Under Convention T is understood in the philosophy of language the main idea of the semantic theory of truth by Alfred Tarski. It was formulated in 1935 in his publication about the concept of truth as follows:

In simplest terms, this is a conventional condition for truth definitions in languages. At a building on such definitions truth theory the claim is made ​​that it is equipped with enough descriptive potential to statements of the form

Or to cite a concrete example


The Convention thus requires the existence of a meta-language that contains logical links and objects, above all, the predicate "is true ". The metalanguage must therefore be richer than the language in which the statements of the type " x is true " be constructed (called the object language ). The " Convention T" is thus an attempt to formalize truth attributions ( in the context of the underlying language ) by a call to the structure of the language. At the same time, the Convention states, in which way one can define a notion of truth in formal linguistic systems. However, the Convention says nothing about the conditions under which in the above example, "X is the case ". It's in the first place - if you will - only to the link between the formal statement of the truth and the truth of the fact.

Tarski's Convention T is a frequently cited, especially in the philosophy of language term that is often associated with the later set out by Paul Benacerraf Benacerrafschen dilemma. The American philosopher Donald Davidson refers in his semantic theory for natural languages ​​on Tarski's work.


  • Semantics ( Philosophy )
  • Philosophical logic