Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes
The Battle of Masurian took place between February 7 and February 22, 1915 in Masuria ( East Prussia, today Poland) between German and Russian forces. It is also called winter battle beiLyck and Augustów or Winter Battle of the Masurian Lakes, and is not to be confused in the latter case with the Battle of the Masurian Lakes.
Background
After the two defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes against the German 8th Army, the Russian military leadership felt compelled once again zoom in reserves to be ready for further operations. The situation was also the fact that in the autumn of 1914, German troops had tried to Warsaw push forward ( Battle of the Vistula River, Battle of Łódź). Although the German attack could be successfully defended, but this belt use at the end of 1914, almost all the forces of the Russian Northwest Front. Since it came on the central front on the Vistula to a stalemate between the two sides, the front commander, General Russki resorted to the plan of a campaign on East Prussia. The Russian headquarters Stawka under Yuri Danilov saw this as a promising alternative. The Russians were able to draw personnel as well as industrially from the solid and planned the formation of a new army - the 12th - at the southern edge of the German area projection. The activation area and the planned deployment axis looked similar to the operation of the 2nd Army, which was destroyed at Tannenberg, to deceive.
In the German rods ruled the further course of action, however, no such unity. The head of the OHL Falkenhayn wanted to save all available forces for the Western Front and to expire the winter on the Eastern Front without further German operations. Hindenburg's chief of staff and the actual commander of the Eastern Front General Ludendorff, however, demanded more troops for another attack. After his offensive in Russian Poland had proved setback, he turned back to East Prussia. The German Eastern Province since 1914 was under the constant threat of Russian troops and the reorganization of the Russian 12th Army made clear once again the urgency of this problem. The lower-ranking officer was able to prevail against the commander in chief of the army and began planning the operation. In January, four corps were detached from the Polish front and reactivated in the newly formed 10th Army under Hermann von Eichhorn in southern East Prussia. Thus the Germans had in their easternmost province two armies, which could be utilized for an offensive. The plan was a battle of encirclement against the Russian 10th Army under Thadeus Sievers. The ausersehene as a target the United Association revealed from the east the border to the German Reich and should be surrounded by two German spearheads.
The Russian higher priority ignored the danger which threatened the Russian 10th Army, despite several warnings of their commander in chief. The head of the STAVKA Danilov hit its concerns with the fact that all available German troops are bound to the central sector of the front in Poland. The subordinate thereto Front commander Nikolai Russky even assumed that any German thrust would be drawn not only be considered by the reorganization of the 12th Army due to lack of flank security.
Course of the battle
The fighting began on February 7, 1915 with the simultaneous attack of two German spearheads. The German 10th Army met before at the northern end of the Russian line, while the led by Otto von Below 8th Army led by the same maneuver in the south. Since both major units each operated on the very edge of the Russian flanks, they encountered little resistance. Just two days later, was able to achieve a breakthrough on the right flank of the Russian positions Eichhorn's 10th Army. The German soldiers were able to prevail against two cavalry divisions and two reserve divisions from Sievers ' army and put them to flight. This opens the way to the Russian supply lines for Eichhorn's troops was free and exposed the Russian center of an immense threat.
This tactical defeat the Russian leadership would surely be able to meet, if she had not assessed the operations on its front wrong. It had been lulled by the headquarters in security and did not expect a comprehensive offensive. Thus, the movement of the 8th Army was seen as an attack on the fortress in corps strength Osowiec and waives energetic countermeasures. Similarly, the strength of the 10th Army was underestimated in the north. You could see in their approach to attack the garrison town of Kovno. It was not until a week after the start of the German offensive until one in the Russian 10th Army headquarters was aware that you ever faced a major offensive. Even the complete breakdown of the right flank on 11 February was not a sufficient sign of alarm for the commander of the army as well as for the higher bars.
On the same day, however, stepped in front of the commander Russki. He planned a counter-offensive in the area of Below's 8th Army. Here he lost two misperceptions that made his intervention for disaster. On the one hand he held the attack of the 8th Army for the German main attack, while in the north already the German 10th Army had thrown back the right wing and prepared the encirclement of the Russian center. He wanted to provide the not yet operational 12th Army for a counter-offensive in the south of East Prussia. To give this operation flank security, but he forbade any retreat of the troops of the Russian 10th Army. Thus were the central corps of the army Sievers ' by decree nailed between the two German armies, which vorschoben at their flanks in their hinterland. The promised counter-offensive of course, did not take place. When they had recognized the seriousness of the situation on February 14, was the army commander ordered to withdraw, but it was this almost too late. The Germans already controlled the streets, which should serve as exit routes for the central units, and had settled in the hinterland. Thus, the retreat degenerated to panic. Two corps of the Russian center could save themselves though, the XX. Corps, however, was included in Augustów in a wooded area and capitulated with 12,000 remaining men. However, the rest of the troops managed to avoid the last minute and decimated collected in a collecting position.
Follow
The winter battle was a German victory, and this was also honored accordingly propaganda in the German Reich. But in terms of Ludendorff's expectations, she was only a partial success. The Chief of Staff of the Eastern Front had planned to destroy the Russian 10th Army in a second Tannenberg completely, and then push forward by enemies of empty space up to Białystok. The army Sievers was indeed beaten, but she could escape a complete encirclement. So you had won 150 km Terrain and thus expelled the last Russian troops from German territory. But a collapse of the enemy front was not induced. Although General Russki had his offensive plan for the conquest of East Prussia by the Russian 12th Army to give up for the time being, but the offensive capability of the Russian armed forces was still present. This was already the beginning of March, when the 12th Army could make in a counteroffensive 30,000 prisoners. East Prussia was backed up but this time by a buffer zone against Russian re- advance of the Russian Imperial forces. The Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich ordered a little later, in his capacity as commander in chief of the Russian army refrain from further offensives against East Prussia.