Theodoric of Freiberg

Dietrich of Freiberg, latin Theodoric de Vriberch or Theodoricus Teutonicus (c. 1240/1245 in Freiberg, † after 1310, probably around 1318/1320 ) was a German philosopher, theologian and natural scientist. He belonged to the Dominican Order, in which he held high office.

  • 3.1 ontology, cosmology, and psychology
  • 3.2 Theory of Knowledge
  • 3.3 Theory of Time
  • 3.4 individuation
  • 3.5 rainbow theory

Life

Dietrich's home and family are unknown. It should have occurred in 1260 at the age of eighteen to twenty years in the Dominican Order. After the novitiate, he probably began basic studies in theology in his native convent to which a two-year study of logic, in particular the logical writings of Aristotle joined. Probably followed by further training in theology and philosophy (including natural science ). 1271 he was a lecturer ( read master ) in the Dominican convent of his native town of Freiberg in Saxony. From the autumn of 1272 bis 1274/1275, he completed a training study of theology at the University of Paris; in the second half of the seventies he returned to Germany. 1280 he worked as a lecturer at the Dominican convent in Trier. For the subsequent period to 1292 are no news about him; probably he returned there in Paris and held a bachelor a lecture on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. On September 7, 1293 he was elected Minister Provincial ( Superior ) of the German province of his order ( Teutonia ). As his vicar ( representative) for the region of Thuringia, he chose Meister Eckhart, with whom he thus then entered into a close professional relationship at the latest. He led the German Dominicans Province until May 1296th From 1294 to 1296 he headed at the same time as Vicar General (representative of the Chief Counsel of the Order ) the entire Dominican Order, since the Office of the General Order was vacant. 1296/97 he received his doctorate in Paris for the Master of Divinity; probably he taught for several years at the department, which was not the French Dominicans reserved. Dietrich and Albert the Great were - if known - the only Germans who taught in the 13th century at the University of Paris, who at that time played a leading role in European higher education as a Master. 1303 Dietrich was elected in Koblenz by the provincial chapter of the province of the order to one of Provinzialdiffinitoren ( an administrative office of the Order ). The last time he appears in the sources in June 1310; at that time he was entrusted temporarily with the office of Provincial Vicar of the Upper German Province Teutonia ( one of the two parts of the now two-part German province ) to the regular election of a new vicar. This took place in September 1310; Meister Eckhart was chosen. As this election was annulled by the general of the order, Dietrich had to call a new election meeting in the same year. In the research literature, his death is usually set without giving the reasons for the time around 1318/1320.

Works

Dietrich wrote, if known, except letters and not received sermons 38 writings: treatises and Quaestionen to philosophy, theology and science. Only 10 of them are lost; is not precisely dated, but can be a framework for an approximate chronology determine, and the order of creation is partially known. The works are all made according to the current state of research in the period 1285-1311.

Earlier font group

Dietrich's first, probably written around 1286 Scripture deals with problems of the ontology; she is entitled De origine rerum praedicamentalium ( " On the Origin of categorical determinable things "). In it, he sits down - from the theory of categories of Aristotle starting - with the question of how related the principles of thinking that led to the usual since Aristotle's division of being into ten categories, in origin with the principles of being.

About ten years later, probably around 1296/1297, he wrote three treatises on controversial issues: De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus ( " About three difficult problems "). They are titled De animatione caeli ( "On the inspiration of heaven " ), De visione beatifica ( "On the beatific vision ," meaning: the perception of God through the blessed after death) and De accidentibus ( "Of the accidents "). The three problems discussed are thematically far apart; the assembly into a three -part work resulted from the intention Dietrich, three examples to counter the views of communiter loquentes ( representatives of the ruling doctrines ). By this he meant the Thomists, the followers of Thomas Aquinas. The Thomists had then become widely accepted in the Dominican Order, and Dietrich wanted with his anti- Thomistic work provide the basis for a fundamental critique of Thomism. A little later came the De quiditatibus entium writings ( "On the Quidditäten - ' What units ' - the existing things " ) and De ente et essentia ( " About the being and essence "). They contain sharp criticism of Thomism, which destroy the science and is incompatible with the philosophy of Aristotle to which the Thomists appealed. Dietrich's attack was directed against contemporary Thomists as Aegidius Romanus, Bernard of Trilia and Thomas Sutton.

The next major philosophical work of Dietrich was the epistemological treatise De intellectu et intelligibili ( " About the intellect and its contents "). In it, he discussed the questions of how the human intellect itself and its principle recognizes how the "reason active " ( intellectus agens ) for "possible reason" ( possible intellect ) behaves and how this respect the Aristotelian with the Neo-Platonic approach to a coherent can be whole together.

For earlier work group also includes the treatise De magis et minus ( " About the More and Less " ), in which Dietrich examines the often discussed in the Late Middle Ages question of the qualitative improvement and reduction in substances, and perhaps De natura contrariorum ( " On the Nature contrarian pairs of opposites " ), in which he set out his theory of opposites. Probably also emerged relatively early are two essays on the philosophy of duration and time: De mensuris durationis entium ( " About measures of the time concerned the existing things " ) and De natura et proprietate continuorum ( " On the Nature and specificity of continua ").

Five received letters Dietrich date from the period 1294-1296.

Later font group

The late work of Dietrich, to which one counts his writings created in the 14th century questions of natural philosophy is, on one hand dedicated to the other, it treats the main themes of medieval theology. However, he does not discuss the theological issues to theological way (starting from the assumed authority of the Bible ), but as a philosopher, on the basis of mere rationality considerations ( secundum rationem ). In cosmology, which were especially interested Dietrich in this late period of his career, the metaphysical and theological problems with the natural philosophy and astronomy overlap.

The most extensive of all the works of Dietrich is formed after his 1304 treatise De Iride et de radialibus impressionibus ( "Over the Rainbow, and produced by blasting impressions "). Other relatively late writings of Dietrich to natural science are De miscibilibus in mixto ( " About the ingredients in a mixed fabric " ), De elementis corporum naturalium ( "On the elements of the natural body " ), De luce et eius origine ( "On the light and its origin " ) and De coloribus ( " About the colors ").

Among the late writings on theological topics include De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis ( "On the spiritual substances and the body of the future resurrection " ) and De cognitione entium separatorum et maxime animarum separatarum ( " About the knowledge in disembodied beings, especially in the body separate souls "). In two later works Dietrich deals " according to the principles of a philosophical investigation" with cosmological themes: De intelligentiis et motoribus caelorum ( "On the intelligences and the mover of the heavens " ) and De corporibus caelestibus ( " About the heavenly bodies "). These two papers also touch on theological questions; it comes to the animation of the heavenly bodies by " intelligences " ( spirit ).

Teaching

Methodically Dietrich represents the priority of justification by a line of argument against the appeal to authority, but is based on a line of the two ways out. Among his concerns heard a clean separation between theology and philosophy ( metaphysics ). He stressed his opposition role as a representative of a minority position in relation to prevailing doctrines. Among other things he advocated in a modified version of teachings that had been condemned church in the Paris condemnation of 1277 with the threat of excommunication. He willingly chooses for his assumptions paradoxical acting, provocative formulations.

Ontology, cosmology, and psychology

In some questions, Dietrich shares the view of Thomas Aquinas, in particular as regards the relationship of matter and form. He denies the composition of form and mental substances ( spiritual ) matter and takes in the human soul as the only substantial form. It therefore goes against the " Franciscan school," the Augustinian doctrine embossed prominent Franciscan theologians. What separates him from Thomism, is mainly be embossed Neoplatonic worldview. He interprets the creation Neoplatonic as eternal emanation of creation from God and takes a reversing this process to return to the origin. In contrast to Thomas, he considered the heavenly bodies (ie, the shell-shaped celestial spheres of the former astronomy) as independent of spirit beings ( " intelligences " ) moves. These spirit beings, it differs from the angels. He sums up to heaven as souls, not just as a mover. He also rejects the view of the Thomists, that a real distinction between being ( existentia, existence ) and beings there ( essentia, Suchness ).

Dietrich's consistent adherence to the belief that an accident can not exist independently of the substance that brings him into conflict with the church, defended by the Thomist doctrine of transubstantiation. This doctrine, according to binding specified by the medieval church disappears in the Eucharist the substance of bread and is replaced by the divine substance of Christ's body, but remain while maintaining the properties of the bread. Expressed Philosophically it means that properties ( accidents ) can exist without its substantial support. This contradicts the definition of accident as that which can not exist by itself ( per se ), so do not separable from its substance. This is for the philosophically educated medieval theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, a serious problem, because they assume that God does nothing contradictory and therefore logically impossible, but the law considered by the unavoidable contradiction. Thomas tries to rectify the problem by changing the definition of accident. He says, though an accident is usually, but not necessarily tied to its substance, there can be no substance in exceptional cases according to God's will. In contrast, Dietrich used. He throws Thomas right to destroy with this assumption a foundation of science.

In the late works of Dietrich anchoring solidified in the Neoplatonic metaphysics and cosmology. His previously expressed tentative agreement to teachings of the late antique Neoplatonist Proclus and the Neoplatonic Liber de causis ( "Book of the causes ") is now more accentuated and carried forward with certainty.

Epistemology

Knowledge is finding the truth in a hidden treasury ( " hiding " ) of the Spirit ( abditum mentis ) for Dietrich. This hiding place - a certificate from Augustine idea - the soul reason he equates with the active intellect ( intellectus agens ) of Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy. The intellect working ( the reason) he regarded as a substance that can be seen from God and His perfect image ( imago ) is. The active intellect is by its very nature, not by a special gift of " god -like" ( deiformis ). In the individual according to Dietrich's teaching the intellect substance of a single soul substance is associated with the efficient cause ( efficient cause ) it is. So he does not grasp the intellect as that of the Thomists as akzidentelles mental faculties. At Thomas intellect has only the task of enabling knowledge, for Dietrich, however, he is the knower itself, the active intellect exists as a substance not independent of the soul, he does not go outside to her add, but is intrinsic to her. The possible intellect ( possible intellect ) is not considered Dietrich as a substance in the strict sense.

A basic assertion Dietrich is that the human intellect by its very nature always in the current implementation is ( intellectus by essentiam semper in actu ). He thinks, the intellect have what he has, always and by its nature, not from the outside or by accident. If something entering from outside into him, could only happen in its own way, so as an intellectual activity. In contrast to the Aristotelian view that a being must first be before it can be worked, he claims that the human intellect itself as being constituted by recognizing itself, ie, his divine reason thinking captured in itself. Thus, the intellect does not think, because he is, but he is, because he thinks; he thinks both his thinking and his being. Within the intellect Dietrich does not allow distinction of Tätigem and activity, subject and object; the substance of the intellect, his work and even his object coincide in one. The self-knowledge of the active intellect considered Dietrich as free from error, as it is simple and not based on a judgment, the parts of which could be linked wrong.

The intellect can recognize being as being and has in principle the ability to do everything and be everything. By its own nature, he bears similarity to all of the being in itself, and indeed in a simple way, since its essence is simple. The multiplicity is the intellectual property unit in it, and due to this unit he is able to know everything. As he recognizes himself, he recognizes both its cause and the other things. For an extremely high rank him comes to.

The relationship between the intellect and the things of nature as its knowledge objects determined Dietrich so that the intellect, the nature thing, as far as it is a " what" ( quid ) and by its " quiddity " (ratio rei or Quidditas ) is determined constituted. For this activity, the intellect Dietrich imprinted " quidifizieren " the expression. In addition, however, the natural thing exists independently of the intellect, namely, insofar as it is constituted by the physical principles matter and form. In this sense differs Dietrich ( entia naturae ) and spawned the intellect contents of thought ( entia conceptionalia, one of Dietrich embossed following on Averroes term ) between natural objects. Nature is indeed a fundamental principle of being, but can not distinguish; that only the intellect, which, by distinguishing, at the same time causes. The conceivability can not be effected by nature she does not go out of the ontological nature of the object, but is exclusively due to the spontaneous activity of the intellect. On the other hand, it is the unchanging, rational structure of reality that allows the human rational knowledge. In the empirical cognition is perception connects through a mapping of the sensory object with a contribution of the active intellect, which provides out of himself a priori spiritual form ( forma intelligibilis ). Through the spiritual form the data supplied by the sensory perception are conceptually understood and assigned to the objects of perception, the terms, so that their provision becomes possible. These intellectual forms include Dietrich apparently the categories.

Theory of time

The time does not count Dietrich to natural things, but he regarded it as a product of the soul, that rejects the " time realism" from. He thus assigns them to not physics but metaphysics. They understood as extended by analogy to spatial extent he deems wrong. Rather, he thinks that it arises from the interaction of representing and reason. Past and future are created as such by the soul by the soul as it determines. If no soul measures the time and their number so that gives character exists neither time nor aktual potentially.

Individuation

In the theory of individuation, the cause of the emergence of the individual things from the general, Dietrich first determines the term "individual ". It defines an individual as an essential unity, added to the special provisions which are ontologically " later ", ie not from the outset for determination of essence (definition) belong. Is a being not by his essential form determined (about as a person by defining features of " living things " and " rational " ), but also through additional, unnecessary rules, so it is an individual or individual thing. Such provisions are, for example, qualitative human substantiality features ( modes substantiales qualitativi ) of his individual intellect or an object a certain spatial extent. Thus, the individuality is accidental. From the perspective of nature that is oriented only to the General and Permanent ( conservation of the species ), it is incidental, not intended as such, but only to the type sake there. Dietrich rejects the view of Thomas Aquinas, that physical matter is the principle of individuation. He thinks that the active intellect itself individuated by setting substantiality acts whose modifications beyond what is its essential definition.

Rainbow Theory

In the original work De Iride et de radialibus impressionibus Dietrich examines the rainbow rays and other phenomena, their origin in the light sources and their inclusion in the medium. Based on the evaluation of " distinct and unmistakable experience," he says with reason reasons, the emergence of rainbow colors, their number and " inviolable sequence ". He distinguishes between primary rainbow and secondary rainbow and explains why the color arrangement in the secondary rainbow is reversed. He distinguishes four rainbow colors and five types of refraction and reflection of light and compares among other things, the beam path in transparent balls with that in dew drops. He also explains the semicircular shape of the rainbow and why the phenomenon is not always complete, depending on the position of the sun about. His understanding of the formation of the rainbow is the basic principle for scientifically- correct.

Reception

Among the thinkers who Dietrich's knowledge and doctrine of creation affected include Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, and Berthold of Moosburg, the often quoted him without naming him. Even in vernacular literature Dietrich was received philosophy, including the " Treatise on bliss " (early 14th century), whose author went Dietrich Imago and Intellektlehre own. Contemporary Thomistic Dominicans oriented ( Henry of Lübeck, Nicholas of Strasbourg) disagreed with his views. His explanation of the rainbow found no resonance. After the mid-14th century, he was largely forgotten. Only in the 19th century became interested in it again, and it went first to his rainbow theory, which has now been recognized as an event of natural science history.

Text output

  • Dietrich von Freiberg: Writings on Intellekttheorie ( = Opera omnia Vol. 1), ed. Burkhard Mojsisch. Meiner, Hamburg 1977, ISBN 3-7873-0372-3
  • Dietrich von Freiberg: writings on metaphysics and theology ( = Opera omnia Vol. 2), ed. Ruedi Imbach, inter alia, Meiner, Hamburg 1980, ISBN 3-7873-0446-0
  • Dietrich von Freiberg: writings on natural philosophy and metaphysics ( = Opera omnia Vol. 3), ed. Jean -Daniel Cavigioli among others Meiner, Hamburg 1983, ISBN 3-7873-0545-9
  • Dietrich von Freiberg: writings on science. Letters ( = Opera omnia Vol 4), ed. Maria -Rita Pagnoni - Sturlese et al Meiner, Hamburg 1985, ISBN 3-7873-0640-4

Translations

  • Theodoric di Freiberg, L' origine delle realtà predicamentali, translated by Andrea Colli, Bompiani, Milano 2010, ISBN 9788845267093
  • Dietrich von Freiberg: Treatise on the accidentals, translated by Burkhard Mojsisch. Meiner, Hamburg 1994, ISBN 978-3-7873-1173-6
  • Dietrich von Freiberg treatise on the intellect and the act of knowing, translated by Burkhard Mojsisch. Meiner, Hamburg 1980, ISBN 3-7873-0502-5
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