Safety culture

Safety culture is a behavior characteristic of a group or organization how to deal with safety questions. It is subject to a complex learning process in which common goals, interests, norms, values ​​and patterns of behavior emerge.

According to:

• Edgar Schein, 1997: "Culture is the result of a complex learning process of a group, organization or society in which common goals, interests, norms, values ​​, behavior patterns, rituals, traditions, being created on continuity, security and other features. "
• Cox and Cox, 1991: " Safety Culture describes the way in which security is organized in the workplace, and thus reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values ​​of the employees in relation to the safety resist. "

Origin and meaning of the safety culture

The concept of " safety culture " was first used in 1986 in connection with the Chernobyl disaster, had contributed to a considerable extent organizational deficiencies as a cause of accidents. The set up by the IAEA INSAG - Commission ( International Nuclear Safety Group ) summarized under this term the " so-called human element " in the operation of the reactor together.

The OECD held in this regard in that:

" The Chernobyl accident has shown that the basic safety values ​​, norms and attitudes of an entire organization were weak or absent. In such a case it does not matter how well existing security devices and procedures are developed and created. They are useless if exceeded its operational limits by the staff and security systems are bypassed. Safety culture must therefore permeate all levels of a business organization. At the top of a group management has, so that workers do not get a profound influence on the safety culture of the entire company, in which she makes the values ​​of safety and quality in the company significantly in their daily tasks in a conflict between safety and production goals. The employees are closely watching whether the output values ​​of the company are in accordance with the actual actions of management. "

As a result of the Chernobyl accident was by the IAEA in 1991 for the first time in the industry, the term " safety culture " (safety culture ) coined to draw attention to the importance of human and organizational issues for the safe operation of nuclear power plants:

" Safety culture is the sum of all features and settings in organizations and individuals which ensures that as a top priority issues of nuclear safety the attention they deserve because of their significance. "

The importance of safety culture for the safety of complex technical systems is now recognized in all industries. It manifests itself in virtually every major industrial accidents, such as chemistry - Sevesounglück (1976 ), Nuclear Technology - Chernobyl disaster (1986 ), Space - Challenger (1986 ), petrochemicals - Piper Alpha ( 1988), Train - ICE accident of Eschede ( 1998).

The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 today clearly the importance of this effect size.

The fact that only a wide range of serious industrial accidents revealed the importance of the influence quantity 'safety culture', explained by the fact that safety culture is not visible and therefore is not directly measurable. In aviation, this cognitive process is referred to as "the evolution of safety thinking", according to which knowledge about the main types of accident causation has developed over time as follows: Technical factors (1950), Human Factors (1970), Organizational factors (1980).

Edgard note describes in his three- level model the characteristics and operation of an organizational culture that, mutatis mutandis, also apply to safety culture, as follows:

• Artifacts of the organization: The visible characteristics of the organization, such as the appearance of the company, the type and condition of the buildings, the equipment of the employees. However, their origins and backgrounds remain hidden.
• Exposed values ​​: How strategy, objectives and philosophy of the company ( corporate guidelines ), but still do not represent a common experience level. By common experience of the transition from exposed values ​​on common basic values ​​are ( transformation process).
• Basic assumptions and values ​​: they are unconscious before, are not measurable and essentially determine the culture of the company. These are the properties we think about things and behave. They are not the subject of discussion. They give confidence in others who have the same thought patterns and enable shared sense of awakening moods to achieve common goals.

Methods to identify, evaluate and control of safety culture

The Swiss supervisory authority HSK is the close correlation between safety culture and safety management out:

" Safety culture and safety management are very closely related. Despite this relationship but there is a significant difference between the two terms. While safety culture itself can not be seen directly observable only by their effects, the safety management can be directly observed and - are described - on paper. Can thus be concluded indirectly to the safety culture of the plant from the presence of a safety management system, the explicit description and determination of its effectiveness. "

Due to the importance of the influence Great " safety culture " today come in handy in all risk- relevant industrial safety management systems for application.

Methods for the determination and assessment of safety culture in companies carried out largely in qualitative form, as by observation of the staff (with emphasis on group discussions ), evaluation of operating reports and case studies and the question actions ( questionnaires ) with standardized questionnaires on organization and operations, management and staff behavior. In a numerical ranking of the results of the surveys that influence size safety culture should be quantified.

Another form of acquisition of the factors of organization and management is the in-depth root cause analysis of incidents and accidents. This analysis is complemented by the derivation of safety indicators regarding the determined frequencies of errors and incorrect actions by the staff ( Human Factors ).

From the American aviation authority is followed by an approach to analyze organizational and management influences of accident events after the Accident Causation Model of Reason in detail. This model forms the essential core, the root cause analysis of fault occurrences and accidents. The reason for this study was the increase " organizational accidents" in aviation, which is attributed to the increasing complexity of the entire socio - technological environment of aviation.

The elements of the event and causes of accidents ( on the model of Reason) after which the accident events are examined are:

• Organizational factors ( erroneous decision processes, economic and political factors, organizational culture )
• Tasks, labor and environmental conditions (insufficient funds for new equipment, low morale )
• Individual factors ( uneffektives Training)
• Inadequate defenses against malfunction and accident sequence, even among previously unrecognized conditions.

Safety culture in the company

Safety culture as a mental construct is used to analyze the society in dealing with ( in) security, with different levels of aggregation (individual, group, organization, social system, etc.) and may be based.

Cultural and social conditions and behavior patterns influence the development of technology, as well as vice versa are influenced by technology.

Security has a strong subjective component and is thus also - or primarily - cultural and dynamic in nature. Security arises not only from knowledge and insights from rational or rational decisions mentioned and transparent actions. Security also arises from an intuitive understanding, experiences and expectations of hopes and fears, from experienced participatory tools for technical problem-solving processes, or at least perceived intervention in technical processes or from feelings of powerlessness in the face of an apparent momentum of Technology. The process of communication about the provision of security ( an industrial plant ) between the creators and operators of a plant on one side and the people living in the vicinity of the plant population on the other side is also affected linguistically and culturally.

The " Cultural Theory of risk" tried social conflicts due to technological and explain environmental risks based on empirical studies. It assumes that different perceptions and discrepancies on risk / danger and security exist as evidence of competing values. In " Grid and Group Cultural Theory " two essential factors are distinguished, the binding in the group and the prevailing rules and structures. With the strength of the expression of the respective influence of size and the perception of risk is growing.

Security and solutions for security problems vary mainly due to political and social institutional relationships. Uncertainty strengthens the long-established interpretations and relationships within a culture.

In European countries, different symbols and values ​​prevail in respect of goods worthy of protection and safeguards. They are reflected in the national laws and technical standards, and provide information on the national security culture of a country.

In the populations of modern industrial societies regardless of the actual risk and security situation grows the desire for security. The risk acceptance, decreasing in dramatic as the same extent the demand for security increases.