Argument from marginal cases
Argument of human borderline cases (AMG) referred to in the animal ethics literature, a class of arguments.
The starting point is the fact that between humans and non-human animal species [A 1] is no sharp dividing line based more suitable for moral evaluations criteria could be drawn. A preference of people due to properties such as the ability to sense pain, foundered in mind that almost all non-human animals - at least all animals with nervous system - have a sensation of pain. On the other hand, supposedly uniquely human abilities, such as the ability to design plans for the future or to make moral judgments are not shared by all humans, eg particularly small children or people with certain disabilities.
For a property that is proposed to be an ethical distinction, then those people who do not have the property or those animals they have the " borderline cases " are.
Requirements
The essential requirement of the AMG is an interpretation of the theory of evolution of species, which is to secure the existence of " borderline cases " to arbitrary properties: So there is a continuum in all ethically relevant skills, the difference between the species is so gradual and not in principle.
Richard Dawkins suggests a thought experiment: a human and a chimpanzee Imagine. Both take turns in a direct ancestor to the hand. His interpretation of the theory of evolution, then, is that there is always a possibility if you just often enough [A 2] direct ancestors seeks to find a common ancestor. So he constructed a finite chain of individuals of whom at one end of a being with fundamental rights is and on the other one without. He concludes that then at least had a place in the chain exist where the "moral status " changes.
Examples
An AMG is mainly used to support an animal rights position to argue for fundamental rights of nonhumans. An application on less far-reaching moral demands can be found in the utilitarian Peter Singer.
This observed that the alleged suffering, arise in many forms of animal use with the benefits to the people from out of proportion. With a principle of equal treatment, he concludes that one should in principle allow this suffering to get appropriate attention. This suffering can not be ignored simply because of species belonging. That there could be no different by species affiliation criteria on the other hand, justify the " ignorance ," he says with an AMG:
"(...) What criteria we choose, we will have to admit that they do not run exactly on the border of our own species. We can assume with justification that certain creatures have characteristics that make their lives more valuable than the other living beings. But certainly there will be some nonhuman animals whose lives - by what standard whatsoever - have more value than the life of some people. (...) So if we base the right to life on these properties, we need these animals an equally great, if not a greater right to life concede as such ( ... ) people. "
Tom Regan used a version of the AMG for criticism against various animal ethics, such as that of Kant or Narveson.
Kant and Narveson beat both of a particular property as a necessary condition for assigning an " intrinsic value " or of " human dignity " before: These properties are in Kant, rationality and the ability to " execute agreements with Narveson, from their own interests out claims asserted to. , and can exercise adequate pressure to enforce these claims of social institutions " [A 3] ( denote this property with *) Regan suggests in his criticism following syllogism ago: [A 4]
Regan also explains why in the case of rationality ( according to Kant ) and * ( according to Narveson ) the precondition P1 in his view is true. Regan notes in his major work, a possible classification of AMG in its animal rights theory provides: "A better understanding of the arbitrariness of this assertion [ that rationality of fundamental rights assignments is a necessary condition ] is alone, neither the treatment of human or animal's [ ...] [ essence ] improve. But it seems to me a useful and perhaps essential to any progress in their treatment to be with us. "
A monograph on the AMG is the work of Daniel Dombrowski, who, unlike Regan, an animal rights position of AMG alone holds for derived.
Forms of AMG
Evelyn Pluhar are two versions of the AMG:
Tom Regan has the same distinction and the terms " strong " and "weak [ argument from marginal cases ] ." In his discussion of the weak argument he adds a further distinction in one hand, a critical version ( shown in the above example ) and in a "constructive " version with the following syllogism:
The name " constructive argument from marginal cases" he justifies the fact that (a ) extends the argument with P3 marginal from the right people and that ( b ) in contrast to the legal argument is not a criticism of the proposed criteria, but by a " sensible criterion for the attribution of rights "includes in such a write-up for some non-human animals. (K2 ) The " Critical argument from marginal cases ", however, " criticized the ADEQUACY certain pre- mounted necessary criteria for the attribution of ( fundamental) right. "
Discussion and counter-positions
RG Frey and Allan According to Holland shows the argument as such only a contradiction, silent about the resolution but from. The rejection of human rights for " borderline cases " is wholly unacceptable. Some defend such a resolution. ( See also slippery slope argument) advocate a concept of " speciesism " see its argument that discrimination on the basis of species membership exists and is proceeding analogous to discrimination on the basis of, for example, gender, religion or skin color, confirmed and in the openness of the argument a strength.
Steven F. According Sapontzis the AMG was misleading because the moral value of nonhumans or humans not arising from similarities, but from a respect for the parent properties virtues that could be observed.
The AMG was unfair towards people with disabilities: People who lose basic cognitive abilities for some reason were disfigured in her personality. People who do not have such skills from birth are also at a disadvantage because they can not "normal members of their species ." That this represented a difference to non-human animals that this affiliation can certainly have. It 'll be close to a situation of moral superiority of people with disabilities. A response from the animal rights activists to this is that the argument is Circular: In the term " discrimination " or the " unfairness " of the moral superior value of people with disabilities towards all animals is included while simultaneously arguing for this.
Arthur Caplan points out that a human limiting case can be distinguished by an emotional relationship with a non- limiting case and from an ethical significance can grow. James Lindemann Nelson rejects this point. Such relations exist between on the one hand and for non- borderline cases and non-humans. On the other hand, there were again a meta- limiting case of people who are not in such a relationship to non - borderline cases.
Peter Caruthers represents Caplan's objection from a contractarian position. Human rights would have the essential function to stabilize societies. A denial of human rights for " borderline cases " would first lead to their exploitation and subsequently to hatred and possibly violence by their relatives. The hatred and the violence of some representatives of animal rights, such as the Animal Liberation Front, and the nature of relations between humans and non-humans stand by it out of proportion. Animals have, in principle no intrinsic values . A similar argument is Elizabeth S. Anderson. Rights are therefore as a social institution basically dependent on the nature of relationships in which the members of society can relate to each other. (See Capabilities Approach). In contrast to Caruthers can at Anderson social, or emotional relationships across species boundaries, achieving a comparable with interpersonal relationships and meaning from such rights arise. However, this is not for all animals with awareness of the case.