Richard Boyd

Richard Newell Boyd ( born May 19, 1942 in Washington, DC) is an American philosopher and philosopher of science. He is one of the representatives of scientific realism.

Boyd received his doctorate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT ) in 1970 with Hilary Putnam. His scientific stations were Harvard University, the University of Michigan and the University of California, Berkeley. Since 1972 he is professor at the Sage School faculty, Cornell University, his areas of specialization are philosophy of science, epistemology and philosophy of language and ethics, social and political philosophy, particularly Marxism and philosophy of biology.

Publications

  • A Recursion - Theoretic Characterization of the Analytical Hierarchy ramified, with Gustav Hensel and Hilary Putnam, in: Transactions of the American Mathematical Society Vol 141 (Jul., 1969), 37-62 ( dissertation topic )
  • Realism and Scientific Epistemology. Unpublished 1971
  • Determinism, Laws and Predictability in Principle, Philosophy of Science 39 (1972 ): 431-50.
  • Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of Evidence. in: Nous 7 (1973 ) :1- 12th
  • Approximate Truth and Natural Necessity, in: The Journal of Philosophy Vol 73, No. 18, Seventy- Third Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct., 1976), 633-635
  • Metaphor and Theory Change in: A. Ortony ( ed.) Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism Does Not entail. In: Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, ed N. Block, vol. 1 Cambridge, Mass.:. Harvard University Press 1980.
  • Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology, PSA 80, vol. 2 (Philosophy of Science Association) (ed RN Giere / PD Asquith ) ( 1982).
  • On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism, Knowledge ( 1983) 19:45-90.
  • Observations, Explanatory Power and Simplicity, in: Observation, Experiment and Hypothesis in Modern Physical Science, ed Achinstein and Hannaway (1985).
  • Lex Orandi est Lex Credendi, in: Images of Science: Scientific Realism Versus Constructive Empiricism, ed Churchland and Hooker, Chicago 1985.
  • The Logician 's Dilemma: Deductive Logic, Inductive Inference and Logical Empiricism, knowledge ( 1985).
  • Realism and the Moral Sciences. Unpublished 1987
  • How to be a moral realist, in: Moral Realism, ed Sayre McCord, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988.
  • What Realism Implies and What It Does Not, in: Dielactica (1989 )
  • Realism, conventionality, and ' Realism About, in: Boolos ( ed.), Meaning and Method, Cambridge 1990
  • Realism, Approximate Truth and Philosophical Method, in: Wade Savage ( ed.), Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science vol. 14 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1990 )
  • Realism, Anti- Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds, in: Philosophical Studies 61 (1991 ), 127-148
  • Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method, in: J. Earman ( ed.), Inference, Explanation, and Other Philosophical Frustrations. Berkeley: University of California Press (1992).
  • Metaphor and Theory Change, in Metaphor and Thought, ed Ortony, New York 1993.
  • Kinds as the " Workmanship of Men Realism, Constructivism, and Natural Kinds, in: Julian Nida- Rümelin (ed.) Rationality, Realism, Revision: Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Society for Analytical Philosophy Berlin. De Gruyter (1999 ).
  • Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realizations: Comments on Millikan 's ' Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences ', in: Philosophical Studies
  • Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa, in: R. Wilson ( ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, Cambdrige: MIT Press
  • Scientific Realism, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( 2002)
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