Explanatory gap

Explanatory gap ( eng. explanatory gap) is a term used in the philosophy of mind term by which the problems of a reductive explanation of consciousness by reference. The term was coined in 1983 by the American philosopher Joseph Levine in the essay Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap introduced into the consciousness debate.

Levine assumes that physicalism is true, which implies that mental states are physical states. This means, according to Levine, that the existence of mental states by physical - should be make intelligible theory - or a neuroscience or cognitive science. Now, however, some mental states have the property to be experienced in a certain way. These subjective experience levels ( qualia ) would be explained by a complete scientific theory. After Levine doing so is not the case. No physical - or neural - event could explain why something was experienced. Just sticking with any attempt at identification of physical and mental events exist an explanatory gap.

The term of the explanatory gap describes the awareness problem in a epistemological and ontological framework no: Levine does not want to show that it is not physical entities with mental states. Rather, on the point of the explanatory gap is included, that it is a problem of explaining nichtontologisches services. This is exactly what distinguishes Levine's analysis of eigenschaftsdualistischen theories such as David Chalmers, who sees the failure of materialism in the explanatory gap.

Levine's argument has had a strong influence on the philosophy of mind, his essay is considered a modern classic in the field. Many physicalist philosophers accept the problem of the explanatory gap. However, Levine's argument has also been criticized. For example, David Papineau has rejected the thesis of the explanatory gap in the much-publicized essay Mind the gap.