Philosophy of mind

The philosophy of mind is concerned with the nature of spiritual or mental states, their causes and effects. Central to this is the question of the relationship between mental and physical states. In addition to these ontological questions, the philosophy of mind is concerned with the epistemological questions about the evidence of the humanities. The philosophy of the movement of the mind through the story (as a particular highlight was, for example, in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit ) is thematically separated from it. Spirit is in the philosophy of mind understood as mind and not as a spirit world.

3.1 behaviorism
3.2 Identity Theory
3.3 functionalism
3.4 Nichtreduktiver materialism and emergence
3.5 eliminative materialism

6.1 Qualia
6.2 intentionality

7.1 Physics
7.2 (neuro - ) biology
7.3 computer science
7.4 Psychology
7.5 System Theory

8.1 freedom
8.2 self

The mind-body problem

The core of the philosophy of mind is the mind-body problem, which is sometimes called " mind-body problem ". It is the question of how the mental states (or the mind, the consciousness, the psyche, the soul ) to the physical states ( or the body, the brain, the material, the body ) behavior. Are these two different substances? Or the mental and the physical are ultimately one? These are the central questions of the philosophy of mind. However, each answer raises many new questions. About: Are we free in our thinking and willing? Could computers also have a spirit? Can the mind exist without the body? The philosophy of mind has thus become an enormously sophisticated project. Already Plato has this in his dialogue Philebus (30a ) theme: " Socrates: our body, we will not say who had a soul? Protarchus: Obviously we want das. Socrates: But where, oh dear Protarchus, he should have received it, even if not of the whole body were inspired that same off than he and yet admirable in every respect "?

The first classical formulation of the mind-body problem comes from René Descartes. But thinking about the relationship between body and mind goes back to ancient times. Plato represents approximately an explicit dualism, which is evident in his argument for the transmigration of souls, can the soul survive the death of the body, so it must be something else than the body. In Aristotle, this looks different. Although Aristotle postulated a " pneuma ", which is owned as a principle of life to all living beings, but the pneuma is not opposed to the material and physical world. Plotinus, the main representative of Neo-Platonism, is based on the existence of the One, from the human souls and everything else entständen. Also the body and are a manifestation of the soul, subordinate and largely separated from them. After death the soul separates from the body entirely, and by the moral freedom of choice they united them with the divine or away.

In the Christian Middle Ages ( Scholasticism ) the distinction between body and immaterial soul is in turn the basis of philosophizing. The influence of medieval philosophy is unmistakable in Descartes formulation of dualism.

Most people intuitively perceive a gap between mental and physical phenomena. This has meant that for a long time dualistic views in the philosophy of mind were predominant. Today, the majority of philosophers represents materialistic positions. On this basis, however, the question must be answered is how consciousness is materialistic to explain.

The mind-body problem is now regarded as a specific problem of European intellectual history. In particular, the philosophical traditions in Asia ( see Eastern philosophy ) are based on fundamentally different metaphysical assumptions, making this separation appears as illusory or meaningless in mind and body.

Dualistic answers to the mind-body problem

The dualism responds to the intuitive gap between the inner mental life and physical reality as follows: He claims that two fundamentally different phenomena in the game are - just mental and physical entities. Depending on how the entities are further specified and how the relationship between mental and physical entities imagines that one can come to very different kinds of dualisms.

Rest of dualism solely on the intuitive gap between mental and physical? Or are there specific arguments for dualism? The best-known argument developed René Descartes in his Meditations. It can be summarized as follows: I can clearly imagine that spirit without matter exists. What you can think clearly, at least in principle, possible. So it is at least theoretically possible that spirit without matter exists. If it is in principle possible that spirit without matter exists, mind and matter must be different entities. So there must be spirit and matter different entities, the dualism is therefore true.

The premises of this argument can be questioned: Why should anything be possible, for example, just because it can be presented clearly? Despite such problems even today still variations of Descartes argument be defended - about Saul Kripke. Generally speaking, that dualistic positions rather by the problems of materialism are plausible than by independent positive arguments.

Interactionist substance dualism

The classic form of dualism is interactionist substance dualism. It was formulated in a controlling manner of René Descartes and has even today trailer. Karl Popper and John Eccles were the most famous interactionist dualists of the 20th century. The basic ideas are as follows: spirit and matter are different substances and they interact with each other. If I stab myself with the needle in the finger, then from there signals in the brain and there must be one, place ' where the brain acts on the immaterial spirit. Exactly how it works in the other direction: If I am in pain, the intangible spirit affects the brain. From there, signals are sent out and I prefer - for example - my hand back.

Such a dualism is struggling with massive problems: If there is a place of interaction between mind and brain, so would this place be found. The speculations of Descartes ( he hoped for the pineal gland as Interaktionsort ) were soon refuted. Even otherwise visible locations were nowhere to be found in the brain, where the behavior of the neurons could be explained only by an immaterial spirit. Besides the fact that seems to be in the brain no "place " for an interaction, the nature of the interaction remains an open question. In the recent time was for example suggested for this by some, the theoretical physicist and mathematician Roger Penrose, an interaction by quantum effects.

From Karl Popper comes a theory that (, human consciousness physical world and mental world ) is extended by a 3rd world the dual conception of the world. ( Three-world theory). It is in the third world to the products of human mind, which exist independently of individual consciousness (further) and can be the cause of changes in the first world (physical world).

The great advantage of interactionist dualism is that it is located with the everyday experience of people in line, as they experience themselves as spiritual beings, separate from the physical world, but the with the help of their senses, their actions and their language with her and can communicate with other people.

Psychophysical parallelism ( nichtinteraktionistischer substance dualism )

The psychophysical parallelism has been developed in his substanzdualistischen variety of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The central theses are:

Thus, the problems of interactionist dualism would be overcome, because you no longer have to look in the brain for a Interaktionsort. But it raises the same new questions, such as: If I want to go to the fridge ( mentally ), so I usually go also to the fridge ( physically ). How can that be if spirit and matter do not interact? The response of parallelism is that mental and physical events run parallel to each other, as synchronously running clocks. The reason for this parallelism - it seems intuitively as an incredible coincidence if, for all spiritual beings, the physical machinery would run exactly parallel to the spirit - Leibniz saw in God's work.

In its second -tier sport has developed the psychophysical parallelism in the 19th century, Gustav Theodor Fechner. His theory was called " identity view " and is thus - strictly speaking - not to dualism, which is always based on two object types. Therefore, this type of psychophysical parallelism is no substance but a property dualism or two-page teaching (dual aspect theory ) dar. body and soul are for Fechner two perspectives on one and the same object. Seen from the outside the human body appears physically, mentally as seen from inside. The psychic is a property of organized matter in the human body. Ernst Mach's "neutral monism " goes directly back to the view of Fechner.

Occasionalism

The occasionalism has been represented, among others, Nicolas Malebranche. The idea: If I want to do something, so that's an intangible thing in my mind. This incident is recorded by God and set the body in motion accordingly.

Epiphenomenalism

The epiphenomenalism is a special form of property dualism and has been developed by Thomas Henry Huxley. The basic idea is that the relationship of mind and matter as one way to think about is: matter acts on the immaterial spirit, but not vice versa. However, the epiphenomenalism has similar problems as the interactionist dualism: Where is the place where the action takes place on the mind? How should we imagine this effect? Another problem is that the epiphenomenalism forcing the causation of mental states by other mental states to deny as well as the cause of states of the world through spiritual states. The idea of a lemon ( a mental state ) can therefore neither cause the notion sour taste ( another mental state ) salivation ( a state of the world ). However, the epiphenomenalism does not provide strong arguments that speak readily of an object of this cause-effect assumption. The epiphenomenalism is today represented only by a few, a well-known advocate who until recently was Frank Cameron Jackson.

Property dualism

The property has dualism in recent years - is experiencing a renaissance - by David Chalmers. The property belongs only to a limited dualism in the series of dualisms: Unlike the other positions he is a Substanzmonismus, so is even compatible with the theory that everything is composed of the smallest physical particles. He insists, however, that there are not material properties. Chalmers calls the " to be experienced in a certain way " feature ( the qualia ) is non-material property. His ideas are based on the notion of supervenience and the logic of reductive explanations. An important category of property dualism is panpsychism, which assumes that all physical entities inherent mental properties.

Monistic answers to the mind-body problem

Monism states, in contrast to dualism, that there is only one substance (eg, only spiritually or only material ), with most monistic theories are material monisms. A material monism therefore states that the only existing substance is the (physical ) matter. However, other formulations are possible: one could also argue that there is no matter, but only the spirit. Such monism is now rarely represented. A third possibility is to assume a substance that is neither physical matter nor spirit. The Mental and Physical properties of these would be a substance. Such a position was represented by Baruch Spinoza and popularized by Ernst Haeckel in the 19th century. This monism is similar to the property dualism (see above).

Behaviorism

Behaviorism has dominated the philosophy of mind in much of the first half of the 20th century. In psychology, behaviorism was developed in response to problems of introspection: If someone reports a result of introspection about his mental inner workings so is (or was then) no verification of statements possible. Without general testability, however, the behaviorists, not a science possible. The way out for psychology: You should dispense with mental inner life and introspection and instead describe the behavior. One speaks in this scientific approach also of methodological behaviorism. Its main representative was B. F. Skinner.

In parallel with such developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism, sometimes referred to as " logical " or " analytical " behaviorism developed. The approach of philosophical behaviorism is physicalistically: Mental states are behavioral descriptions or - dispositions. One of the main representatives of this position within the philosophy of mind was the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle. Meanwhile, in 1949 published classic, The Concept of Mind developed a style similar to Ludwig Wittgenstein behaviorism and coined the CONTINUED philosophical debate for decades. Another " father" of philosophical behaviorism is Carl Hempel, which was influenced in his work, The Logical Analysis of Psychology heavily on the work of Rudolf Carnap.

Behaviorism is now largely obsolete both in its methodology and in its philosophical expression. Have been raised include the following arguments against it:

Hilary Putnam designed the thought experiment of a " Superstoikers ", which shows no discernible pain behavior on every conceivable pain stimulus. The fact that this is conceivable occupied by Putnam that pain is more than the mere disposition to pain behavior.
Behaviorism can be no explanation for rational thought. Does a person first, today is Tuesday, and secondly, Tuesdays training in the sports club was taking place, they will conclude that training is taking place today in the sport club. A large part of everyday human life and behavior is determined by such relationships that can not be explained by the philosophical behaviorism.
Some mental states are associated only with difficulty along with behavioral dispositions. Thus, it is implausible to claim that a person is talking about behavioral disposition when she speaks of stabbing headache.
The relationship between certain behavioral dispositions and certain assumed mental states is by no means unique. If a person "believes", a particular behavior could relieve their pain, they will show this behavior when she is in pain. It may also be so absurd behaviors such as reciting a "healing " spell.
Note also that the related with the philosophical behaviorism above-mentioned methodological behaviorism renounced the description of mental states, because these can not directly observe (and thus verify ). This argument, however, would also apply to other scientific research objects, such as atoms or for Stone Age people.

Identity theory

Developed by John Smart and Ullin Place identity theory was a direct response to the failure of behaviorism. If mental states are something material, but no behavior, so mental states are probably identical with physical states. The obvious idea here: a mental state M is nothing more than a brain state G. The mental state " desire for a coffee " would be nothing more than "that fires ' of certain nerve cells in certain regions of the brain ."

A popular analogy to illustrate this theory is the identity of water and: each phenomenon that can be referred to as water, can also be referred to as, and vice versa. The properties of water are identical with the properties of. However, it required a long-running scientific process to obtain the concept and be able to assign it to the everyday understanding of water. In just such a way, Go followers of the identity theory assumes that the further scientific progress will bring clarity about the identity of mental states and brain states increasingly in neuroscience.

Two types of identity must be distinguished, namely between type and token identity. A token is a concrete instance of a type, whereas types include certain quantities of specimens that satisfy all specific properties. A token is identical to another token if it is the same copy. For example, the Eiffel Tower, a person A has seen token- identical to the Eiffel Tower, the other person has seen B. Smart is, however, originally a type - identity from: Water is type - identical. Due to the described in the next paragraph the problem of multiple realization of a type - identity of mental states and brain states can be difficult to maintain.

The problem of multiple realization was first formulated by Hilary Putnam. Thereafter, it seems clear that not only humans, but can also, for example, have amphibians pain. But it seems unlikely that all beings with pain have the same brain state, as the brains of these creatures differ structurally strong. If this is not the case, the pain can not be identical to a particular brain state. A modified form of identity theory can now summarize and say individual realizations to separate types: human pain is identical to a particular brain state of a human brain, while Lurchschmerzen are identical to a particular brain state of a Lurchgehirns. Ian Ravenscroft calls this a restricted type - identity theory. Eventually leading to further this line of thought, we come to a token identity theory, the only still postulates the identity of mental states of an individual with the brain state.

Between Smarts intended type - identity theory and a token - identity theory, the essential difference that the former is reductionist: You want to make our mental states through repatriation to another theory more understandable, as the return of water to the entire declaration apparatus of physics and chemistry to water makes applicable. If mental states are type - identical with brain states, then psychology can finally be on the neuroscience traced. In token - identity but this is only limited because every brain is different in its realization of any other brain. A token identity theory is thus non- reductionist.

Despite these problems, there is now a certain renaissance of the identity theory, which is mainly due Jaegwon Kim.

The identity theory has flourished in that the physical concept of matter and their interactions is clearly not complete. This implies the hope that may directly and the emergence of new " dimension " of consciousness can be derived from future expansions of the physical understanding.

Functionalism

Functionalism was developed, inter alia, Hilary Putnam in response to the problems of the identity of theory. The idea is as follows: When beings with different brain states can have the same mental state ( ie, the identity theory is wrong), so still must exist something that have the brain states together. The proposal of the functionalists is to assign the different brain states the same functional state. The mental states would then be functional states.

But what are functional states? This is often explained with the example of simple machines: Imagine a vending machine before. This raises at a euro from a candy. Now you can vending machines with different states describe: There must be a state in which the machine ejects the candy without asking for more money. However, it must also give states in which the machine still calls for a euro or 50 cents, to spit something. In the sense of automata theory can be the candy machine so completely described by abstract functional states. The core of the example is now that the description applies, no matter from which the machine is made concrete. The analogy is clear: mental states are to be functional states, regardless of what brain states to be realized in practice.

The central problem of functionalism is awareness. As an example serves as a "China - brain" designated thought experiment: Every Chinese own a cell phone and have clear instructions on what number he should call if he is called by some other numbers. Now Imagine additionally provide that the number of Chinese people and the number of brain cells of a human brain are equal, and that one could produce a situation in which the current call state of the Chinese mobile phone network identical to the state of activation of the neurons of a human brain in Presentation of the Eiffel Tower is. Then it is intuitively hard to imagine that the whole formed by the Chinese people and their mobile network actually developed solely on the basis of the current connection status and then selected number sequences an idea of the Eiffel Tower, or any other idea or a different mental state. No matter what may have been a function of the connection state of the Chinese mobile phone network, a kind of gearteter collective mental state is not a plausible assumption. Functionalism thus explains not the phenomenon of consciousness of the human brain, because how the firing of certain neurons should lead to a conscious mental experience, even then remains unexplained, if it fulfills a specific function.

Nichtreduktiver materialism and emergence

Many philosophers two beliefs come together:

This raises the question of whether there can be a non-reductive materialism. Donald Davidson's anomalous monism is an attempt to formulate such a materialism. Often the idea is formulated with the notion of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to it. " Supervene " describes a dependency relationship: The Mental can not change, without changing the physical itself.

Also the Emergenzbegriff plays a central role in the debates about the non-reductive materialism. A phenomenon is known exactly then " emergent " than when it appears at the macro level of a system, but not at the micro level of the system components. In this sense, some assumed that consciousness is emergent, since humans have consciousness, but one can not ascribe the different parts of human consciousness. Here, the Emergenzkonzept is often combined with an anti-reductionist thesis: The phenomenon at the macro level (in this case: The awareness ) can in principle not on the micro level ( ie about brain activity ) lead back. In the philosophy of mind is debatable whether such a position again leads back to dualism. Critics of Emergenzbegriffes declare that the irreducibility of macro-level as part of a materialist theory was not understood.

Eliminative materialism

If one is a materialist, holding the reductive efforts failed and holds a non-reductive materialism for incoherent, so you can grab a last resort and say: "There are no mental states. " Assert Eliminative materialists that mental states have been introduced by our folk psychology are. Now if it turns out that folk psychology in the course of scientific development to be false, then we must also abolish the postulated from their entities. Eliminativisten such as Patricia and Paul Churchland refer at this point many times on the fate of other, false theories throughout history. For example, the system of belief in witchcraft has been proven wrong. The consequence is the recognition of the non-existence of witches.

Philosophy of mind in Buddhism

" But what is now, Lord, old age and death, and who again this age and this death is intrinsically too? " "The question is not right ," said the Blessed One. "When you said, ' what is aging and death, and who again this age and this death is intrinsically too? ' - Or if you said, ' another is old age and death, and another is the one to whom this age and this death is inherent to, ' so would be both one and the same, only the expression would be different if the perception is, life. and body are the same, so there is no holy life, ., or if the view consists, another is life, and another is the body, so there is no holy life, these two ends avoiding announced in the middle of the Tathagata (ie the "So- Gone ", ie Buddha) the true doctrine: from the birth arises as a cause of old age and death. "

Eastern traditions such as Buddhism do not expect a dualistic mind-body model, but find that mind and body are two different entities. Especially in Buddhism the idea of continuous selves of Hinduism ( Atman ) is not accepted ( anatta ). Some schools of Buddhism are based on a very subtle level of consciousness, which leaves the body at death and goes to a new life.

According to Buddhist scholar and meditation master Dharmakirti, the definition of the mind or consciousness is what is clarity and recognition. This definition applies to " clarity " on the nature of mind and "Recognize" on the function of the mind. Mind is clarity because it always is formless in comparison to objects, and because he has the ability to perceive things. Mind is knowing, because its function is to know or perceive objects.

In Ornament of the Seven Sets of Buddhist scholars Khedrup Gelek Pelzang says that thought, awareness, mind and " recognizers " are synonyms. Buddha explained that the spirit, even though he is formless, yet this part of the form. Thus, our spirit is one of our body and is distributed all over the body " resident ". This can be understood in the context of how the awareness of the five senses and the spiritual consciousness arise. There are many different types of mental - sensory awareness, spiritual awareness, gross consciousnesses, fine consciousnesses, very subtle consciousness, and they are all formless (ie, without shape, color, sound, smell, taste or tactile properties ) and they all have the function to recognize or know. There is no mind without an object that is recognized by the mind. Even if none of these consciousnesses has a shape, they can belong to the mold.

Language Philosophical criticism of the mind-body problem

Any attempt to answer the mind-body problem encounters massive, especially conceptual problems. It may therefore also be an option to reject the mind-body problem as a pseudo-problem. Such a position is now represented in particular in analytical philosophy in the footsteps of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Explain the representative of such a position that it was a mistake to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather, it should be accepted that people in different ways - such as in mental and biological vocabulary - can be described. Pseudo-problems arising in the opinion of Wittgenstein's tradition when attempting to reduce the description of ways to each other or even if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts. This is approximately the case when searching in the brain after mental states. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary - the search for mental states in the brain therefore a category error or pure conceptual confusion.

Today, such a position is often represented by artists such as Peter Hacker Wittgenstein. Also, Hilary Putnam, the founder of functionalism, and now holds the mind-body problem is a false dilemma, which was to be dissolved with Wittgenstein. In Germany there is a corresponding view Dirk Hartmann as a representative of the methodical culturalism.

Naturalism and its problems

The thesis of materialism is that the mind is something material. Such a position has the fundamental problem that the mind has properties that has no material object. Materialism must explain how it is possible that a material object but to get these properties therefore. Often the project the declaration is called the " naturalization of the mind". What are the critical characteristics? The best known are probably the two following:

Qualia

Many mental states have the property to be experienced in a certain way. The essence of the mental state pain is about quite obvious that it hurts. But where does this experience ( the quale )? Nothing about a neural or functional state indicates that it is accompanied by an experience of pain. Often the argument is formulated as follows: the processes in the brain can not do (yet) understand why they expire with the appropriate experience level. Why do many processes in the brain, not without a spark of consciousness take place? This does not seem to be explainable.

But it nevertheless seems to be such that the sciences must explain this experiential content. This follows from the logic of reductive explanations: If I ( eg water) will reductively explain a phenomenon, I must also explain why the phenomenon has all the features that it has (eg, liquid, transparency ). In the case of mental states would have to explain why they have the capacity to be experienced in a certain way.

Intentionality

Intentionality refers to the " directionality " of the mental states that they " truly worth capable " does. This means that thoughts can be right or wrong. This may not at first seem puzzling, but when thoughts to natural processes are to be reduced, the result is a mystery: Natural processes are not right or wrong - they just happen. It would be pointless from a brain process to say he was right or wrong. Thoughts or mental judgments are right or wrong but how can be natural processes thoughts there?

The truth value of the ability of thought comes from the fact that thoughts are directed to facts: The idea about that Herodotus was a historian, refers to Herodotus and the facts that he was a historian. If the facts, the idea is correct - otherwise just wrong. But where does this reference? In the brain, only electro- chemical processes take place, and who seem to have nothing to do with Herodotus.

Philosophy of mind and the natural sciences

Physics

Man is a physical entity that can be described as such by the natural sciences. Erwin Schrödinger assumes an absolute nature of the mind and outlines the problem (1943 ) as follows:

Roger Penrose which a different view towards. If the mental processes are not absolute or independent, but depend on the physical processes that plays the purely scientific description of the people in the philosophy of mind an important role:

In the latter case, in principle, all disciplines of importance, describe the processes which are related to the mental. According to the long list of important sciences: biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology, psychology, etc.

(Neuro ) biology

Theoretical background of biology, as common in modern science, is usually a materialistic approach. As an object of study, first serve physical processes which are considered as the basis of mental activity and behavior. The increasing success of biology as explanation of mental phenomena can be attributed mainly by the absence of a refutation of the basic assumption: Understanding " No change in the mental states of a person without a change in his brain ."

Several disciplines within neurobiology deal with the connection between mental and physical processes:

The sensory physiology examines the relationship between perception and stimulus processing processes.
The cognitive neuroscience correlates mental processes with neural processes.
The Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental abilities of individual brain regions.
Finally, the biology shows through their evolutionary approach that the human nervous system has developed as the basis of the spirit of both ontogenetically and phylogenetically from simpler precursors ( see also: emergence).

The methodological progress in the neurosciences, in particular the collection of imaging techniques, led in recent years to formulate increasingly sophisticated research programs: Criterion agenda uncover the neural processes of mental functions and understand (see also: neural correlate of consciousness). A few neurobiologists, such as Emil Du Bois - Reymond and John Carew Eccles have denied the possibility in principle of a "reduction" of mental phenomena on brain mechanisms of partly religious grounds. Today, some of the well-known in German-speaking neurobiologist and philosopher Gerhard Roth represents a form of non-reductive materialism. With popular science publications on experiments on brain research, particularly the psychiatrist, psychologist and professor Manfred Spitzer raised the issue of self-determination in the public.

Computer science

The computer science is concerned with the automatic processing of information (or at least physical symbol systems, which one attaches information ) as it is done by computers. Computers were capable of a man needs his mind since the beginning of their development actions. An example is the multiplication. But apparently computer in multiplying have no mind. Could they get a mind but sometime? This question has gained in the research on artificial intelligence (AI) significantly more important.

Also in AI, one can distinguish between a moderate and an ambitious research program - is John Searle's distinction between weak and strong AI. The weak AI has only to simulate the target mental states without make the claim that computers really have awareness etc.. Goal of strong AI on the other hand is a computer with confidence. The strong AI goes back to the computer pioneer Alan Turing. He formulated in response to the question " Can you think of computer?" The legendary Turing test. Turing suggested that a computer could then think if he was not distinguishable from a human in a " chat ". In the Turing test a lot of criticism has been practiced, among others, John Searle, with his thought experiment of the " Chinese room". In addition, the question of a possible sentience ( qualia ) of computers or robots remains completely unanswered. Here also, most computer scientists are probably less optimistic.

Psychology

Psychology is the science that investigates mental states most directly. Specifically, it examines mental states such as joy, fear or obsessions. The Psychology investigates the laws that mental states combine with each other or with the input and output of man.

Examples provides about the psychology of perception. This allows general principles of Gestalt perception discover. A formative psychological law is: objects that move in the same direction are perceived as belonging together. This law describes a relation between the visual input and the mental states of perception. However, this result does not say anything about the nature of perception states. The discovered by psychology are compatible with all laws described answers to the mind-body problem.

Systems theory

Gregory Bateson comes in his " Ecology of Mind " to the conclusion that the spiritual is not the property of an organ - about the brain - or an individual - for example, the people - is, but the property of a system that can transport information. So passes information from the external objects in the form of electromagnetic waves on the sense organ eye through the nervous system to the brain and goes from there by means effektorischer nervous about the speech motor skills and the transport medium air in linguistic form on the sense organ ear to fellow human beings is communicated. So mind is this interacting system of people, a society or a linguistic community, immanent. Bateson: "In no system that includes mental characteristics, so it can have any part of unilateral control over the whole. In other words, the spiritual characteristics of the system are not a part of immanent, but the system as a whole. " ( Bateson, 1985, p 409). The philosophy of living systems follows this cybernetic view of the concept of the spiritual and examines the question of the storage of the spirit, of the ideas, plans, hypotheses, and theories. The product obtained by interaction mental result required for its preservation a tangible medium. She comes to the conclusion that evolution acquired by selection experience in the genetic code stores ( intracellular storage), man can his ideas, insights and experiences during his lifetime to save the body internally as well as all brain animals, but he also has various body external data storage options, such as books and computers, developed, which can transport the spiritual not only to the future now, as the genes, but also spread it almost simultaneously in space. This man has created a new Erbweg and sets an "evolution of the mind" in gear.

Consequences of the philosophy of mind

There are countless issues that can not be unaffected by the outcome of the philosophy of mind. Obvious examples are the nature and finality of death, the nature of emotions, perception and memory. The question of what is a person and what constitutes its identity has many interfaces with the philosophy of mind. Two issues that have gained particular attention in the context of the philosophy of mind, is the freedom and the self.

Freedom

In the context of the philosophy of mind, there is the question of freedom of the will in a new sharpness. This is true at least if one has of materialism and determinism to be convinced: All mental states - including the human will - would thus be material states. And the laws of nature place, accordingly, the running of the material world completely fixed. Even mental states such as desires and actions are then completely determined by the laws of nature. Some now argue further: So people can not even determine what they want and do. Or at least they are open to any alternatives. Consequently, they are not free.

This argument contradict the one hand the compatibilists. They argue that "freedom" do not mean indeterminacy, but willing and acting to the best of my knowledge. In this sense, people can be free if determinism is true. Perhaps the most famous Kompatibilist the history of philosophy is David Hume. Today compatibilist positions are approximately represented by John M. Fischer and Daniel Dennett.

Contrary to such compatibilist positions represented Inkompatibilisten that free will and determinism contradict well. Therefore, if determinism is true, there can be no free will. But there are also Inkompatibilisten which are of the opinion that people have free will. These philosophers argue that the way of the world is not completely determined by the laws of nature: At least the will is not determined and therefore potentially be free. The most famous philosopher, who is usually associated with the incompatibilism is Immanuel Kant Whether non-deterministic physical theories support this, it is judged very controversial. Regardless of throwing some of the critics before incompatibilism to use an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: If our will is determined by nothing, so it's pure coincidence, what we want. If it is pure coincidence, what we want, so we are not free. So we are not free if our will is determined by nothing. Defenders of incompatibilism would partly be objected: This argument is based on the assumption that there are only two alternatives in this case: either my action is externally determined or determined by chance. The requirement excludes already that there is a third option: self-determined will. By definition, the concept of the will presupposes the self-determination.

Even

In addition, the philosophy of mind has considerable impact on the concept of the self. If we understand by "self" the immutable essence of a person, the most representative of the philosophy of mind are likely to argue that there is nothing of the kind.

The idea of a self as an unchanging essence stems from the Christian idea of an immaterial soul. Such an idea is for most contemporary philosophers not acceptable because of their materialistic core belief. But the idea of a constant core material beings - as realized in a constant area of the brain - seems implausible because of the empirical findings of developmental psychology, developmental biology and neuroscience.

Some philosophers declare due to these problems that we should stop talking about a self. However, this is a minority position, common is the following opinion: You should understand under the "self" is not immutable essence, but something that is in constant change. A prominent advocate of such a position is Daniel Dennett. It's also amazing how some considerations of modern philosophy of mind in this area with their traditional knowledge of non-European cultures - about Buddhism - overlap.

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