Perlocutionary act

Perlokutiver act or perlocutionary act, even Perlokutiver speech and perlocution, is a concept from the theory of speech acts to Austin, which refers to the effect of aspects of the speech act. John Langshaw Austin identifies in his speech act, among other things between illokutivem, lokutivem and perlokutivem act

Illocution - perlocution

Unlike illocutions that are the result of a speech act and thus coincides with their execution, are perlocutions consequences of a speech act, which connect to the enforcement. Usually spoken in the speech act theory from the fact that one takes illocutionary acts by remarks, and perlocutionary acts in that it manifests itself.

Konventionaler versus causal perlocutionary aspect

It is necessary to distinguish between causal konventionalen and perlocutionary aspects.

For konventionalen aspect:

Here are perlocutions the specific, that is, the illocutionary purposes associated effects. They are:

  • , anyone who makes, for example, a communication ( = assertive illocution ), expect that one believes him,
  • Must at all to write, for example, a promise ( = commissives illocution ), reckon that will be expected to comply with it,
  • Everybody who praises someone for example ( = expressive illocution ), expect that the Promised enthuses about
  • , anyone who, for example, a ship renamed ( = declarative illocution ), expect that one accepts the name and call it from now on so
  • Everybody who asks another eg ( = directive illocution ) to do something, expect that the Broken Demanded wants that to which he was invited to perform, and finally executes.

Such action aspects are covered by the illocutionary purposes each konventional.

For causal aspect:

This is about the question of the perlocutionary act S ( = Leader ) completed and what perlocutionary effect S in H ( = hearer ) has achieved. In German, there is a variety of verbs that are used on this aspect can be referenced ( for example, convince, surprise, persuade ).

Perlocutionary effects can be divided into three classes: epistemic ( at H a belief is triggered, etc.), motivational ( at H intention is triggered ) and emotional (when H is an emotion triggered ). Anyway, this is the result of the classification of work Staffeldt (2007).

Criticism

Not all conventional utterances, or speech acts can be assigned properly to certain illocutionary classes. So is debated, for example, in the literature on an association of the " Erlaubens ". On the one hand is an explicit Allow perfomative statement with which the addressee is legitimate to use a utensil for example. Pragmatically, representing a larger room for maneuver is the addressee guaranteed, whereas this is interpretable as Kommissiva. This view Rolf in his work " illocutionary forces."

On the other hand allowing yourself through a permit (eg to use a utensil ) and an action restriction is waived by the speaker, the speaker on a sanction law, or is committed to providing the utensil. So this would be interpretable as Direktiva. This view represents Searle.

It is thus clear that the speech act of allowing is neither prototypical kommissiv nor direktiv. The only logical conclusion from this would be the inclusion of a new Sprechaktklasse, such as a legation in which, according starch degrees (up) requirement, legality, any rights of use are collected staggered.

Problems are also the so-called illocutionary indicators. While those indicators speak clearly to a Sprechaktklasse, but they prove inconclusive.

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