Consensus theory of truth

As consensus theory of truth (even consensus theory or discourse theory ) refers to the epistemological view that the truth of an assertion depends on whether solely by arguments forced free general consensus can be produced on this claim.

Spirit Historical Background

The consensus theory of truth is to be understood as a response to positivism. For the positivists, the modern natural sciences are the benchmark of all science. The natural sciences are based solely on observation and logic. In science, truth is claimed only for two types of sentences. Firstly, for empirical statements, ie statements about the nature of reality, such as " Goethe died in 1832. " Or " Smoking increases the risk of lung cancer. " On the other hand they claim truth for analytic sets, ie sets which by definition true are like " gray are white. " or " All bachelors are unmarried. ". Logical conclusions based on an empirically- propositional logic are also accepted by positivists.

All other sets are not capable of truth in the positivist sense. Value judgments and ethical standards will be interpreted as an expression of feelings.

For scientific disciplines that deal with the judgmental and / or normative questions, raises such epistemological position on issues. The consensus theory of truth will overcome this " scientistic " narrowing of the concept of truth, without however behind the critique of the positivist to the logically impermissible commingling of descriptive and evaluative sentences fall back (→ Hume's law → naturalistic fallacy ).

" In contrast, procedural metaphysical theories of truth by such theoretical explain practical issues in the same sense for truth able to extensively [ ... ]; and positivist theories of truth behave, by denying the truth of practical ability questions at all, too restrictive. "

The new basis

Consensus theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Karl- Otto Apel and Paul Lorenzen put on to the concept of truth. They ask: What do we really mean by the word " true"? What do we do when we say that a theory or proposition is true? What rules must we always assume to be valid if we strive arguing and arguing about truth? Try a new foundation of the concept of truth from the reflection of what argumentative search for truth contains.

Your answer to these questions is pointedly: If we denote a set as "true", then we affirm this sentence not only (redundancy theory of truth ), then we do not just say that it is as of this theorem says (Semantic theory of truth ), but then we raise for this set also intersubjective validity claim ( " this rate applies to everyone. " ) and an intertemporal validity claim ( "This sentence is permanently valid. " ): Who says a sentence as true, raises this claim a entitled to permanent general application.

From a claim to obedience in thought, a claim to truth differs in that the truth claim can be redeemed generally understandable through clear arguments.

Capacity for consensus rather than consensus

Consensus ability as a criterion for the truth of an assertion does not mean that the truth of this statement depends on whether there is in relation to the claim actually a consensus ( unanimous consent ). Via the truth of an assertion can not vote, and theoretically can an individual have against all the others right. However, one can lay claim to the extent truth and universality for an assertion, how has generally comprehensible, ie understandable and acceptable arguments to justify this assertion.

"If we understand by, consensus ' that have been made at random each match, it could obviously not serve as a criterion of truth [ ... ]. Therefore, discursive redemption 'is a normative concept: conformity to which we can get into discourses that alone is a reasonable consensus. "

Conclusion

With respect to the position of the consensus theory to other theories of truth following points should be noted: