On Certainty

On Certainty ( engl: On Certainty, short LEL) is the last work of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Formation

On Certainty forms the conclusion of Wittgenstein's later works and was built in four phases between April 1950 and April 29, 1951, two days before the death of the author. It is on the one hand not provided manuscript for publication but may vary due largely thematic and outward separation of other topics well be considered as an independent work. It was Wittgenstein's executors GEM Anscombe and G. H. edited by Wright and numbered by paragraphs.

Context

TG was created in discussion with G. E. Moore's essays A defense of common sense and proof of an external world in which this responds to the skeptics by citing a number of things that he knows:

The classic example of this is: " I know that there is a hand. "

ÜG connects directly to this example: "If you know that here is a hand, so we give you everything else to. " (§ 1)

Certainty concept

Wittgenstein is aware that we may be wrong always. His certainty concept aims not to show it, where we have access to the truth, but how doubt and the idea may be meaningless to a mistake because of their roots in the language game or incomprehensible. He argues that the structure of our language can lead us to form sentences doubt, where can not be doubted.

Imagine the example before, where someone says, "I do not know if I have hands. " According to Wittgenstein, the answer is constitutive for the language game, as it demonstrates one rooted in the life-form types of service that persuasion "Look closer there! ".

The radical skeptic who wishes to doubt everything, overlooks the fact that our doubts are only useful in a system of certainties. So linguistic doubts about something in the outside world EXISTING only makes sense because you not doubt the significance of their own words. Do not accept anyone these certainties, but doubt it, doubt itself is nonsensical. Therefore provide a useful within the linguistic community doubt is possible, first of all a system of propositions must be accepted that are not in doubt.

However, this is not a rigid system, but one which, due to the dynamics of the changing forms of life may also change. Thus, a sentence which was the earlier judgments based now itself become an experience set, or vice versa. Undoubtable sentences in an absolute sense, there is, according to Wittgenstein therefore not. In ÜG this is illustrated by the image of a river bed: " One could imagine that certain phrases would be frozen on the form of empirical propositions and as a conduit for the non-solidified liquid empirical propositions worked; and that this relationship changed over time by liquid solidified and fixed rates would be liquid. / / The Mythology [ i e the undoubted records ] may again fall into the river, move the bed of the thoughts. But I distinguish between the movement of water in the river-bed and the shift of this; although there is not a sharp separation of the two. "(§ 96 and 97)

The belief in a set or system of records has quite a normative character: How can a man, he should discover something that one of his convictions contrary, always (the " river bed " ) to change the conviction or the reference system. However, the firm belief in a set does not show in a language to be uttered conviction, but in action. Here the belief in unfounded sets is clear.

An important improvement over the classical skeptical theses is that this is always a solution to the unfounded doubt demanded, while Wittgenstein arguing that to doubt the reasons are needed. Therefore, a radical embracing doubt, as expressed him about Descartes, not possible.

The role of language game and form of life

Doubt is useful only in the language game. However, this must not be understood as a speech act, be so conceived, so to speak, as the smallest, an essential element of the language, but must as a comparison object for the language. In this case, there is no element that is common to all language games given, but these are due to their family resemblances to recognize as language games.

The Language Game in turn is embedded in the form of life. It must not be made the mistake of identifying it with it. Since the form of life, however, changed, also creates new language games, while old disappear.

Summary

1 In principle, we do not have direct access to the truth.

2 However, we can perform no radical doubt, because we need this certainties and because we often lack the grounds to doubt. Only if a doubt is part of the language game and this in turn element of life, a doubt is possible.

3 The skeptic who wants to doubt everything, no classical answer must therefore be given. It's Wittgenstein rather a therapeutic treatment of the doubt by the groundlessness and the uselessness and finally the impossibility of doubt are presented.

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