Verificationism

Verificationism is a position in the philosophy of language, according to which the meaning of a sentence consists in the method of its verification.

The verificationism can be seen on the background of the problem, to formulate a criterion of meaning, which allows to distinguish scientifically meaningful statements of metaphysical statements. The Verificationism has thus to the intent and consequence that sentences that can not be verified, are referred to as meaningless. Meaningless statements are withdraw from the empirical science.

Based on Ludwig Wittgenstein of verificationism was represented by the Vienna Circle, in different versions of Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick and Friedrich Waismann.

The verificationism is not simply the reverse of falsificationism. For Popper, it is the latter that deviated from a problem: He does not seek a criterion for the meaning of statements, but a demarcation criterion of empirical science on the one hand, and metaphysics, logic, mathematics, and pseudo-science on the other side. He finds this criterion in the falsifiability of statements by empirical tests.

The philosopher Daniel Dennett tries to use the Verificationism problems in the philosophy of mind - to expose as pseudo-problems - such as the qualia problem.

Michael Dummett has examined the following alternative to the explanation of the meaning of a sentence in a particular language within his philosophy of language: a) in terms of how we prove it to be true; b ) in terms of what is involved if we accept it as true.

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