Naming and Necessity

Name and necessity ( in the original: Naming and Necessity ) is one of the major works of the American philosopher Saul Kripke Aaron and one of the meistrezipierten of Analytic Philosophy. The work, published in 1972, based on a series of lectures which Kripke has held in Princeton in January 1970. Kripke makes here an important contribution to philosophical debate about proper names, at the same time it is his intention to sell the notion of necessity from that of the A Priori. With his conception Kripke refers also position in the mind-body problem, he puts forward an argument against the so-called identity theory.

Main theses

Kripke's theory of proper names

The labeling theory

Kripke developed his theory of proper names based on a critique of his predecessors. According to Kripke take Frege and Russell as a proper name " abbreviated or disguised labeling " (1 lecture, Suhrkamp edition p. 36). The proper name "Morning Star " is thus for example an abbreviation for the phrase " the one star that is in the morning to see the last still in the sky ." In the case of many proper names, especially in the case of famous people such as Aristotle, but it is difficult to give such a description. If " Aristotle " now " to be synonymous ," the author of " metaphysics " with " the teacher of Alexander the Great ", "the most famous student of Plato " or? Given this problem, the philosopher Wittgenstein and Searle had improved to the effect, according to Kripke, the labeling theory of proper names that proper names no longer with a single labeling but with a " bundle " ( clusters) on the labels interchangeably (p. 39 f.) Of these identifiers, not all, but a sufficient number apply to the appropriate person. The labeling theory and the improved bundle tag according to Kripke theory have the following advantages (p. 37 f ):

• A labeling gives us a criterion at hand, as we can weed out the actual intentioned speakers from the crowd of other potential speakers. The labeling theory can therefore explain how we determine which object the speaker with the proper names says.
• The labeling theory provides an explanation for why there are so -called " informative identity statements" ( this had Frege prepares in his essay " On Sense and Reference " headache ). An empirically full statement like " The morning star is the evening star " would, according to the theory to analyze as "The one star that is in the morning as a last resort in the sky, is identical to that star, the first is in the sky at night ." This analysis has shown clear what the empirical content of the statement is.
• The labeling theory can explain the importance of negative existential statements. The enigma that a statement like "Moses did not exist " is, is " How can we on the one hand take on Moses respect and deny him in the same breath existence. Did not we already undermined by reference its existence? ". But if "Moses" is synonymous with " the leader of the Israelites from Egypt," so the sentence would "Moses did not exist " because of the labeling theory be easy to analyze as "There was no leader of the Israelites from Egypt," and in this analysis is clear that we did not already assume the existence of Moses here.

The Importance determine or set the reference?

Kripke makes in respect of the labeling theory of proper names is a subtle difference: Shall serve the labeling to determine the importance of the proper name, or only set its reference ( fixing the reference)? To understand this distinction, you have the modalities of "necessary" and " possible " or make use of the Kripke often used tool of the " possible world " use. If the Id really determines the meaning, then the identification and the proper name must be necessary - ie in the speech of all possible worlds: in all possible worlds - speak to the same thing. However, it serves only to define the reference, then it is sufficient that the identification and proper name actually - speak to the same thing - in this world. This distinction will become clearer in the following, at the moment was only told that Kripke rejects both variants of the labeling theory.

Kripke developed his now famous critique with reference to some examples, including that of the standard meter in Paris (p. 67 ff.) The length " a meter " is defined as the length of the standard meter, that is, a specific member, at a particular time t. Thus, the length is determined by a meter, according to Kripke, but the terms " one meter " and " the length of the rod to t" is not synonymous, because this would have two names in all possible worlds that mean the same thing. However, it was possible that the rod to a different length t have had, ie there is a possible world in which had a different length. According to Kripke, the term " one meter " is a " rigid designation expression" ( rigid designators ) (p. 59 ), ie he called in every possible world the same (namely, that particular length). The term " the length of the rod to t" is used to determine its reference, but not to determine its importance. This is clear that in relation to another world in which the rod to t had a different length, would be that the bar was not one meter long, and that the staff was not there though a meter long, but one meter there is a different length than in this world.

The example thus shows that labels are not intended to define the meaning of a proper name. The reason is that proper names ( such as " one meter " ) are rigid designation expressions that refer to them in each world the same. Numbers (such as " the length of the rod to t" ) but typically does not denote in each world the same. Condition for synonymy would be, however, that designation is equality in every possible world. At the same time the standard meter is an example of how a marking, the reference of the proper name is determined: that the staff in this world t is the length of one meter, has determined the reference of this expression in all possible worlds.

As already mentioned, however, Kripke also criticizes the theory that labels specify the reference of proper names. While there are such cases as the standard meter displays, but they are not the rule. To show this, Kripke constructed another example, the " Godel -Schmidt example " (Lecture 2, pp. 98 f.) The example assumes that most people associate the proper name " Gödel " marked " the one who discovered the incompleteness of mathematics ". That this identification does not determine the meaning of " Gödel ", is clear from what has been said, it should in fact be impossible that Godel had not discovered the incompleteness, which is obviously not the case. But serves the identification of at least ( as in the case of the standard meter ) to define the reference, ie labeling is used to determine at least in this world, the referent of ' Gödel '? Kripke constructed in the event that Godel had plagiarized his manuscript by an unknown (and now deceased ) mathematician named " Smith." In reality would be so not Godel, but Schmidt the discoverer of incompleteness. In this case we would, we believe that Gödel had proved the incompleteness, but a false opinion about Godel not a correct about Schmidt. The name " Gödel " would thus still speak under these circumstances Gödel and not Schmidt. This example therefore shows that the labeling does not even serving to define the reference that it is therefore the identification and proper name is not even necessarily in this world speak the same thing.

The causal theory of proper names

Kripke outlines a theory of proper names that he opposes the labeling theory. This theory was later called " causal theory of proper names ": " Let's say there is someone born, a baby: his parents call it with a specific name, you talk to their friends about it Other people come along with it through various. .. types of speech is the name of member to member widespread as by a chain ... a certain chain of communication that goes back ultimately to the [ baby ] even reaches the speaker. He presents then [ the baby ] ... " ( p 107). One that I mean by the name " Gödel ", is therefore the same as what those meant, of which I have heard the name. This in turn meant those, the ones thought of which they have heard the name. Eventually, this chain leads back to people who had direct acquaintance with Gödel. Through the initial members ultimately the reference of the name " Gödel " is determined.

A weakness of the causal theory is that it has no good explanation for negative existential statements: How should the term " Moses" in the statement " Moses did not exist " will be analyzed? If Moses actually does not exist, then there can be no causal chain that rejects up to him.

Essentialism and natural kinds

In his third lecture, Kripke turns to the question of whether there is "essential properties ", ie Properties that come necessary an object. Kripke replied in the affirmative, so be it, for example, essential for a particular person, that he has emerged from the egg and sperm cell from which he is in fact emerged. We can not imagine a possible world in which man has been created from other cells, even if we can imagine that this is perhaps for another people with similar characteristics may be very true ( 3 lecture, p 130). We can also, if we find that an article of a certain material, do not imagine that it is made of a different material. According to Kripke, we can imagine though, that we find that a certain table that seems to be made of wood, instead, is made of ice, which is cleverly shaped and painted. But is the table actually made ​​of wood, then we can not imagine that he actually would consist of ice to us, it would not be more then the same table (p. 131). The material consist of the items, so is also an essential property.

According to Kripke have expressions for natural kinds, such as " tiger " as a proper name in proximity to, as they are also rigid designation expressions. The term " tiger " so called in every world in the same species. Having once determined that tigers are cats, we can not imagine a possible world more in the Tigers have a very different internal structure, such robots are. These robots would probably look similar and behave similarly to Tiger, but there would be no tigers, because the reference of the term " Tiger" has been defined by our acquaintance with real tigers in the world and is now the same for all worlds. It follows also that tigers are necessarily cats. That Tiger Cats are, however, a scientific discovery. According to Kripke, the natural sciences by analyzing the internal structure of species, their essential (necessary) properties.

A necessary and a priori

Kripke's execution to proper names at the same time serve him also, more specifically sell each other two traditional concepts of philosophy: that of necessity ( ie the truth in all possible worlds ) and the a priori. Latter term determines Kripke as follows: " A priori truths are those truths that can be seen independently of any experience" ( Lecture 1, p 44). An example is the phrase " bachelors are unmarried ". According to Kripke one is in philosophy often assumed that all a priori truths are necessary and vice versa. The supposed justification for this equation is by Kripke as follows: "If anything, [... ] is true in all possible worlds, then we should of course simply the fact that we run through all possible worlds in our head, [ ... ] in be able to see that [ the statement ] is necessary, and thus be able to recognize them a priori. [ ... ] Second, one thinks [ ... ] that conversely something that a priori is detected must be necessary because it has been recognized, without looking at the world., if it would depend on a contingent aspect of the real world, how could it then realize without looking? Maybe the real world is one of the possible worlds in which it would have been wrong. "

From the foregoing, however, there already that there is according to Kripke both a priori propositions, which are not necessary, and necessary, are not valid a priori. An example of the former is the statement " The standard meter in Paris is a meter long at time t ". This statement is true a priori, because we have defined the reference of ' one meter ' accordingly. It does, however, as already stated, is not necessary, it's possible worlds are conceivable in which the bar at the time had a different length. Statements "This table is made of wood " or " tigers are cats " are examples of the opposite case, namely the necessary statements that do not apply the a priori. To determine that this table is made ​​of wood or that tigers are cats, an empirical study has to be performed, the statements are not therefore a priori. As stated above, the statements but are nonetheless necessary, once we have determined that the table is made ​​of wood, no longer a world is conceivable in which it would be made ​​of other materials. Similarly, we can not imagine a world in which tigers are no cats.