Optical scan voting system

A digital pen is an election system in which a combination of digital pen and digital paper to be used for the detection of ballots. He is like a conventional pen in addition, one mini digital camera is built, the closer filming the pen tip environment and can register in the position at which the pen is used. Its use should be used in voting in elections for a simple and rapid counting of votes. Originally, the use in the Hamburg state elections on 24 February 2008 was planned.

Voting

The voter receives his ballot as before and make in the voting booth with the ink of the digital election pens his crosses on the paper. The pin registered automatically at which positions on the ballot, the pin was placed. Once the voter has made ​​his crosses, he casts his ballot as before in the ballot box, there is also additionally from the digital pen choice at the election board. This connects the choice pen with a reading device which reads the stored Stiftaufsetzkoordinaten and on the connected local personal computer (PC) stores. The storage is done without time - and order information in order to preserve the secrecy of the ballot. After data transmission, the electoral board switches the selection pin for the next vote electronically freely and the next voter can cast his vote.

If the voter is provided during the Ankreuzens, so he can use to give a new ballot. The old ballot is torn, the choice pin reset and re-released, and the voter can choose again with the new ballot.

Technique of digitizing

The digitization of writing or Ankreuzvorgangs is possible because the paper of the ballot, barely visible from the people, is finely patterned. The pattern divides the ballot into a grid whose grid spacing is 0.3 mm. Each field of this grid is again uniquely encoded by tiny dots. When the pin is attached, the pin detects this using a built mine pressure sensor and the digital camera in Wahlstift recognizes from the patterning of the ballot, the coordinates at which the pen tip is placed and stores these coordinates on any memory in the pen from. It is in this technique, the so-called Anoto technology, which has the Swedish company Anoto Group AB develops and established.

Evaluation

The analysis is done by software, but you can at any time be checked by the election committee for accuracy. In the evaluation software valid ( checkboxes) and invalid (the rest of the ballot ) defined coordinate ranges of the ballot. Based on defined rules ( written only in valid ranges? Was written in at most n valid areas? Were made in the applicable areas crosses? ) Assigns the software the individual ballot records, to "consider " the categories "valid" or "invalid " about. The Electoral Board now has the opportunity to have every ballot record, especially the " under test" and the " invalid " display. Therefore, the coordinates at which the pin was placed, overlaid with an appropriate digital ballot image. The write information is so visualized: It can be seen has been placed on the positions at which the pin of the ballot. The Electoral Board advises now as before on the validity of the ballot and the apparent will of voters and then arranges it according to definitively the categories "valid" or "invalid " to. Any valid coordinate range ( = checkbox ) is assigned to exactly one candidate. This results from the valid ticked coordinate areas the election results.

Tallying

The election result is after the evaluation process before immediately. The manual counting is voided, but is possible if required. The subsequent verification of digital ballot records and subsequent verification of the analysis, which was performed by the software, with the support of the electoral board is possible. In particular, sample comparisons between machine (pen / software) and manually ( ballots from the ballot box / election officials ) determined results are possible by randomly selected polling stations tallied completely by hand. An immediate allocation of individual paper ballot to the corresponding digital ballots is not, or only with great effort possible because the ballots are not individualized.

What is missing so far is a legal provision in the event that a difference between the digitally calculated result and the manual ballot counting is present. It needs to be regulated, which of the two the mandatory election result. In an election in Belgium, the manually counted using result was accepted as binding at an eight percent difference due to the existing law. Experts ( "official expert" ) kept the computer count but more credible.

For the state election in Hamburg was intended to use the Digital Wahlstift system as a dialer. This means the primacy of digitally determined result. A manual ballot counting should be made only on a sample basis. The alternative is to use the Digital Wahlstift system as a counter. This means the priority of manual ballot counting. Then the manual counting of all votes would be conducted. The counting is a rapid counting and a confirmation of the - in the case of Hamburg error-prone - manual counting.

After confusion regarding safety was excited in a constitution committee meeting on 9 November 2007 by Prof. Joachim Posegga to use the Digital Wahlstift system as a counter. This proposal was considered by the opposition factions in the following days, a suitable compromise, but could not prevail in the further course.

Application

On 26 April 2006, the Hamburg Parliament unanimously decided the widespread use of digital election pens at the state election in Hamburg 2008 and instructed the Senate with the implementation. The conformity of the results of the paper ballots with the electronic result should be checked at random during first use. According to Land Returning Officer Willi bite it had been in the exclusive use of the digital election pens in Hamburg to a world premiere. Interior Senator Udo Nagel (independent) as well as the provincial election supervisor Willi bite stressed several times that the digital pen choice was safe. It was referred to the various certifications.

After the GAL MP Farid Müller expressed substantial doubt about the security of the digital pen choice in fall 2007, an expert consultation was conducted over the Constitutional Committee on 9 November 2007. As a result of the hearing decided on 15 November, the chairmen of the three represented in the citizenry fractions completely refrain from use in state elections in 2008.

Legal and Safety

The Digital Wahlstift currently has no approval for use in federal elections. For such an approval would also be first adjusted the Federal Voting Machine Ordinance, as it is tailored to devices with buttons and screen.

In Hamburg, the country's election law would have to introduce must be adjusted. The fact that this has not happened and the fractions do not plan to do this, the application for the state election of 2008 was no longer possible. For Hamburg, the approval by the Physikalisch- Technische Bundesanstalt was determined to be a necessary condition.

The dotVote based on the security requirements of a Protection Profile according to Common Criteria, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has been specifically certified for a Digital Wahlstift system on March 14, 2007. The certification of the system dotVote on the basis of this protection profile was performed by BSI and the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt ( PTB). The result of the evaluation could be released only four months after the state election in Hamburg.

The Chaos Computer Club (CCC ) expressed criticism of the protection profile as an inappropriate means for Election Systems. In addition, the technique used, to significant vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities wanted representatives of the CCC show at a special meeting of the Constitutional Committee in Hamburg on 9 November 2007. The demonstration was surprisingly canceled and instead presented an alternative attack, in which the digital paper was manipulated. This representation of the manipulation was rejected by representatives of the manufacturer, as security measures against such manipulation existed. Committee members reacted angrily and threw the representatives of the CCC before, to have remained the evidence of their manipulation allegations guilty. The strained by the manufacturer in the wake of court cases was decided in November 2009 after two instances at the Higher Regional Court of Hamm in favor of the CCC.

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