Value judgment

A value judgment expresses the more or less positive or negative award, which is contained in the opinion of any person in respect of a more or less well-defined object. It is often accompanied by the more or less explicit expectation and / or solicitation to third parties only shared the same rating as sufficiently justified.

Value judgment or value statement

Conceptions of logic differ in whether they emanate from certain basic terms such as " judgment " and / or " statement " (or " normative statement "). Depends on, for example, whether a value judgment is logically presented in the form of a sentence into subject - predicate structure, or as a fully pulling act of valuing or as a single logical entity, as that is often considered a statement, or, again, to an even others, such as psychological or action-theoretical way.

The explication of " value judgment " requires an explicit theory of value or a different type of clarifying what is to be meant by value.

Value freedom

In the philosophy of science the claim is often made ​​that scientific statements should be free of normative ( or at least moral ) content. This property is referred to as value-free.

Values ​​controversy

Value judgments are a central object of value judgment controversy in sociology and economics. In this case turns on the question of whether value judgments about the policy measures to be taken should be taken in science or of whether such value judgments can be scientifically justified.

Conceptual history

Ignaz Pokorny

The Herbartians Ignaz Pokorny has the value judgment term closely tied to the concept of feeling. Pokorny different theoretical judgments that " judgments about the being and its detailed provisions " are, according to him, and value judgments, which he also called practical judgments. Value judgments are according to Pokorny starting point of aesthetics and occur in very different shape ( eg approval, Missbiligung, pleasure, displeasure, preferring Discard ) He observed that different people and societies make different value judgments and thus are limited. He claims that the aesthetic should seek absolute values ​​. Value judgments have, in its opinion articles to the subject and feelings to the predicate. If the value judgment necessarily, also feel it is essential, that is, of other ideas to be independent.

Max Weber

Especially in the still ongoing debate about the value of freedom of judgment a little more explicit term use is often taken as a basis, the Max Weber follows or believes to follow.

" Under, ratings ' are practical ' reviews of influenced by our actions phenomenon be understood as objectionable or worthy of approval. "

And: "Value judgments are practical ratings of social facts as, ethical or cultural point of view (or for other reasons), practically desirable or undesirable. "

As attempts at defining these formulations are inadequate because in the definiens as in the definiendum same expressions occur ( logical circle ). Exactly the same objection applies to "value judgment" = ( def. ) "a judgment of what is Desirable or worthwhile ."

In order to gain a clear picture of Max Weber's comments on " value judgment ", and in particular on his conception of logic and his theory of value, you can first clear the area of the debates that are not only informed Weber's theses, but sometimes have rather obscured.

Karl Popper nor Max Weber had put into the orbit of essentialism because of its extensive use of explicit definitions. In the positivist dispute, however, defended representatives of critical rationalism as Hans Albert, Wolfgang Schluchter and Herbert Keuth not only Popper, but also Weber against positivism and decisionismo accusation, attacks, as had been argued about by Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas.

Only later was noted that Max Weber had in science teaching and theory of value unmistakably connected to the Baden neo-Kantians, especially to Heinrich Rickert. Weber has these preparations as modified its particular purposes and ideas accordingly; yet this problem- historical relationship is to consider if you want to understand Weber's epistemological versions.

Victor force

Victor force holds the concept of value for definable. He distinguishes value carrier and value predicate:

" The object to which a value is attributed to the value of the carrier; the value that is attributed to him, speaking from a value predicate. This is a concept of value, usually as adjectives, but also in a substantive or verbal form. X is sinful, x is a sin x sin "

The various value types differ in force in their factual, descriptive content. Force denies an independent existence of values ​​and differs from the so called value absolutism (see value realism) from.

Hans Albert

Building on strength is a set according to Hans Albert iff a value judgment when it

" 1 the respective targeted facts in a positive or negative way for the behavior ( opinion or action ) is characterized;

2 while a normative principle ( default value or behavior maxim ) assumed to be valid, the calls for a corresponding behavior; and

3 involved a prescriptive expectation that the addressee of the sentence to identify with this principle, and therefore act accordingly. "

Theodor Geiger

Theodor Geiger wins his most theoretical position in engagement with the Uppsala school ( cf. Axel Hägerström ). According to Geiger's view, a value judgment objectifies the subjective relationship of a person to an object, the linguistic representation of an inadmissible way from the subjective assessment of an objective property of the evaluated object makes. This abuse of language holds Geiger illegitimate:

" The value judgment that is objectively a subjective relationship of the speaker to an object and makes this pseudo - lenses for statement part of a set of the form of theoretical factual statements. This is illegitimate. "

Value judgments and freedom of expression

The distinction between value judgments and factual judgments plays with the question of what opinions are covered by freedom of expression (see freedom of expression), a major role. In German law, fact judgments are better protected by the constitutional right of freedom of expression as value judgments.