Gettier-Problem

The Gettier problem arises from an objection to the so-called classical analysis of knowledge ( KAW or English for Justified True Belief JTB ). This defines knowledge as opinion ( belief ), which is justified and true. The replies is that a justified and true belief can be true even by " accident" but. This in turn would mean that this opinion is not knowledge then, as the KAW but would argue why the KAW is wrong. The Gettier problem now is to KAW to improve so that they can avoid accidentally justified true opinion with such cases, or replace it with another, better analysis. The problem is the famous, comprehensive only three pages essay " Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? " (1963 ) (Engl. " Is justified, true belief knowledge? ", 1987) by Edmund Gettier back. The Gettier problem is one of the main problems of contemporary epistemology.

• 3.1 Elimination of false assumptions
• 3.2 requirement for causality

• 5.1 Primary Sources
• 5.2 secondary literature

The standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief

Until the publication of Gettiers top most epistemologists assumed knowledge could be analyzed as justified true belief. More precisely:

A subject S knows that P if and only if:

• ( i) S believes that P,
• ( iii ) S has good reason to believe that P.

After the first condition ( belief condition), one can only know what is also believed. ( "Believe " Here, as often in contemporary epistemology, "believe", "believes", " to hold true," used interchangeably.) After the second condition ( truth condition ), one can only know what is actually the case is. After the third condition ( justification condition) the opinion must not merely be advised, etc.; the believer must be able to cite reasons for his conviction. What exactly is meant by the third condition is controversial. However Gettier uses only two assumptions about justification ahead that are relatively uncontroversial ( cf. Gettier 1963: 121 ): (1 ) fallibilism: A legitimate opinion can be wrong. ( 2) Deductive coherence: If you have a different opinion derives logically correct from a justified opinion, then the second opinion is warranted. The Gettier problem should therefore be relevant for all those variants of the standard analysis of knowledge sharing, the two assumptions about justification.

Gettiers counterexamples

Gettier are two opposite examples of justified true opinions, which are nevertheless not knowledge. The three conditions were satisfied in these cases, but it is not a case of knowledge. Therefore, the three conditions of the standard analysis were not sufficient.

First counterexample

Smith and Jones have applied for a job. Smith has strong reasons to believe the following:

• ( a) Jones is the one who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's reasons for ( a) are that the boss has assured him that he would select at the end of Jones, and that he, Smith, has counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. From (a ) Smith draws the following conclusion:

• ( b ) The person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith believes ( b ) only because he understands the logical conclusion of (a ) to (b). In this case, Smith is justified in believing (b).

Now, however, it is so that - without that Smith knows this - Smith gets the job, and Smith also - without that Smith knows this - has ten coins in his pocket. ( b ) is true, therefore, even though (a ), from which Smith inferred ( b ) is false.

In our example, therefore:

• (i ) Smith believed that ( b),

But it is also clear that Smith does not know that ( b ) is true. For ( b ) is therefore true because Smith gets the job and has ten coins in his pocket, and not because Jones gets the job and has ten coins in his pocket. Smith bases his opinion that ( b ), the recounting of the coins in Jones's pocket and that he mistakenly believe that Jones would get the job.

Second counterexample

In Gettiers second counterexample Smith believes that Jones drives a Ford. It has strong reasons (or evidence) for this assumption: since he knows Jones, this has always driven a Ford, and Jones Smith, sitting in a Ford invited for a ride. In addition, Smith has another friend who Brown is, and whose current whereabouts Smith has no knowledge.

With the strong evidence for the proposition

• ( c ) " Jones owns a Ford "

In the back concludes Smith further proposition (d):

• ( d) Jones owns a Ford, or Brown stays in Barcelona.

Well, it happens but entirely different: In truth, Jones has absolutely no Ford, but this has only borrowed. Consequently, the proposition ( c ) for which Smith had strong evidence wrong. Coincidentally, however, Brown holds actually on in Barcelona, making the proposition ( d) true. Again, Smith has a justified true opinion, but not knowledge.

General characteristics

In general, Gettier problems are characterized and as such are characterized in that a justified belief is true in a different way than expected. A new analysis of knowledge should take this epistemic random attack.

Problematization of different approaches

Elimination of false assumptions

In both examples, the justified true belief comes about by a conclusion from false premises. But it would be premature to think that the standard analysis would now be easy to upgrade by adding an additional clause:

Also that this analysis is not sufficiently modified standard, other examples are shown (see Feldman, 1974), such as the following:

Smith enters a room and sees Jones. He immediately forms the justified opinion

• ( e) Jones is in the room.

In fact, Smith had not seen Jones, but a faithful replica of Jones. But now Jones is, as it happens, really in the room - although Smith has obviously not seen him.

Smith believes that ( e) is a justified true belief that is not based on a false assumption, but not knowledge.

Demand for causality

The idea to ask the same causality between fact and faith, so

Solves the basic problem and the above example of the simulation, since no causal relationship between the presence of Jones ' and Smith's faith remains effective. However, an extension to a causal relationship is also possible if one assumes that the replica is the only reason in the room because Jones has created them just there. In this version, the new definition of knowledge is thus also inadequate. The objection here is that there is no adequate causal relationship, lacks a definition of the term " adequate".

Another possibility would be to require that the epistemic success, ie that the believed proposition is true, also probably was. Because then the actual, highly unlikely cases of Gettier problems were excluded from the concept of knowledge.

However, we would so faith, not to win the lottery, his knowledge, if he proves true, as this event is very likely. To say that you not only believe, but know that you did not win, however, seems paradoxical.

Historical classification

Often one is already writing to Plato, to have understood knowledge as justified true belief. Thus we find in the Meno dialogue, the traditional definition of knowledge ( episteme ) as bound by reasoning correct opinion ( orthe doxa): Instead of slipping the current contemplated becoming, the correct idea was being held permanently by a justification. In the Gorgias knowledge and conviction are defined in that knowledge always belongs to truth, to the conviction but not necessarily; as Plato speaks in Politicos of " true opinion with safeguards" ( doxa alethes meta bebaioseo ).

This analysis does, however, questioned in the Theaetetus Plato: he negates this straight, that knowledge ( episteme ) " true opinion [on x] with knowledge of a difference [ of what x is different from all relevant alternatives x -type type ]: reason or Declaration " would be (doxa orthe meta epistemes diaphorotêtos: Logou [ ... ] proslêpsis ). The determination of knowledge as " true belief with justification " is discarded because the justification of one mind in turn would have to be justified and also the justification on the grounds that this would lead to an infinite regress. Rather, it would have a justification loose beginning of all give reasons. The creation of a opinion must therefore be based on existing knowledge to make the true opinion about knowledge. However, the definition of "knowledge is justified true belief through knowledge " can not be valid because the term to be defined is included in the definition, and this would lead to a circular argument. The dialogue ends aporetic.

In the first half of the 20th century was still brisk rumored that Plato would have analyzed knowledge as justified true opinion and is thus seen as a pioneer of the standard analysis.