Ousia
Ousia (Greek οὐσία ousía, also transcribed as ousia, "being", " beings ", literally " beingness " ) is a central concept of the ancient Greek ontology. There is an on with the participle ( " being" ) etymologically related noun. Accessible is the translation with "substance". However, it is problematic because it reflects only part of the spectrum meaning of ousia. In general, the term refers to the being from the point to its durability and the "essence" or "nature" of something as the constant factor that evidences a continuing or time-independent identity. Unlike the ousia form changeable properties whose occurrence or omission does not affect the identity of the wearer.
- 3.1 ousia in the Categories
- 3.2 ousia in metaphysics
Origin and History of the term
The derivation from a root meaning "to be" is considered safe, the etymological development but can be reconstructed only hypothetically. The oldest documented importance of ousia is " property", "property". This usage comes before Herodotus, and even in the Roman Empire. In particular, the word was used to refer to real estate. At the end of the 5th century BC, it also had the meaning of " reality " or " real existence ".
In philosophical terminology ousia was introduced as a technical term in the 4th century BC by Plato. He described thus ontologically stable, unchanging and essential, which he could build on the land connected with idea of resistance. In this philosophical sense ousia expresses that something has the property of " being" to be in the sense of being resistant. It refers to the literal translation of " beingness ". Since Plato only one true being said in the sense of an unchanging reality, ousia can also be translated as "reality". At the same Plato called ousia with the essence of a thing ( what the thing gives its permanent identity). Depending on the particular context, it is Plato's ousia in some cases with "being" ( beingness ), in others with "essence" to translate. In addition, other meanings come with him currently, which it is evident that the philosophical use of words in the initial phase was not clearly spelled out.
Even in Aristotle an inherent consistency is what makes the ousia. For him, an ousia is a single thing that exists independently as such. This existence is made possible by the presence of a stable substrate that despite all the changes of variable properties ensures the constant identity of the thing. In this substrate, underlying the existence of the individual thing, there is the ousia; the thing itself is the substrate. Already in antiquity ousia a noun that belongs to the verb substare, the " underlying " " below ( or in the process, it) be present " Therefore latin reproduced with substantia means. Of these, the German foreign word "substance" is derived.
Although substantia expresses that something is based on, but not the entirety of what can be meant in Greek with ousia. This is not an accurate translation, because substantia makes the connection between ousia not recognize with Being. Even in ancient times, a different, literal Latin translation was used, which refers to the basic meaning of " beingness ": essentia, derived from the verb esse ( "being" ). The portmanteau was essentia specially created for the purpose of reproduction of ousia. Its creator was Cicero, Seneca reported. Some authors used in Late Antiquity ( Augustine, Calcidius ) essentia as a synonym of the more common term substantia. Under the influence of Aristotle translator Boethius but naturalized a distinction that was crucial for the use of the concept of the medieval and early modern philosophers. According to this understanding is the substantia standard translation of ousia and expresses its substrate aspect of; essentia has the meaning "essence" ( " quiddity " ) and stands for the characteristic nature of a thing that gives this definition of the characteristics and thus a determinate being. Substantia refers to the being that belongs to the individual thing as such, essentia having on the species and genera nature, the individual things because they belong to species and genera.
In modern philosophy of historical literature is ousia usually - depending on the context - with " being," "essence" or " substance " translated. The common translation "substance" but also criticized as narrowing of the meaning content; strongly rejects the philosopher Rudolf Boehm, which they criticized as inadequate and therefore missed. Wolfgang Schneider also suggests that " substance" is the meaning of ousia reflects inadequate. He advocates " beingness ", the translation used by Martin Heidegger. Hermann Schmitz holds - as far as it concerns texts of Aristotle - "essence" for the best translation, since the German word can be used both as a two -place predicate as a single digit as well as the Greek.
Plato
Plato, who introduced the technical term ousia in the philosophy thus combines different aspects of meaning. Based on the totality of reality is ousia that exists in every being, all reality common characteristic of "being" that makes up the character of reality of existing things. Based on the contrast between the unchanging and the variable is ousia the being of Invariant opposed to becoming the emerging and disappearing phenomena. In relation to the transitory objects of sense perception ousia denotes that which justified its continued identity in transition: the totality of the constant characteristic which the objects can be defined.
Ousia in the area of the ephemeral
Plato regarded as defining a central task of the philosopher. It depends on the characteristics that make a thing to what it is, correctly and completely specify, to distinguish it from everything else. Defining a thing is therefore to determine its ousia. Who is capable of doing, has won a correct and comprehensive knowledge of this thing and thus acquires real knowledge about it.
The ousia one thing X is determined by the definition of features that make it possible to answer the question " What is X?" Clearly and truthfully to answer. If a sensible object which is subject, as such, always changing, is mentioned, then it must be the constant characteristics that, as long as there exists a particular thing as such, always and everywhere to come and resistant to it account. Thus, these features can not relate to the single object of sense in terms of its specific nature, variable. Rather, they need to relate to what the identity of the object gives its stability: its membership is related to a species on a sense object ousia therefore always the ousia of the kind to which it belongs.
A single sensuously perceptible thing has thus as such, does not own, inherent ousia, but what he ousia - his being and his nature - lends his style is you is the actual carrier of the entire ousia. All observations, which makes the philosopher to individual objects of sense, only serve the purpose to determine the basis of examples the nature of the species and genera of which such objects. The goal is to determine how the species and genera behave as part of a hierarchical order another. Only species and genera are defined. Therefore, only they are possible objects of scientific knowledge.
From Plato's view therefore is that which is real in the field of sensory perception, not what the senses immediately presents itself - the individual objects of sense - but ceded to the sense objects General: the essential defining features they the same in each case with all other objects kind have in common. These features exist independently of the random survival or demise of the individual sensible things in which they appear. The essence of a kind is a timeless, no change subjugated condition.
As a result, for Plato, a hierarchical order of the levels at which ousia occurs. The species- General is to be the true bearer of the ousia generally senior to that which constitutes the peculiarity of the individual. From ousia as a being and essence of the individual can only be spoken of inasmuch as the individual of its kind welcomes its essentials on which its existence depends. In this sense the individual is a product of its kind between the species and their individuals, there is a participation ratio ( Methexis ). The single thing has " involved " the essence of its kind " share ", it is to some extent on the nature of the species. Mentally detected is the ousia of the kind only if you turns to her as such, that is, apart from all individual peculiarities and only the Common contemplates the totality of each species-specific characteristics.
Ousia in the purely spiritual realm
The genera and species are, for Plato, not mental constructs of man, but transcendent objects, the later so-called " Platonic ideas ". Together they form a sensory perception withdrawn, but real and independently existing range. This is of a purely spiritual nature ( " noetic ", Latin for " intelligible " ) and can only be detected in a purely intellectual way. The ideas apply in Platonism as the true being, the actual reality, their ousia is the being in the true sense. Any idea is of timeless perfection. The existing in the purely spiritual realm ousia is characterized by its unchanging perfection. Features of the Perfect are certainty and uniformity.
In relation to this area called ousia the true, authentic being, in contrast to both the Will and the non-existence. The ousia is eternal, but her eternity is not intended under the condition of time; here it is not a continuation, but a timeless reality. The term ousia Plato used in this context, both for the individual ideas, each with its own ousia - is constituted, as well as for the being or beingness itself as the totality of everything that exists extensive - their being and essence.
A fundamental difference between the true ousia of ideas and improper ousia of sense objects is, for Plato, is that the ideas "in itself" ( kath ' autá ) are existent conditions that exist independently of references, while the changeable things only a notice regarding his have that given to them by their relationship to the ideas.
A mediating role has to Plato in his ontological model of the world soul. In the Timaeus dialogue, he distinguishes three kinds of ousia: the indivisible and always consistent ousia of the ideas divisible ousia, which is classified as part of the perishable body, and a third kind generated by combining these two types The mixed ousia is the creation myth the Timaeus, the mode of being of the world soul and the individual souls. Due to their mixed nature of the world soul is the mediating agency between the purely spiritual world of ideas and the material realm, the body of the cosmos. Since it includes indivisible and divisible at the same time, it has access to both areas. In their mixed ousia but is the aspect of immutability of priority, applicable to their nature. He characterizes the nature of the world soul and causes it is immortal and indivisible and thus belongs to the intelligible region. The same applies to the souls of men and their relationship to the human bodies.
In late dialogue Sophist Plato writes of ousia and thus the ideas move to. It is about the act of cognition which does not appear enforceable if without movement. It is postulated movement of ousia is necessary for the actual realization of a knowledge, for something completely at rest was not apparent, but all action, including the cognitive process, deprived of principle. This seems Plato's thesis, in the purely spiritual realm there is only unchangeable, to disagree. In research, different solutions are discussed.
Ousia and the good
A special position is occupied by the idea of good. It is superior to all other ideas in Plato's model, that is, it has in the hierarchy of existing things the highest rank. To give the sense objects whose ousia as the ideas, gives the idea of good all other ideas their ousia. Thus, the idea of good is the highest principle.
Very controversial in research, the question of whether the idea of the good along with the other ideas accounts for Plato the realm of true being, or whether they have children of this area, so " seinstranszendent " is. The research controversies revolve mainly around a point in Plato's interpretation of its sun parable, where it is determined that good is " not the ousia " but " beyond the ousia " and meet them on originality and power. Here it depends on whether ousia is meant at this point only in the sense of "essence " or of "being" and that is to understand "beyond the ousia " in the sense of absolute transcendence.
A number of influential philosophy historians interpret the disputed passage in the sense of being transcendence. According to their interpretation, the idea of the good of all other ideas differs principally in that it exceeds the realm of being. Since it is the cause of the whole intelligible output, they can not belong to him themselves, but must be ontologically locates above it; she is absolutely transcendent ( " about -existent ").
Representatives of the contrary opinion believe that there is not is a " Übersein ", but only to a particular kind of ousia, which is distinct from that of other ideas, or be it with the ousia, which is exceeded, only the essence, not the meant being of ideas.
Aristotle
Since Plato's pupil Aristotle rejected the theory of ideas, his understanding of the ousia of the Platonic difference. Like Plato, Aristotle was convinced that it was only from the general, can not give from the individual a science. In contrast to Plato, but he refused to accept a real, independent of the individual sense objects existing range of general and assign the true, actual ousia this area. While Plato only the general beilegte one ousia in the full sense and individual things only a participation in the ousia of their respective kinds, Aristotle moved inversely primary, original ousia in individual things and approved the species only a secondary, derivative ousia to.
In his relatively early written font categories Aristotle treated the subject differently than in the event later work metaphysics. This has resulted in research intense debates about the coherence of Aristotelian doctrine. Whether and to what extent, the different handling of the philosophers with the problem of ousia in the two works reflects a change of mind, is controversial. Some historians of philosophy are based on an unsolvable contradiction that show the lack of a consistent concept. Others use only one of the two theories coincide with the valid position of Aristotle and keep the other for a failed attempt. In addition, there are efforts to combine the two theories coherently. According to the current state of research is more likely to think with her on a limited review of the original position as a radical break. Ilan Moradi thinks that it was an evolution from the "Category font " to metaphysics. Here Aristotle had his first theory is not abandoned, but only supplemented for application in a different context and extended.
Ousia in the Categories
In the " Category Scripture " comes from Aristotle of the Platonic distinction between the independent existence of the constants and the only being of the relevant variables. But He introduces a new concept: the ousia to him is a stable substrate that underlies the existence of a single thing ( synholon ) basis and shall ensure its constant identity. For this substrate contact variable properties that accidents ( symbebēkóta ), were added. The accident does not belong as addition Coming to nature of the thing to which it is connected; it is in fact, but neither necessarily nor generally available. The presence or absence of accidents is random and does not affect the identity of the thing, as this with its substrate, the " Underlying " is ( hypokeimenon ) equate. Of the accidents, the ousia differs in that it is no more or less allows that there is nothing Opposite to her and that it can accommodate opposite accidental provisions, without losing their identity.
Aristotle distinguishes ten categories. His categorization includes everything that can be the subject or predicate of a statement, so the entirety of the linguistically expressible. Ousia is the first category; it is usually called in the history of philosophy literature " category of substance ." Among them falls the Underlying, ie everything " is not predicated of one Underlying is still in an Underlying ". The remaining nine categories include accidents that can attach a ousia (for example, quantity or quality ). You are predicated of one ousia or are in it. As an example, Aristotle calls the color of a body. The body is as Underlying ousia, the color is accident.
In the category font Aristotle takes the position that any sensible concrete individual thing is a ousia and as such an Underlying. Only One is ousia in the strict sense ( " primarily and in the first place and especially called ousia "). As examples, he leads the individual man ( " this particular person" ) and the individual horse. He calls the ousia of individual things " first ousia " as opposed to " second ousia ", the ousia of the genera ( for example, " living creatures " ) and species ( for example, " person" or " horse "). Regarding the assumption that genera and species are as ousia look at, Aristotle is careful; he considers it plausible, but not necessary.
The first and second ousia together form the first category. But there are important differences between them. The first ousia can never act in a judgment as a predicate, the second, however, can be of a Underlying, a first ousia, testified ( " Socrates is a man "). The first ousia is indivisible, that is, a subdivision would destroy the individual thing and thus the ousia. It is the number by one unit. The second ousia, however, such a indivisibility does not occur and is predicated of many individuals. The unity and indivisibility is a main feature of ousia in the proper sense, for Aristotle, as for Plato. In contrast to Plato, but he locates these not in general but in the individual. The genera and species, he writes a ousia to only insofar as they are provisions of the concrete individual things and, with them. Being of such a provision is derived, as it is of its substrate, the first ousia, interdependent and indivisible connected with him. Without the first ousia nothing else would exist, because without individuals there would be no genera and species. The second ousia to the provisions pertaining thereto are but despite their ontological subordination is not trivial, since they refer to the individual thing than what it is, allow its definition thereby making it identifiable.
A genus is, as it includes several species, from the simplicity of individual things further away than one species Therefore, the species occurs in a higher degree ousia as the genera; they behave to these terms of ousia as individual things to the species.
Ousia in metaphysics
In the Metaphysics Aristotle carries criticism of his own determination of ousia as Underlying; he referred to them as inadequate because it was unclear and to put back the ousia equated with matter ( hyle ). In the Aristotelian system, the matter is the Underlying processes; it is what remains when everything else is taken away mentally. Thus, it has one of the features of ousia, and from this point it is expressly stated in metaphysics as ousia, but only in a very limited sense of the term. Since matter is entirely of himself forth Indefinite their ousia has with that of the individual things nothing to do, because a single thing is always a certain " this thing ", and contributes the matter as the absolutely indeterminate at nothing. Thus, the determination of ousia must be modified if the ousia of individual things to be captured. Therefore, Aristotle is looking for a new approach. The term " second ousia ", with whom he had the species and genera awarded the status of an ousia in the category of writing, he no longer needed.
As in the category header determines Aristotle in metaphysics ousia as the only in the original sense and simply - not because of a reference to something else - being. He is not content here but with an indication of the presence of signs of ousia in individual things, but look at what makes up the ousia in individual things. He goes by his principle that every individual thing is constituted by two principles: its specific, inherent essential form ( eidos ), which is its formal cause, and his matter. A recycling the ousia of individual things on the matter he denies decided. He comes to the conclusion that the ousia of a single thing consists in its essential form. The essential form is for each individual thing than what it is stated to be, and thus what is captured in the definition and scientific investigation is accessible. It is ousia in the original sense, the individual thing, however, can only be described in a derived sense as ousia. While the single thing comes and goes, the essential form is a constant condition; it is more original than the individual thing and thus ontological priority. In addition, individuals of the same species are different through the matter, while the essential form always is indivisible and equal. In addition, the essential form is an absolute unit while the individual things represent a ratio of the form to their substantive support. Thus, the characteristics of ousia, simplicity ( Unzusammengesetztheit ) and immutability, the essence of the species occur to a greater extent than the individual things. In the species, they are also given more than in the genera, as a genus consists of several types and therefore less uniformity than one species proves So for Aristotle, the essential form of the species as ousia in the true sense. He approaches the metaphysics of Plato's way of thinking again about something. But in rejecting the separate existence of ideas he notes. An essential form there is for him only in the individual thing, it can only be conceptually separated from it; no General can be ousia. Also, mathematical objects have no ousia character.
When defining ousia is the "what" of the object targeted by the definition. One type is ( subdivision ) defined with the procedure of Dihairesis by starting from a highest genus forms a term set by an ever more extensive differentiation, until you come to a not further divisible content, the " final difference " with reaching the definition is. The last difference is what Aristotle ousia of the subject matter of definition.
Aristotle emphasizes the priority of ousia against everything else; he notes that it is a First after every respect, both the concept and the knowledge and the time after. It is in his teaching at the same time a principle of knowledge and constitutive principle of individual things, both the being in the highest manner and the most discernible.
An exception to the Aristotelian rule that everything that exists is composed of matter and form or essence, is the divine spirit ( nous ). He is pure, existing for itself essential form without matter, absolutely immutable and absolutely simple. Since he can not be reproduced by matter and its individuality is based only on the essential form, coincide the conceptual unity of nature and the numerical of the individual in it. Thus, the characteristics of ousia in the highest possible degree, come to him only.
Since Aristotle various carrier of ousia assumes it differs in metaphysics three types of beingness: the ousia of the sensible, transitory individual things, like living beings or man-made objects, the perceptual sensual ousia of, but imperishable objects ( celestial bodies ) and the eternal and unmoved ousia of God's " unmoved mover ". As Aristotle ousia of an organism determines its soul.
How far is it succeeded Aristotle in metaphysics to provide a consistent, its own conditions sufficient ousia concept is controversial in research. In an effort to answer this question, several competing interpretive approaches ( " predictive ", " idealistic " and " individualist " interpretation). A major problem is that the ontological ousia neither general may be individually or according to the understanding of Aristotle. If it is general, it is affected by the criticism of the theory of ideas; if it is individual, it is deprived of access scientific principle.
Stoics, Epicureans and Peripatetics
In the materialistic natural philosophy of the Stoic philosophy there is no transcendent being and therefore no pre-images in the sense of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. For the Stoics the first ousia is the loose quality (qualitative indefinite ) primary matter as the material substratum of all provisions and the absolutely simple. Also, the substrate of individual things they call ousia. However, they prefer the term " Underlying " in her class teaching. Also in the philosophy of the school of Epicurus ousia is perceived materialistic; any simple or compound body is considered a " per se existent " ousia.
In the school founded by Aristotle direction of the Peripatetics, the influential thinker Alexander of Aphrodisias uses the term ousia both the essential form as well as matter and constituted by these two principles, individual thing. But he has only the physical single thing to an independent reality. In contrast to Aristotle, he distinguishes between a physical and an incorporeal ousia and considers the physical and ontological priority.
Neoplatonism
Plotinus, the founder of Neo-Platonism, goes back to Plato's definition of ousia and deals with the concept of ousia, Aristotle apart, as well as with the Stoic concept. He notes, Aristotle had in its category theory takes into account only the area of growth and decay and neglect the existence of immutable. The category of ousia can not include both because of the fundamental difference in the mental and the physical way of being. It lacked a definition of this category, which indicates a special characteristic of being, which is present in all species of being alike. For the spirit realm Plotinus arrives at a schedule of five categories, including the ousia in the proper sense. For the world of sense, he also takes on five categories, including the ousia in the unqualified sense, which refers to the becoming and passing.
The ousia in the proper sense is the same as the Nous totality of ideas for Plotinus. Since, according to the Neoplatonic doctrine of the Nous, unseparated contains everything the observer met separately in the physical world in itself, it is easier than the multiplicity of ideas and of particular things. Therefore, and because the nous is only by itself and Certain beings, he is the perfect ousia. Above the Nous is in the Neoplatonic hierarchy only " the one " (to hen ), although not as being, but is regarded as over -existent and therefore no ousia has.
The late antique Neoplatonist Proclus discusses the ousia in connection with his theory of what exists by itself. This alone has a separate ousia for him. As composed by Proclus to determine that which is able to return to itself. So he takes on the triadic structure of its emanation reference ( the remaining of the effect in the cause, her emergence and its reversion ). In addition, the ousia is in the system of Proclus himself a part of triadic structures: the Triassic ousia - sameness - otherness that structures being, and the Triassic ousia - Life - Nous in which unfolds the thinking of the Nous, its reflection on itself.
The Neo-Platonic understanding of ousia makes itself felt in the Aristotle commentary on the late antique Neoplatonist Ammonius the School. Try the Platonic and Aristotelian ousia to bring the concept into line by the primacy of the "first" represent ousia ( individual things ), Aristotle postulated in the category of Scripture, as the expression of an evidence- based perspective. Only "for us " it appears so, since that is recognized ousia of individual things at first, but ontologically is the ousia of transcendent ideas of priority.
Gnosticism and Christian theology
In the literature of the ancient Gnostics ousia was a common term. In particular, in the Valentinian Gnosis was much talk of ousia. Gnostic authors understood ousia an underlying passive substance which receives forms. They distinguished between an intellectual, a spiritual and a material world and wrote each of the three areas to own ousia. Each ousia is in their area, the substrate for its entities. In all three types of human Ousia are present.
In the Church Fathers, the term ousia is attested from the 2nd century. They used him as part of their intensive polemic against the Gnostics. Hippolytus of Rome and Clement of Alexandria, which dealt with Aristotle's category Scripture came there on the Aristotelian ousia concept. Hippolytus rejected the doctrine of the categories from, Clemens picked it up and recycled it for his theological purposes. Clemens was the first Church writer who ' called the Christian God as one ousia in the sense of Aristotle's use of the term. This ousia it bordered on the attributes of God, such as omnipotence, goodness, and wisdom, for he regarded these properties as accidents. He was of the opinion, the divine ousia is the Christians even during the earthly life accessible.
In the ancient theological disputes about the Trinity ousia underwent a change of meaning. Until the second half of the 4th century was in this context is synonymous with ousia hypostasis ( hypostasis " way of being "). In this sense, in the 3rd century a church writer Origen, God the Father, Christ and the Holy Spirit to an ever own ousia or hypostasis. The participants in the Council of Nicaea in 325 ousia considered as a synonym of hypostasis. They put in their creed established that Christ was begotten "from the ousia of the Father", and proclaimed the anathema on those who say, was the Son of God. " From another hypostasis or ousia " than that of the father However, in the second half of the 4th century, there was a reversal of terminology: The Church Fathers Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzus put emphasis on a distinction between the two terms. They understood ousia under the common, the general essence, hypostasis under the individual and special. Based on the three elements of the trinity that meant the adoption of a single ousia, but three hypostases. In the West knew and accepted the scholar Marius Victorinus this distinction. Disagreed with the church father Jerome; he held strongly fixed to the equation of ousia and hypostasis. In the early 5th century, but the new use of the term was already common in the Greek terminology; henceforth established the principle that in one ousia of the Godhead are three consubstantial hypostases.