Pancritical rationalism

Pancritical rationalism, also Comprehensively Critical Rationalism, is a technology developed by William W. Bartley complement of critical rationalism of Karl Popper. It introduces an all-encompassing method of criticism, based on the falsification, but this expanded so that it can be applied to their own foundations. This makes it possible to represent the critical rationalism, without hurting their own claims. Pancritical rationalism rejects to the, Comprehensive rationalism ', which states that a position can only be represented rational if it is grounded or at least could be theoretically justified. He replaces it with the basic position that there is no justification and that rationality instead of the willingness to hold open positions that one holds, for criticism. All positions may be represented, as long as they can withstand rigorous testing.

Rationality problem

A basic problem that arises from the critical rationalism, as Popper describes it in the logic of research and open society, the question is whether he can ever be accepted according to its own criteria. In both works, Popper was not assumed that metaphysics is meaningless, but he was of the opinion that the limits of Falsifzierbarkeit represent at the same time the limits of the rational are negotiable and thus the absolute limits of science. The question of its validity could not be answered by their own means of critical rationalism thus. This leads to the consequence that there is even from the perspective of critical rationalism is no way to rationally decide between the critical rationalism and other existing positions and thus no reason the critical rationalism preferable to these other positions.

Popper's first attempt at a solution is to speak of an " irrational faith in reason " was. To this view he came through the discussion of the comprehensive rationalism, which raises the requirement that every decision must be justified by experience or argument, and the complete irrationalism that considers every decision as purely arbitrary and therefore arbitrary. Popper recognized that it was a decision for the comprehensive rationalism according to its own criteria can not be justified. But when he saw him in the form of critical rationalism to admit this problem openly and "certain restrictions recognizes " the lesser evil. He argued for it with some negative consequences of irrationalism. In a later essay on the topic then he formulated specific criteria for review and distinction of metaphysical theories:

  • Is the theory a solution to the problem?
  • Raises the theory the problem better than other theories, or they shifted the problem only?
  • Is the solution simple?
  • If the solution is fertile?
  • If the solution is inconsistent with other philosophical theories that are needed to solve other problems?

WW Bartley found these positions Poppers very unsatisfactory, and stressed that they can be attacked with a variant of the tu quoque argument: If the critical rationalism of the validity of his own criteria and principles can not be justified, but other positions judged according to these criteria and principles, then it must also be allowed the other positions to assess the critical rationalism according to their criteria and principles. However, this results in the consequence also to irrationalism, since the choice of criteria and principles in no logical relationship is a reality and is thus arbitrary. Bartley referred to this problem based on Popper's induction and demarcation problem as the Rationaliätsproblem.

Criticism rather than justification

The first step in Bartley's approach to solving this problem was a strict separation of justification and criticism. Bartley saw that in the comprehensive rationalism the classic form of criticism was to point out a lack of justification. However, if one starts from an absolute truth, it means a lack of justification is not the falsity of the thesis criticized. Popper had admittedly been previously represented, but it did not relate explicitly to the principles and standards of rationality itself Bartley, however, rejected this form of criticism that led Popper in The Open Society and to his skeptical attitude regarding one's own position, for all areas completely invalid. For Bartley was thus a critical argument admissible only if it attacked the truth of the criticized position; While it is therefore with the criticized position was the logical contradiction. Wide explicit as Popper himself Bartley set against any form of explanation and justification and distanced himself radically from the comprehensive rationalism. Bartley spoke of the comprehensive rationalism as an authoritarian structure of thought which was much closer to the irrationalism at the same time, as Popper had recognized this in the open society.

Rational argument

The second step of its solution was the logical context of arguments continue to work out, aimed at the truth of the contested position, and not on their justification. While Popper had already recognized that a contradictory position, and a falsifiable theory that contradicts a true basis set, can not be true, Bartley introduced another form of rational argument:

  • A metaphysical theory that contradicts a true falsifiable theory can not be true.

Thus metaphysical theories can be verified by empirical theories. Such arguments are non-dogmatic, since the empirical theory used in turn can be falsified by observation sentences. Conversely, there is also no argument that would allow for criticism only the use of observation records and not the use of falsifiable theories, because the strength of observation sentences is not their provability, which is not given, but, as with falsifiable theories also, the possibility to check them through further observation in any depth. This was Popper's view of the irrefutable metaphysical void.

Furthermore, Bartley made ​​the logical relationship between normative and methodological statements and realities advantage. In his view, in the discussion of the critical rationalism had the invalidity of naturalistic fallacies of the form

Too much meant that normative and descriptive statements were incorrectly considered to be independent and a logical relationship between the two was denied. Bartley had this vision back to its sweeping a and limited them to the thesis that there was no way the only justification of a normative statement by accepting the truth of a descriptive statement. However, normative statements by descriptive statements can certainly criticize, because normative statements are in a strictly deductive, logical relationship to descriptive statements, such as the final

Bartley argued that the normative statement thus could be quite criticized by the empirical finding of a severe brain damage. ultra posse nemo obligatur as a form of criticizability of standards due to facts but was also represented by Popper as well.

Basic position

With these results and the extension of Popper Falsifikationsmethode to a comprehensive theory of rationality, the importance of falsifiability falls as the boundary of science; it becomes a distinction between empirical and non- empirical statements, which is determinative of the method, but not for the epistemological status of sentences. The science is characterized solely by their comprehensive critical- rational approach, not by the logical structure or other criteria of the sentences which represents them. Bartley called this position the pancritical rationalism and took them with the basic hypothesis

Together. Any rejection of an argument that is not based on factual arguments, but on the claim that the theory is in principle not arguable, for example, unprovable, or not falsifiable, or not coherent with their own basic assumptions, is therefore a dogmatic regress. ( See, on the one hand the rational dogmatism and on the other hand, doubly entrenched ',' reinforced 'or' aggravated dogmatism ' - deliberately constructed immunization strategies, such as the defense of each counter- argument by a reference to an alleged mental illness of the discussion partner. ) Emphasized Bartley that a metaphysical determinism, which could be followed by analogy to the indeterminism of quantum physics from a falsifiable theory, in principle, the position of the pancritical rationalism could bring their own criteria to case, as it would expose any criticism as an illusion.

Despite long-standing differences between Popper and Bartley both agreed on many points, the precise situation is very complicated. There are some passages in Open Society from the fourth edition and in Realism and the aim of science to suggest strongly that Popper accepted the position of Bartley eventually full. On closer inspection, however, it turns out that Popper Bartley had given permission to make these changes themselves; So they were all written by Bartley itself. After the death of Bartley Popper distanced at a meeting in Kyoto from full compliance with Bartley.

Dialectic

Joachim Klowski worked the critical method of pancritical rationalism on for criticism of dialectical positions. He distinguished this kontextinvariante and context- variant objects in the language. If in a dialectical set ( a set in which contradictions are ) a context variant object can not be converted into a kontextinvariantes object, and the logical contradictions of the sentence can only be caused by such objects (for example, the whole in the sense of totality), then can not rationally argue with deduction and criticism and the contradictions are not an argument for the rejection of the position.

Klowski therefore tried to solve the problem of criticizability a dialectical movement, while still accounting for it as a logical component and the application of the critical method restricted to such Share. He did so on the one hand preventing dialectical rates are flat rate excluded from criticism and comment, rejected, on the other hand, that they are subject in all, especially in their dialectical components of the criticism, though that also would inevitably lead to the wholesale rejection because of contradictions.

Since each dialectical sentence always has such a logical component, the position of the pancritical rationalism can be successfully defended against dialectics. For it indicates only that all positions are open to criticism. However, this does not include criticizability the structure of each object on the speaking position. Isolation of such objects, they do not represent a set, and thus no more position so that they are no longer affected by pancritical rationalism. Since such dialectical objects that make up the dialectical share a dialectical movement, are necessarily contradictory, they may not be used inversely to derive any. After all, this would lead to arbitrariness. This means that the critical method has the primacy, ie it can and must be applied to everything that belongs to logic, even to the logic portion of dialectical sentences.

Klowski headed this primacy from from Bartley's finding that there is a core logic unrevidierbar. Without them, any discussion would be completely arbitrary and only consisted of a disjoint sharing any records. It therefore constitutes an absolute prerequisite for any meaningful argument and can only be given together with the activity of reasoning itself, but are not replaced by something else in the context of an argument. The primacy of the critical method is therefore indissoluble. She has but from the perspective of Klowski not, as Popper saw it, the absolute rule: you must not be applied in his eyes on the dialectical constituents of a sentence, ie exceed their own boundaries, although it has no validity beyond.

For this would lead to the uncritical and wholesale rejection of each dialectical sentence solely on the basis of assumptions that do not share the dialectician and without which he believes to get along, namely the validity of the logic, in particular the full exclusion of contradictions. Pancritical rationalist would therefore lose the right to criticize the dialectician for anything at all, since that could hold him, the rejection resultiere alone from the inadequacy of the critical method that he, the dialectician, had recognized and which he therefore deliberately in favor of dialectics avoid.

Klowski concluded from his considerations:

He explained the example of the totality that a rational criticism on the basis of a successful argument against the claim would be possible that it exists at all, but not on the basis of a wholesale rejection because of their contradictions.

Criticism

John F. Post and John WN Watkins have doubts that pancritical rationalism itself is fully criticized and expressed concern that he might be a tougher dogma. Bartley replied in additional appendices to The Retreat to Commitment, has further discussed the question David Miller. Armando Cintora believes that this clarification is ad hoc and the problems still exist.

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