Naturalistic fallacy
As a naturalistic fallacy (English naturalistic fallacy ), the test is called to define the good as a specific descriptive, natural or metaphysical property or relation. The naturalistic fallacy was described by George Edward Moore in 1903 in his Principia ethica. According to Moore the naturalistic fallacy is both a fallacy of naturalistic ethics, as well as the most non- naturalistic ethics, especially all metaphysical ethics, and provides a case of reductionism dar.
There is a certain relationship to the moralistic fallacy assumes that properties that are dealt with by certain ethical values bring natural tendencies expressed. Moore's argument is directed against the reduction of ethical and natural predicates in both directions.
Moore's argument
According to Moore can be judgmental ( prescriptive ) statements are not prepared from natural or supernatural properties define. Even David Hume had pointed out that one can not conclude from a description of the state of the world on an ethical imperative without additional assumptions ( Hume's Law). The attempt to close it is, therefore, also referred to as "His - Shall - fallacy ". A correct conclusion to an evaluative statement requires at least one evaluative premise. According to Moore must be good in this premise, offered, or at least implicitly occur a comparable value predicate and returned to descriptive predicates. Against such premises is directed Moore's argument.
In contrast to Hume Moore speaks strictly speaking, not by a final manner as the German translation suggests, but of fallacy, so an error. Whether referred to as naturalistic fallacy of inference is indeed a fallacy or a logical error, is controversial, in fact, and as dependent on whether to allow descriptive and prescriptive predicates differ always clear. Moore rejects the possibility of defining the good as it try naturalistic or categorized by him as metaphysical ethics. According to his meta-ethical position is to be intuitive decision on which things can be classified as good ( or as bad). Then Moore builds an intuitionist ethics. By contrast, could be at each proposed definition always questioning whether the proposed property unless really good, that is an ethical obligation to bring with them, or positive value attributions result have ( the argument of the open-ended question ). Also, because the alleged fallacy or error is therefore not specifically only a problem of ethical naturalism, as suggested by the term " naturalistic fallacy " First, this is sometimes criticized as inaccurate.
Examples in the Principia ethica
As an example of naturalistic fallacy within a naturalistic ethics Moore mentions in his Principia ethica popular in naturalistic circles proposal that is well equated with naturally. However, this is incorrect, since natural, so far as Normal or Necessary is meant not seriously as always good or as the only good things could be assumed:
"As typical of naturalistic views, other than Hedonism, what there first taken the popular commendation of what is natural: it was pointed out by natural did there might also be here Meant Either normal or Necessary, and did neither the normal nor the Necessary Could be Supposed to be seriously Either always good or the only good things. "
Naturalistic fallacies come to Moore but also in the metaphysical ethics ago. As an example, Moore calls the ethics of Spinoza, Kant, and the Stoics. For example, could the good not only by following instructions from metaphysically justified, whether it be in terms of a categorical imperative or the commandments of a supernatural authority, defined as:
" And so Kant commits the fallacy of Supposing that ' This ought to be' means ' This is Commanded '. He conceives the moral law to be in imperatives. And this is a very common mistake. "
Criticism
The Encyclopedia of philosophy divides the critics in the conception of the naturalistic fallacy, according to their reasons for refusal in ontological ethicist, naturalist reductionists and internal realists.
Against the thesis that the predicate " good " can not be reduced to a descriptive, led by representatives of natural law, among other things, that there is no alternative to being. If not the 'ought' can be derived from the essential being, then no ethics would be possible because the Nothing can justify just nothing. In addition to that intuition is a being, but it alone is not sufficient for a scientific justification of an ethical system. According to the doctrine of natural law, the good thing is that being righteous, so that the immutable essence of things Corresponding.
The assumptions were criticized behind the concept of the naturalistic fallacy by linguists. In his contribution to the theory of speech acts Searle speaks of the " fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy " ( naturalistic fallacy fallacy ). In the linguistic description of what is, are necessarily contain normative elements. What would be included in the canon of human language and thus the discourse was thus already changed judgmental. Therefore, there can not be " value-free " description of objective things and the 'ought' is already implicit in the designation of what is included. Even Hilary Putnam's Internal Realism assumes that the transition from factual statements to statements about norms and values is possible.
Was considered critical to the naturalistic fallacy among others by William K. Frankena in an article in the journal Mind. Frankenas approach was taken about by Arthur Norman Prior, a historical analysis of the His - Shall dichotomy takes in Logic and the Basis of Ethics and notes that Moore's formulation for the rejection of an intelligent naturalism is not sufficient.
From the perspective of WW Bartley the naturalistic fallacy is already inadmissible because it presupposes the possibility of justification. However, Bartley interpreted the Münchhausen trilemma so that there can be no absolute reasons, so can an should not be sufficiently justified by a being. Instead, only consistency checks within each of the sets of prescriptive and descriptive statements can be made for him: One can check that what is to be done, is consistent with other things that should also be done. Also, one could criticize the 'ought' with being, by checking whether what is to be done can be done. So Logically, one can not derive from empirical theories, but only falsify ethical demands; here Bartely sees an analogy to the relationship between empirical theories and observation statements in the critical rationalism.