Ordinary language philosophy

Philosophy of ordinary language (English " ordinary language philosophy" ) or Linguistic Philosophy (English " linguistic philosophy" ) is a philosophical point of entry to the language within analytic philosophy that assumes, in contrast to the philosophy of ideal language that the normal language, ie, the language that is used in everyday life, is not in deficit. Therefore can be obtained knowledge through a detailed analysis of the everyday use of the language.

History

In the early days of analytic philosophy, the philosophy of the ideal language was predominant. This way access to the language assumes that the everyday language in many ways is flawed and needs to be improved by a formal language, or even replaced. Philosophical knowledge can therefore not attain the fact that we analyze the normal language, but only in that you develop a clear language. Exemplary for this access mode are the following books: The term font, one of the arithmetic replicated formula language of pure thought (1879 ) by Gottlob Frege, the Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus (1922 ) by Ludwig Wittgenstein and the logical structure of the world (1928 ) by Rudolf Carnap.

In the 1930s, Wittgenstein changed his mind. He came to the conclusion that, first, the normal language as we use it normally, not false ( inadequate ) was, and that, secondly, many traditional philosophical problems are only illusions, which are caused by misunderstandings over the functioning of the language. The first conception led to the rejection of previous approaches of analytic philosophy - possibly all previous philosophy - and the second led to replace these earlier approaches by reflection on language in its normal use, so that philosophical questions are clarified, ie are recognized as the misunderstandings and resolve it. instead of trying in the ambiguous context to answer them. Philosophy of ordinary language is therefore occasionally, sometimes understood as an extension as an alternative to analytical philosophy.

Although she was very much influenced by Wittgenstein and his students in Cambridge, flourished and the philosophy of ordinary language developed mainly in Oxford in the 1940s and 1950s under JL Austin, Gilbert Ryle and Peter Strawson and was quite prevalent for some time before their popularity in the late 1960s and early 1970s subsided quickly.

Central ideas

The normal language as we use it usually is, first wrong ( unsuitable ), and secondly, many traditional philosophical problems only illusions caused by misunderstandings over the functioning of the language.

An example: What is reality? Philosophers have treated the word as a noun which refers to a something with certain properties. Over the millennia, they have discussed about these properties. The philosophy of ordinary language studied instead, use the word like human reality. In some cases, the people say, " It seems to me that this - and - this is true; but in reality, but is that - and that the case ". This expression does not mean that there is a particular dimension of being ( a property, namely the actuality ), which that - and having this- and - that but not. We actually think: "This - and that sounded true, but was somehow misleading. Now I 'll tell you the truth: That - and - that ". In this use is " in reality " more like " instead ". And the phrase "In reality, it is so ... " performs a similar function - to guide the expectations of the listener in the right direction.

This approach is also applied to more traditional philosophical questions: What is truth? What is consciousness? What is freedom? If we want to answer questions like these, we need to investigate "freedom" in everyday language use of the words " truth," "consciousness".

For example, Austin has indicated that wahrheitspostulierende statements are subject to pragmatic and performative, contextual conditions. So true a statement, London was from point X 80 km, sufficiently in many conceivable situations, although it - Taking up this example - could strictly speaking be 78.5 km.

The philosophy of everyday language is necessary with a theoretical turn to the actual voice activity associated in the sense that it deals with language and intentional dispositions (eg received a promise ) only creates. In Austin's terminology, these are performative speech acts. However, the accentuation of this circumstance is different even within the theory direction. How can John R. Searle, who is widely seen as the successor to Austin, see a much stronger shift towards a competence theory, although treated as before speech acts.