Speech act

The Sprechakttheorien or speech act theories thematize as different aspects of linguistic pragmatics verbal expressions, such as speeches, which not only describe facts and make assertions, but at the same time itself acts ( acts) take place. Accordingly, commands, Naming, oaths, promises, warnings, insults, etc. active changes the reality. Analyze the esp. in the 1950s and 60s published on the basis of this theory treatises and classify such linguistic actions and their implications. Among the most important representatives include John Langshaw Austin ( How to Do Things with Words ) and John Searle.

• 8.1 classic
• 8.2 launches
• 8.3 Further Reading

Classification

The speech act theories are attributed to linguistic pragmatics, which the linguistic behavior and language use, that is, the relation of signs to their users, researched. This is again - as the semantics - the branch of semiotics that deals with linguistic signs. In connection with the concept of the sign examined the (internal) semantics basic relations between linguistic expressions and content as well as relevant substantive relations between expressions and their meanings, but - in contrast to pragmatics - not by a situation-dependent description of the objects and circumstances of the extra-linguistic reality. The Generative semantics approaches this context and situation level, but has difficulties to formalize these complex relationships in their models. The reference semantics ( referred to as external semantics ), however, selects the communication situation in their relation to reality as a starting point. In blurred boundaries also sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics and communication studies deal with the research field of pragmatics.

The representatives of the speech act theory often invoke authorities who have turned away in the 20th century by the traditional logic and philosophy of language and / or a philosophy of pragmatism represented: esp. Wittgenstein, Peirce, Mead and Morris. Their scientific world views and epistemologies can be quite different, basic similarities in their communication and character models ( with the exception of Wittgenstein ) with the more developed systems of Austin and Searle, which express not only the designation of a linguistic act, but their execution, but are obvious.

Similarly, reference may be made which contains both the instrumental character of the language of human action practice as well as the relation to jointly experienced reality as a reference object on Karl Bühler's Organon model. In this context, in particular the factors and language functions (1 ), ( 3) (4 ) and ( 6) the representation ( left) of Roman Jakobson for comparison with the Sprechakttheorien important.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations controversially interpreted (1953, posthumous ) are often used as reference point for the Sprechakttheorien called, inasmuch as the author of the dyadic theory of meaning ( "Every word has a meaning. [ ... ] It is the object for which the word stands. " pi 1 ) rejects. In contrast, " [ t] he meaning of a word [ ... ] its use in the language" was, whose rules will determined by that linguistic utterances in communication in different situations of everyday life take on different functions (from Wittgenstein " language game " called ). "Look at the record as a tool, and its meaning as its use " ( PU 421 ) - (. More at The semantic theory in the discussion )

Charles Peirce draws its ideas of semiosis (ie process the action unfolding of a character ) as the actual subject matter of semiotics to the ontology to general categories of perception. He is concerned with epistemological and metaphysical generality, universality. Starting point for his consideration is the effect that assigns the man in his presentation the object of a concept ( object) and determines the conceptual content. Against this background he developed in his pragmatic semiotics from the dyadic sign model ( The character - the representamen - is directly related to the extra-linguistic object) a triadic relation, by inserting an intermediate instance, the interpretant, this means that the importance of individually recognized, which arises context of action - through interpretation of the speaker / listener in one - culturally predetermined. Since the respective representamen be interpreted differently depending on the situation, the characters relationships are always in perspective, that is: it can lead to misunderstandings and delusions and interpretation about the actual object ( the dynamic object ) may need to be adjusted. By understanding the characters get an intersubjective interpretation, which is accepted as conventional.

George H. Mead also designed a dynamic model: In his philosophy he studied the role of language in interpersonal, social context and incorporates the verbal non-verbal communication a: through words, gestures, facial expressions of the person may have certain reactions in themselves and - in one interactionism - in other trigger, give hints on itself and thus trigger with themselves, while others reactions. The individual takes in this way the social communication process and to process it. For Mead, this process is important for the development of identity through interaction. Arise mainly through the characters of the language - through the cooperation of subjects - feedback loops, but not in a simple behaviorist stimulus-response scheme, but in a complex process of consciousness ( Sozialbehaviorismus ): The man registered as his behavior the stimulus for the behavior another is. So he can be behavior and to control and correct, so that can be optimized linguistic cooperation processes of the other. The speaker connects with his character the reaction of the other person - the character is so significant, that is, a symbol.

For Mead's student Charles W. Morris, pragmatics as a relation of signs to interpreters is ( Foundations of the Theory of Signs, 1938) to understand. He takes in his theory of communication - similar to Peirce - for semiosis ( sign process ) a tripartite division of a sign in front of a indirectly - note -taking through the mediation of a third element: the agents are characters support; the note names are interpretant (in place of a concept or idea, he uses behavior: The interpretation is understood as a behavioral disposition, as an act of indirectly note taking ); that is taken from the note, Designate are (objects). Later he supplemented his model to the players in this process: the performer. The part of semiotics which deals with the relationship of the characters to support the artist, Morris called pragmatics. He represents in this context - in contrast to Peirce - a behaviorist view, the descriptive- empirical the use of characters observed in the social context: interpretant he defined as an effect that is triggered in any recipient and through which the thing in question appears to him as a sign ". " The interpretant of a sign is the habit, by virtue of which the sign support the designation of certain types of objects or facts on types is attributed; ... " ( Fundamentals of the theory of signs, 1988).

History

As a birth year of speech may 1955 be considered in which John Langshaw Austin gave a lecture series entitled How to Do Things with Words at Harvard University. It was published posthumously in 1962; a German translation appeared in 1972 under the title On the theory of speech acts. Essential responsible for spreading ideas sprechakttheoretischer is that of John Searle, a student Austin, 1969 published book Speech Acts, more systematic in certain aspects of Austin's thoughts, but others will also neglected or recorded. In particular, Searle developed the example of the speech of the " promise " a model for the description of individual speech act.

First reflections on a theory of language behavior and the designation of a statement as an "act " can already be found in Charles S. Peirce. This differentiated between the sentence as such, and the statement: " we distinguish between the set [ proposition ] and the statement [ assertion ] that proposition. We confess to be happy that the sentence itself is merely a picture with a label or a pointer that is assigned to him. But what that sentence for him is, the responsibility to take over " (CP 5.343 ) Peirce chose this as an example the plot to swear an oath ." It is not a mere word, but an action. The law calls it an act, I think. " (CP 5.346 )

In a sense, the philosophy of language as a pioneer of speech Ludwig Wittgenstein can be considered ( "Words are deeds "). In 1953 the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations he speaks already explicitly against the theory that words generally only served the Naming of Things:

"As if the act of naming already what we do but would be given. As if there were only one thing, which means: ' to talk about things. ' While we still do the most multifarious our records. " (PU p. 28, § 27) The theory of language as a " designation " ( and nothing but name) is already Wittgenstein the idea countered that " speaking " and " action " is: "The word ' language game ' is to stress here that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life " (p. 26, § 23) As some of these " language games " Wittgenstein calls, in part, later examples used by Austin on speech acts examples of how commands, requests or thanksgiving.

However, this tradition has to be taken with caution, since the cognitive interests of Ludwig Wittgenstein and especially John Searles, but even John Austin, are very different. In particular, the attempt to further substantiation of speech Searles in a theory of the human mind makes it clear that the key questions of speech with Wittgenstein's language game - thinking are more likely to criticize. The unexamined appeal to Wittgenstein, whose still unsystematic ideas Searle have systematized, not true history of ideas. At the term rule - rule-following, this is particularly evident, as the speech act - like other theories of grammar (eg Noam Chomsky GTG ) also - it should go on the introduction of a technical term of it, one can follow rules, without them ( in whatever form whatever! being able to express ). This idea is in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations their sharpest criticism (see Ohler, Matthias: language and its Explanatory Memorandum).

Speech acts

While Austin performs the division of a speech act in three acts, Searle distinguishes four such partial acts.

Theory of Austin

According to Austin, the following acts may be distinguished, which run simultaneously in an everyday communication process:

1 The lokutionäre or lokutive act (from the Latin Locutio = " language " or loquor = " I speak " ): the act of ' saying something ' ( ' saying something ' in the full normal sense ' "as Austin says ) consisting of three sub-activities:

For example, Hannah says to her friend: " Drive carefully, the road up ahead in the curve is smooth. " It thus produces a sound chain ( phonetic act ), which is a grammatical expression of the Germans ( phatic act ), and thus has to a point out her associates a property and manifests itself on the driving behavior of their friend ( rhetischer act ).

2 The illocutionary illocutionary act or: the implementation of a conventional speech act, such as a question, please, warning, recommendation, threat etc. ( "doing something in saying something", as Austin says ).

The illocutionary act is the central aspect of a speech act and contains the interpersonal determination. Is from a social interaction out a speech act - the act of enunciation - executed ( that which is to be reported), will eventually pulled out of the third aspect of the listener a conclusion. That is for the previous example: Hannah makes her sentence by her boyfriend on the point of danger attentive and issues a warning. From this example you can Searles criticism that illocutionary act and rhetischer are hardly separable understand.

3 The perlocutionary act or perlokutive: achieving an effect that goes beyond the illocutionary act, such as Persuasion, retuning, Anger, unsettle, lurch, Consoling, etc. ( "doing something by saying something", as Austin says ).

Example: Hannah intends her utterance to take by Convince influence on the behavior of their friend. Does he understand the speech act, this has consequences ( a perlocutionary effect) for further communication and action process (reducing the speed and / or continuation of the conversation ).

After Austin is to distinguish between the perlocutionary act and the perlocutionary effect. The perlocutionary effect is the effect that occurs because of a perlocutionary act. The speaker may have intended, for example, in a speech that the listener laughs. The actually added effect is that the listener is annoyed. The intended perlocutionary act the speaker is so failed. From the execution of a perlocutionary act, one can speak only when the intended by the speaker intention agrees with the actual changes in effect. This is not just part of a normal communication acts that are performed sequentially or simultaneously, but also to aspects of a speech act. These aspects are connected by a " by - relation".

Examples:

Theory of Searle

While Austin performs the division of a speech act in three acts, Searle distinguishes four such partial acts.

The measures proposed by Searle changes to Austin's theory relate primarily to act rhetischen Since this is indistinguishable from the illocutionary act, he replaces it with the propositional act and determined it again by differentiation Referenzakt and Prädikationsakt. The phonetic and phatic act he summarizes under the term of the enunciation.

Speech act theory as a theory of meaning

The speech act is - according to some theorists, but not Austin! - Not just a theory of linguistic action, but also a theory of sentence meaning. The speech act theory calls so that an extension of the concept of meaning: the explication of "meaning " can not be done as in the one side based on the philosophy of language, logic only by taking recourse to truth conditions. Linguistic expressions require on the assessment of their truth value addition, an assessment under other aspects such as success or failure fortunes. Speech acts are complex acts whose components are layered hierarchically above the other. This stratification analyzes the speech act theory and shows how to make a difference by doing something by saying something by you express something.

To set meaning of an utterance such as (1 ) is the meaning component that (1 ) is a question about the meaning of (2 ) that there is a ban.

In this case one says that the utterance of a certain illocutionary force ' or " illocution " has. Speakers perform illocutionary acts, utterances have " illocutionary roles" or " illocutions ". The illocutionary force of an utterance can be recognized by the so-called Illokutionsindikatoren. The Illokutionsindikatoren include:

Classification of speech acts ( Searle )

For the classification of illocutions Searle uses twelve criteria, are three of them:

According to these three criteria Searle divides the illocutions further into five classes:

Repräsentativa (also Assertiva called Assertive ) are speech acts such as: find, say reports, statements, close, etc. Common to these that the speaker through it " is set to the truth or falsity of the statement expressed proposition ". Assertiva " commit the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition ."

• " I hereby declare my resignation ... "
• "In the name of ... "
• " In my role as ... I explain ... "

Explicit and implicit, direct and indirect speech acts

Explicit speech acts are, for example, "I hereby promise to do X" or "I hereby name this ship in the name of Y". This is referred to explicitly direct performative speech acts. Explicit performative because a so-called performative verb is used in the first example will " promise ", " baptized " in the second. This is called direct speech acts, because the proposition ( " to do X " ) is exactly the illocutionary point, the aim of the utterance corresponds to.

On the other hand, there are also implicit ( primary ), direct speech acts. These are much more common. To explicitly performative direct speech "I promise to do X " is the implicit performative "I will do X ", the performative verb is therefore simply omitted.

There is - at least according to Searle - even indirect speech acts. Here is not the illocutionary goal from Proposition recognizable. Indirect speech acts relate to conditions that exist for a speech ( type). One can say, for example, but as well you can here also refer to a preparatory condition for this speech: " The listener must be able to reach the salt "; " Pass the salt! " Accordingly, one can ask, "Can you give me the salt rich? ". This is ( literally ) a question on the ability of the listener to reach the salt. However, the illocutionary act that the speaker wants to accomplish with this is a request. In indirect speech acts, we distinguish primary and secondary illocution. The secondary illocution is the literal, so in our example the question of the ability of the listener to be able to reach the salt. The primary illocution, the real goal of the utterance, but here is a request that could be put forward also by the statement " Give me the salt! ". We will make it the primary speech by making the team's secondary. According to Searle's conception of indirect speech acts the primary illocution ( Please ) must be accessed via a complicated sequence of conclusions from the secondary. Only after these conclusions recognizes the handset according to Searle, that it is not a question of the ability to act, but rather a request. Thus, an indirect speech act succeeds, so the listener recognizes another propositional content about what was said addition, the maxim must apply for the speaker: Be sincere and relevant! For the listener is the maxim: search for the meaning! Also must both have the same ( linguistic and extra-linguistic ) background knowledge. However, this position is not without controversy in the research. Opponents of this view argue that the utterance " Can you pass me the salt? " In German conventionally " Give me the salt! " Means. The listener must not only reveal laboriously.

Historical Sprechaktanalyse

Recently, one can speak of the existence of a historical Sprechaktanalyse. Andreas Jucker, who also manages a bibliography of historical pragmatics, and Irma Taavitsainen have established as the central organ of publication, the Journal of Historical Pragmatics. The question of how a particular speech act has been realized in the course of history, also falls within the range of onomasiology ( as has, edited by Joachim Grzega, Alfred Bammesberger and Marion Beautiful magazine Onomasiology Online also begun to pick up items from this area ).