John Searle

John Rogers Searle ( IPA: [/ sɜrl / ] ) ( born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado ) is an American philosopher. His main research areas are philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, social ontology, as well as parts of metaphysics. Searle is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.

2.2.1 intentionality
2.2.2 Artificial Intelligence
2.2.3 Theory of Consciousness
2.2.4 criticism

2.3.1 The construction of social realities
2.3.2 Realism and relativism

Life

Searle's father was GW Searle, an electrical engineer at AT & T, his mother named Hester Beck Searle was a professional physician. Searle began his studies of philosophy, political science and economics in 1949 with seventeen years at the University of Wisconsin. From 1952 he continued it with a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford University. Here he attended events of John Langshaw Austin and Peter Strawson. In Oxford Searle taught from 1956 to 1959 at Christ Church College. With his supervised by Peter Geach dissertation on the meaning and reference Searle earned his Ph.D. in 1959 In the same year he was not even 30 years, a professor at the prestigious University of California, Berkeley. The local philosophy department he belongs to for more than 50 years.

In Berkeley Searle supported the emerging student protests and was the first tenured professor who participated in the Free Speech Movement. 1969 Searle published his philosophical work spoke Speech Acts, which, among other things worked far into the linguistics. In the following years, Searle turned to other topics, so among other things the philosophy of mind, in which he repeatedly criticized the reductionist approaches. For his work in this area in 2000 he was with the Jean- Nicod Prize. 2013 he was appointed to the Albertus Magnus Chair of the University of Cologne.

Services

Philosophy of Language

Speech acts and everyday language

Searle applies with John L. Austin, William P. Alston, Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish as an important representative of speech.

The speech act is, according to Searle crucial for a theory of linguistic meaning based on assumptions such as the following: " Talk does perform speech acts - acts such as Make assertions, give orders, ask questions, make promises, etc., and on a more abstract level acts such as Clues and predicting - and that the possibility of this Act generally based on certain rules for the use of linguistic elements and the enforcement of this Act follows these rules. "

Language rules

Searle also speaks frequently in his remarks about speech acts on the rules and is thus probably in the tradition of Wittgenstein, who linked the meanings of speech acts with their use rules. He takes over from G.C.J. Midgley in " Linguistic Rules" (1959 ) introduced the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. According to this konstitutieren constitutive rules new behaviors, regulatory rules, however, regulate already existing practices. For example, the traffic is routed through rules, but none of these rules is a necessary condition for traffic. In contrast, the rules of chess are constitutive: Those who do not follow the rules of playing chess, can not play chess, he can at most play a different game on a chessboard. Also Midgley 's " Linguistic Rules" following, Searle also claims that the language is konstitutiert by constitutive rules, which makes the term usually the central element of Searle's theory of meaning. He explained that "a language is to speak, to perform speech acts in accordance with systems of constitutive rules. "

Although the appeal is probably based on rules of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, there are important differences between the two philosophers: Searle would like to have a system of linguistic rules formulated as Wittgenstein would have such a systematizing access to everyday language probably rejected as illusory. The systematizing efforts Searles have indeed worked very productive for linguistic research, however, remain controversial as saying philosophical project.

To date, the claim is that linguistic meaning rules is the existence of ( constitutive or other ) controversial. Thus it can be asked how to genesis and validity have to think of such a linguistic rules. These rules were, so one can argue (as opposed to game - or transport rules ) never explicitly formulated and recorded. Rather, the speech rules to be included by implication in practice. A competent speaker can follow the rules of his language without explicitly aware of these rules. These problems have about Donald Davidson led to reject the rule concept. Robert Brandom, however, is sticking to its rule concept and tries to show how linguistic rules arise from a common practice. Matthias Ohler has in his work explicitly on the methodological status of the control concept as a settlement offer in Wittgenstein's philosophy pointed and on the systematic problems that one einhandelt, if you make a technical rule concept of it as in the theory of speech acts Searle and related schools of thought ( Noam Chomsky about universal grammar ) happens. (: Cologne language and the reasons Wittgenstein contra Searle, 1988 see Ohler, Matthias. ) In this way the absurd claim must be installed, one can follow rules, without formulating it can (regardless of any degree of accuracy of the formulation)

Illocutionary acts

Following John L. Austin Searle claims that the illocutionary act is a central aspect of any speech act. What this aspect is exactly at Searle, however, remains unclear. This aspect is in any case complemented by a propositional structure, on its investigation, the philosophy of language was limited for a long time. Under a proposition is understood in the theory of speech the content of a speech act that establishes a connection to the world. In German, propositions can be expressed with the phrase that p. Examples are that Napoleon was cruel or that grass is green. For a complete speech act description must to the specification of the proposition nor a specification of an illocutionary Akttyps are emerging. Some examples: One can hope, claim, promise, or fear that p. Through these various illocutionary aspects very different speech acts can be performed with the same proposition. Searle makes this clear in the following example:

All these descriptions express the same proposition, namely that Sam smokes habitually. However, they differ in their illocutionary aspects: In the first sentence asserts asked, ordered and desired in the following. Searle is now trying to work out the rules of the various illocutionary acts. To this end, he presents his analysis of a ( supposed ) illocutionary act, namely, the promise. In order for a speech act can be a promise, numerous conditions must be met. Some examples: In order to be able to promise a person p, the addressee p must prefer the absence of p - otherwise we would be dealing with a threat and no promises. At a promise is also part of the intent of an action execution. In all these conditions, the constitutive rules of the language are included according to Searle, which applies to uncover and describe it.

Propositional Act

Searles determination of the propositional act does not coincide with Austin's concept of Rhetischen act. The main difference is that Austin rhetischer act one aspect of the pure " Something saying ," while Searle's propositional act, one aspect of the speech act is ( generally considered a speech act ' using ' the something - agent is completed, so adds a lot more ). The propositional act can be determined "as that which the act of communication is " (that is what prompted with a question of what is claimed in a claim, etc.) is commonly known as " propositional content ". The propositional act is divided into the two acts of reference and predication.

Philosophy of mind

Intentionality

The phenomenon of intentionality, Searle's own view, according to which a link between his philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. The concept of intentionality was introduced by Franz Brentano in the modern philosophical debate. Brentano defined " intentionality " as the feature of the directedness of mental states. This means that mental states refer to situations in the world, refers about the idea that Napoleon was a politician, to the facts that Napoleon was a politician. Only by this way of referring thoughts can be true or false: Does the thought on an existing state of affairs, it is true. If the situation is not (about the thought that Napoleon was a giant), so the thought is wrong.

In his book published in 1983 Intentionality (Eng. 1987) Searle, the works of Paul Grice and other advances following the phenomenon of intentionality in the center of his attention. Even in speech acts, as Searle, intentionality plays a central role, as speech acts without intentional reference to the communication participants could have no meaning. Would the utterances of speakers caused by an accident in the universe without intentional polluters, it would only sound waves without meaning. Intentionality is thus a necessary condition for importance, and may only living things at the same time.

The debate about intentionality has been dominated in the last 20 years in particular by the question of reductionism. Reductionists, the thesis that all phenomena can be ultimately explained by a scientific description. The reductionist thesis also includes the awareness and intentionality with a. Searle has strongly turned against reductionist efforts: First, he has criticized, computers or robots ascribe intentionality. Such claims are fundamentally flawed by Searle. Secondly, Searle tried so tightly bind intentional states to the experience ( qualia ) that the assumed irreducibility of experience states transfers to intentional states.

Artificial intelligence

The correct understanding of the phenomenon of intentionality has an impact on the basic theory of artificial intelligence (AI). The computer pioneer Alan Turing formulated in 1950 the Turing Test as an answer to the question of whether machines can think. According to Turing, a computer can think if and only if he ( a chat ) can deceive a man about it in a written interview that he is a man. According to Searle this Turing test is not sufficient to ascribe thoughts can a computer. Such a computer would behave according to Searle only one person accordingly, but nothing my self or think. For such mental processes, according to Searle, intentionality is necessary to go beyond the behavior. To support this critical perspective, Searle has developed an argument to prove the Verfehltheit the Turing test. This has become known under the name Chinese room thought experiment begins with the assumption of a library. In this library, sits a person who list gets served with Chinese characters. The person does not understand Chinese. However, in the books of the library transformation rules: the person searching in books for the string on the paper and writes the new string specified in the book to a new list on. This they are now out of the library. The joke in the thought experiment is that right other Chinese sentences are applied in the books the Chinese sentences. The result is for a Chinese observer outside the library the impression of a proper communication: On slips of paper, which are served in the library, are correct Chinese sentences, such as issues. On the paper, which are served from the library are appropriate Chinese sentences, about the answers to the questions. The Chinese room would therefore pass the Turing test.

Yet no one understands in the library Chinese, neither the person nor the library. Also, library and person together, according to Searle understand no Chinese. According to Searle, this shows that the existence of the Turing test is not sufficient to understand language. A computer doing basically nothing more than the Chinese Room: He Transforming strings by given, purely syntactic rules in new strings without understanding their semantics. But if that is not enough for thought in the case of the Chinese room, so is also not clear how ever should arise a thinking computer.

Searle draws from his thought experiment, the consequence of that distinction should be made between a weak and a strong AI. The weak AI will attempt to simulate human behavior and solve problems that can be managed only by people of intelligence. Such a project is perfectly legitimate according to Searle. The strong AI on the other hand wants to build thinking computer. Representatives of artificial intelligence have, if any, reacts differently to this argument. Some researchers are limited to the weak AI. Others reject Searle's thought experiment. Some explain about that the Chinese room would actually be understood as a complete system. Counter- intuition based on the fact that the complexity of such a system do not clear up.

Theory of consciousness

As a result of his work on intentionality and artificial intelligence Searle has also made increasing efforts to a general theory of consciousness. On the one hand, he sees himself in the tradition of naturalism, claiming that consciousness must be regarded as a normal, biological phenomenon. At the same time Searle is a sharp critic of reductionism, explaining that the subjective experience perspective is never get at through a scientific description. Because of its naturalistic beliefs Searle wants you to stop by dualistic philosophers who see in consciousness is an intangible phenomenon. His anti-reductionist orientation prevents, however at the same time an identification of mental states with neural processes. Searle tries to escape this dilemma by declaring that mental states are caused by biological conditions.

Now, however, the causal interaction between mind and brain is a typical element of dualistic theories already René Descartes argued that the biological processes acting at a specific location in the brain ( pineal gland ) on the mind. Searle wants to set itself apart from such theories, explaining that they had in the case of consciousness assumed another form of causation. Consciousness is a higher-level property of complex biological systems and no intangible entity. At the same time, however, Searle has epiphänomenalistische views back sharply and describes himself as a representative of naive realism.

Such a position is attractive because it promises to avoid the problems of dualism and physicalism. Despite this attractiveness is often argued that Searle's biological naturalism can not bring together coherently with his antireductionism. If consciousness - as Searle claims - an unproblematic biological phenomenon, then is incomprehensible how consciousness can have a subjective component that is not detectable by biology.

Criticism

On critics is to say, among other things Hubert Dreyfus. Dreyfus has worked in the U.S., especially with the reception of Heidegger's work. He faces a " Husserl searleschen " tradition and their understanding of intentionality Heidegger's concept of the world and in-the -world.

Heidegger had to show in Being and Time attempts that the existence (the person) is never an unworldly subject, as it were self-sufficient, which only then directs his mind to the things in the world. Heidegger illustrates this especially in that it emphasizes the primacy of practice over theory: Man has first one dealing with things by having them handle and used; only under certain circumstances, he trains at all an awareness of this self-understanding. Dreyfus is in the following example: If we leave a room, we operate quite naturally the doorknob, open the door and go outside. Only once the door handle is broken (Heidegger refers to such a case as " deficient mode of handiness " ), then we will be aware that we try to get out. Only in such a situation, breaks down for us the world in an intentional subject ( with the desire to get out ) and an object ( the broken doorknob ). Then only a theory of the mind builds up, which is aimed at things in the world. Dreyfus points out that Heidegger would not say what Searle stated, is wrong, however, Heidegger makes the claim to investigate a more original phenomenon.

Furthermore Dreyfus Searles provides conceptual understanding - background against the in- the-world - Heidegger. Although Searle also assumes that we are to deal accordingly with things that need a background understanding but it is at Searle again only a mental content. From the perspective of Heidegger, this would not solve the problem of how the mental background understanding, in turn, relates to the world. Accordingly counter Heidegger wants to break radically with such structures by as it is the world and existence in one: existence has always been the world - in other words, the world is only if existence is. The difference lies mainly in the fact that Heidegger represents an ontological concept.

In the paper " Limits of Phenomenology " Searle takes a stand for criticism of Dreyfus. He points out that this is due primarily misunderstandings over his philosophy about that this is neither enqueues in a Husserlian tradition nor that his study of intentionality of a self-sufficient subject goes out, the opposite is an independent object. Nor make obvious acts of which one forms no direct consciousness, unconscious, ie non- intentional actions dar. Thus, a tennis player who is asked what he has just done, can explain precisely and confidently that he played tennis, even if he was thinking while playing something else.

Searle goes even further when he accuses them of phenomenology in general and in particular Heidegger's use to have as a philosophical method of major weaknesses. By the phenomenology only asks how something appears for the actor, it remains at an early stage are, rather than to investigate the phenomenon further, thereby, simply ignored questions raised by logical analysis. Heidegger is also systematically ambiguous between phenomenology and ontology accused, which leads to contradictions with regard to the reality of the world.

Writings

Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. London: Cambridge University (1969). German: Speech Acts: An Essay philosophy of language. Translated by R. and R. Wiggershaus. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt q.s. 1971

Secondary literature

Jacques Derrida: Limited Inc. Vienna: Passages Verlag ( 2001). ISBN 3-85165-055-7
Friedrich Christoph Doerge: illocutionary acts - Austin's Account and What Searle Made Out of it. Tübingen: Tübingen University. http://w210.ub.uni-tuebingen.de/dbt/volltexte/2006/2273/
Nick Fotion: John Searle. Teddington: Acumen ( 2000). ISBN 1-902683-08-0
Michael Kober & Jan G. Michel: John Searle. Paderborn: mentis ( 2011). ISBN 978-3-89785-509-0
David Koepsell & Laurence S. Moss ( eds. ): John Searle 's Ideas about Social Reality: Extensions, Criticisms and Reconstructions. Malden, MA: Blackwell ( 2003). ISBN 1-4051-1258-1
Ohler, Matthias: Language and its justification. Wittgenstein contra Searle. Cologne: Janus (1988 ), ISBN 3-938076-24-0
John Preston and Mark Bishop ( eds. ): Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Clarendon Press ( 2002). ISBN 0-19-925277-7
Stephen R. Schiffer: Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press ( 1973). ISBN 0-19-824367-7
Barry Smith ( ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ( 2003). ISBN 0-521-79288-6
Dirk Franken, Attila Karakus & Jan G. Michel ( eds. ): John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World. Frankfurt: ontos (2010). ISBN 978-3-86838-096-5

International Phonetic Alphabet University of Wisconsin System Jean Nicod Prize William Alston Ludwig Wittgenstein Meaning (linguistics) Donald Davidson (philosopher) Organism Turing-Test Dualism (philosophy of mind) Constructivist epistemology Barry Smith (academic and ontologist) Integrated Authority File

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