Science of Logic

The Science of Logic is a two-volume work of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), which first appeared in Nuremberg 1812-1816. Is based on the Phenomenology of Spirit here an ontologically - metaphysical logic are developed that connects to the ancient logos philosophy. At the same time she wants to be onto-theology.

This work is one of the most influential philosophical works of modern times, which play a role, among others, in the neo-Marxism, the Frankfurt School, the philosophical hermeneutics, and dialectical Marxism. Many philosophers sat down - to the present - intensely with their contents apart, including Søren Kierkegaard, Bruno Liebrucks or Dieter Henrich.

Content

Hegel sets in logic the award in the Phenomenology of Spirit " scientific point of view " forward. This had shown that the logical rules ( categories) can not be regarded as mere rules of subject- independent reality, as in classical metaphysics, nor as mere rules of the subject as in the philosophy of Kant. They must be understood from the unity of subject and object rather.

The task of logic is to represent pure thought in its specific meaning. You should replace the traditional disciplines of philosophy, logic, and metaphysics, by which combines two programs, the representation of pure thought and the idea of the Absolute with each other. The logical rules have thereby According to Hegel, at the same time ontological character. They are not only as contents of consciousness, but also to be understood as " the interior of the world " (cf. Encyclopedia I 81, Z 1).

Hegel's aim is to conduct a systematic derivation of the categories and explain their necessity. The decisive means for it illustrates the principle of the dialectic, which, according to Hegel, is grounded in the natural logical determining itself. Therefore, he believes that all categories " as a system of totality " (LI 569 ) are fully deductible in this way.

The logic is divided into an "objective logic " - the teachings of Being and beings - and a " subjective logic " - the doctrine of the concept.

Doctrine of Being

( His ↔ Nothing ) → If → existence →

The beginning of the logic must make for Hegel, a term which is characterized by "pure immediacy ". This is expressed in the concept of being that has no rules. But the absence of any further differentiation makes the determination of "being" completely devoid of content. Thus, for the being after all, the definition of the "Nothing and no more nor less than nothing" (LI 83). Not " less than nothing " means that this " nothing" after all, a determination of thought, something thought is.

The pure immediacy of the beginning can be so only in the two conflicting provisions "being" and "nothing" to express. The two terms "walk" into each other " about". This " pass" both into each other is itself a new category represents the "becoming" (LI 83f. ). In the "becoming" are both provisions, "being" and "nothingness", including specifically in their mutual interlocking override.

If now a mediated through this unit of becoming His thought, then there is the determination of the existence become, the " existence " (LI 113ff. ). Its genesis, however, requires that the "nothing " to him is discernible. On this side, the " existence " shows as a " something" that is opposed to the "other." A bit can only be recognized when it is distinguished from others - according to the quoted Hegel set of Spinoza: " Omnis determinatio est negatio " ( Each determination is a negation ) ( LI 121).

Each determination is a demarcation, where to each boundary also heard what exists beyond it ( cf. LI 145). To think a limit as such is, to think the Boundless. Likewise, with the idea of ​​" finite " of the " infinity " given (LI 139ff. ). The infinite is the "other" of the finite, as well as vice versa, the finite is the "other" of the infinite.

However, for Hegel, the infinite to the finite can not be simply compared. The infinite would otherwise be " limits" to the finite and thus would be limited and finite. The " actual infinite " must be rather thought so that it engages with the finite, as the " unity of the finite and the infinite, the unit which is infinity itself, which understands itself and the finiteness " (LI 158).

Hegel does not want to be understood pantheistic, because it is their is no undifferentiated unit, but one that in the infinite the finite can certainly pass this unit. He calls this the " true " or "affirmative infinity " (LI 156). It differs from the " bad infinity " (LI 149 ), which comes about only by a mere Continue below from border to border in an infinite progress and the lack of reference back through the other side of the border.

This reference back also characterizes the finite; it is the result of his mediation with the infinite and makes the " self-existence " of the finite from (LI 166). From the category of " for-itself " Hegel developed later in the section on the "quality" or any other provisions. If something "for themselves ", it is "One ". Is this " A " mediated by "others", these are also each be regarded as " One ". From the "one" arises as the plurality of " one". They differ from each other, but are also related to each other, what Hegel called " Repulsion " and " attraction" (LI 190ff. ). Your uniform pluralism leads to the notion of "quantity".

Separation ↔ continuity Intensive Size ↔ Extensive size

The decisive difference of the quantity of quality is that by changing the quantity, the identity of which is changed, remains. One thing remains what it is, whether it is made larger or smaller.

Hegel distinguishes between the pure, indefinite quantity and the particular quantity ( the quantity ). So the room is as such an instance of pure quantity. When speaking, however, of a certain space, so it is an instance of the specified quantity.

The two concepts of " attraction " and " repulsion ", which are suspended in the category of quantity, here are the moments of continuity and separation ( discretion ). These two terms do each other. Continuity means that a continuously advancing translated "something" is there. That "something " is necessarily a of 'the other' separate 'something'. Conversely, is the notion of separation ahead of the continuity; you can only disconnect under the assumption that something is there, which is not separated and of which the separated parts separately.

A quantum is of a certain size, which always can be expressed by a number. The concept of number is one question under the category of quantum. A number has two moments: it is intended as a number and as a unit. The concept of number as a sum of units includes the concept of separation, the concept of unity, however, includes continuity.

Quantum may be an "intensive " or " extensive" size. An intensive variable (eg color sensation, feeling of warmth ) can be calculated using the concept of characterizing degree - a degree, depending on the size of more or less intensity. Extensive variables ( eg, length or volume) have neither degree nor intensity. About extensive size is decided by means of an applied scale. Intensive variables, however, can be determined by any of them lying outside scale. The physicalist theory, any intensive quantity 'll be reduced to an extensive quantity is rejected by Hegel.

The doctrine of the " degree " is about the unit of "quality" and "quantity". An illustrative examples Hegel explains the nature of this unit. For example, the quantitative change in the temperature of the water leads to a qualitative change in its state. It freezes or turns to steam ( I L 440). This creates the determination of an underlying, indifferent remaining " substrate ", change the "states" according to the measure relations. The idea of ​​something that by " substrate" and "states" is distinguished in in this way leads to the second part of the logic, the " Doctrine of Essence ".

Doctrine of Essence

The Doctrine of Essence is considered the most difficult part of the logic and has been modified several times by Hegel. Hegel here could not lean to the same extent as in the other two books ( the science of being, doctrine of the concept ) to the philosophical tradition. The greatest influence exercised the " Transcendental Logic " Kant, the theory of elements tried conceptually consistent derive ( modal and relational categories, concepts of reflection and antinomies ) Hegel in a new context.

Hegel describes the concept of essence by the "memory", which he interpreted in a literal sense as " Innerlichwerden " and " introspection ". He referred to a sphere that lies deeper than the outward immediacy of being, the surface must first be " pierced " to get to the essence. The logical rules of the system are distinguished from the of being. In contrast to his logical categories they tend to occur in pairs and get their certainty from the terms of their respective Other: essential and unessential, identity and difference, positive and negative, primary and Grounded, form and matter, form and content, Conditional and Unconditional etc.

Hegel begins with the discussion of the " determinations of reflection ", " identity ", " difference ", " contradiction " and " reason ". It analyzes the determinations of reflection to each other in their relationship and shows that they are offset themselves, to no truth in their isolation. The most important provision is the reflection of the " contradiction". Hegel makes a point that the opposition should not be " pushed into the subjective reflection " as in Kant (L II 75). These would be " too much tenderness " (LI 276) mean to things. Rather, the contradiction comes to the things themselves. He is " the principle of all self-movement " (L II 76) and therefore also present in all movement.

The principle of contradiction applies not only to the outward movement, but is the basic principle of all living things: " There is something so alive, only insofar as it contains the contradiction in terms, and that this force is to grasp the contradiction in itself and endure " - otherwise, it is " in the contradiction to reason ." In a very significant extent, this principle applies to the sphere of thought: " The speculative thought consists only in that thinking the opposition and holds himself in the proletariat " (L II 76). The contradiction is, for Hegel, the structure of logical, natural and spiritual reality at all.

In the second section of the beings logic, "The Apparition ", Hegel explicitly sets apart with Kant and the problem of the " thing in itself ". His intention is not only to eliminate the difference between the " thing in itself " and "appearance", but also to explain the " phenomenon " of the truth of the " thing in itself ": " The appearance is what the thing at himself, or his truth " (L II 124-125 ).

What is something about him showing up for Hegel nowhere than in its appearance and it is therefore pointless, "behind" still a realm of " itself" build. The "appearance " is the " higher truth " against both the "thing in itself" and against the immediate existence, for it is the "essential, then, against the [ immediate ] existence are still unsubstantial appearance is " (L II 148).

In the third section, "Reality ," discusses Hegel central doctrines of logical and metaphysical tradition. A central issue is the discussion of Spinoza's concept of the Absolute.

Hegel sees in the absolute one hand, " all determination of the nature and existence, or of being in general, both as a reflection of the dissolved " (L II 187), since it could not be understood as the absolutely unconditioned otherwise. But if it meant merely as the negation of all predicates, so it would be only the void - although it should be but as its opposite, as the abundance absolutely thought. This Absolute can now not thinking as external reflection face, because this way the concept of the Absolute would be repealed. The interpretation of the Absolute can not fall into an external reflection of him, therefore, but rather must be his own interpretation: "In fact, however, the laying of the Absolute is his own doing, and that begins with how it arrives at home" (L II 190).

Doctrine of the Notion

The third book in the Science of Logic develops a logic of " concept ", the " objectivity " and " idea" is divided into three sections " subjectivity ".

In the " subjectivity " is Hegel from the classical theory of concept, judgment and conclusion.

To explain the " concept of the term" recalls Hegel to the " nature of the self." Between the concept and the ego, there is a structural analogy: As the term, so too is I " self-relating unit, and not directly, but by abstracting from all determinateness and content, and in the freedom of unrestricted equality with themselves back " (L II 253).

Hegel's use of the term " concept " is different from what one usually sees under a concept. For him, the term is not absehende from the empirical contents of abstraction, but the concrete. An essential element of the concept is its " negativity " dar. Hegel rejects the ordinary understanding of the term underlying concept of an absolute identity, since the notion of identity for him necessarily includes the concept of difference with.

Hegel's " term" has three moments: universality, particularity ( separateness ) and detail ( individuality ). Negate means to determine and limit. The result of the negation of the general, the Independent ( specificity ), which as a result of the negation of this negation (ie the negation of particularity ) with the general is the same as the feature to the original unit is returned and is used to individuality.

The concept is the unity of the universal and is individual for Hegel. This unit is in the judgment "S is P " explicated, where "S " is the subject, the individual, and "P" is the predicate, the General.

A set can, according to Hegel very well have the grammatical form of a judgment to be without a verdict. So the sentence " Aristotle died in the 73 year of his age, in the 4th year of the 115th Olympiad " (L II 305) no judgment. Although he shows the syntax of the judgment, but no general concept combines with the individual and thus does not meet the logical demands of the judgment. Nevertheless, the above theorem can be a judgment, namely, when the set is used in a situation in which one doubted what year Aristotle died or how old he was, and the ending of the doubt is expressed in the sentence discussed here.

For Justus Hartnack this means that Hegel thus in effect - " without it be formulated so - introduces the analytical distinction between a set and its use. One and the same sentence can be used as an imperative, as a warning or threat, as a request, etc. ".

In conclusion, a unit of judgment and concept takes place. Hegel viewed the following example ( from L II 383 ):

The particular concept ( special ) here are " people," the individual ( the individual ) is Caius, and the term " mortal" is the universal. The result is a unit of the individual subject and the general or universal predicate, ie, the predicate in the sentence " Socrates is mortal".

The concept of the object can be understood only in so far as he has a necessary connection to the notion of the subject for Hegel. As such, it is also the subject of " Science of Logic ". Hegel's philosophical analysis step by step from a "mechanical" about a " chemical " to a " teleological " approach of the object. In the teleological object, the processes that lead to the purpose, and the purpose themselves can not be different from each other. It reflects the subjectivity itself This unity of subjectivity and objectivity objectifies Hegel calls the idea.

The concept of the idea all the provisions of the being and nature of logic as the logic of the concept are " lifted ". The idea is the truth (L II 367 ); it is thus identical with everything that sets out the science of logic in terms of the logical structure of being. All categories are integrated in the idea; with their ends the so-called movement of the concept.

Hegel distinguishes three aspects of the idea: life, knowledge, and the absolute idea.

In life, the idea of ​​a unity of soul and body can be understood. The soul makes an organism only to such a. The various parts of an organism are what they are, solely on the basis of their relationship to the unity of the organism.

In the knowledge ( of the truth and goodness ) the knowing subject strives for knowledge about a given object. The object of knowledge is at once distinguished from the subject and the same with him.

In the absolute idea eventually - as the culmination of philosophical thought - sees the awareness of the identity of subject and object - of Ansich and for-itself - a. The subject recognizes itself as an object and the object is therefore the subject.

Schematic overview

Expenditure

  • Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Science of Logic. Schrag, Nuremberg 1812-1816 Vol 1.1. Schrag, Nuremberg 1812. ( Digitized and full text in German Text Archive )
  • Vol 1.2. Schrag, Nuremberg 1813. ( Digitized and full text in German Text Archive )
  • Vol 2 Schrag, Nuremberg 1816. ( Digitized and full text in German Text Archive )
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