... Could may be ... it will be a missed approach. Report runway in sight if you can " ( German: " Ok, they retain their current heading, it would ... could ... possibly a missed approach be Report it visual contact with the runway if possible ". . )
As the air traffic controller of the crew at 19:19 clock decision was that they just fly over the runway threshold, LH 5634 disappeared almost simultaneously by the radar and the crew stopped responding to radio messages. 19:20 clock was therefore declared from the control tower of an emergency.
The investigation revealed that the first officer deactivated the automatic thrust control 80 seconds before impact and a further ten seconds later, the two thrust levers were at idle. 53 seconds before impact, there was a first alarm of the GPWS, who pointed to the high rate of descent ( " SINK RATE" ). This sounded more times, after which the alarm signals " TERRAIN " and " PULL UP at" 47 seconds until the final impact also sounded.
The wreck, which still skidded another 400 m on the ground after the crash, was finally found away against 19:55 clock in a depression 1 km before the runway threshold and about 500 m north of the localizer.
Causes and consequences
The cause of the accident in front of all the inappropriate behavior of the pilots is considered, even if the weather conditions, particularly visibility and cloud cover, were poor and the already sophisticated Swing -over maneuver required so even more concentration. The pilots too late or not noticed her too high rate of descent, although many of the GPWS audible alarms went out. Furthermore, they forgot to extend the landing flaps, without the faster a stall occurs at low speeds. As indicated by the air traffic controllers, the crew would have at lack of visual contact with the runway take off and have to carry out a missed approach procedure.
As a result of the accident came four passengers, including a child, killed five persons were seriously and eleven other persons slightly injured, including four crew members. Four other passengers were uninjured. The aircraft suffered irreparable damage and was written off.
It has also been criticized by the media after the accident and the Lufthansa City Line concept: this will deliver a " sham" because the flights are operated by contractors who would the usual Lufthansa pilot training and safety standards not just.