Historical institutionalism

The Historical institutionalism is a theory of integration based on the principles of neo- institutionalism in the field of political science. The resultant in the 1980s in the U.S. approach attempts origin, change and function of institutions to explain and represents thereby the fundamental assumption that these can be based inter alia on the path dependency, ie the historical course, explain. Policy choices and preferences of actors based on the pre-structured by institutions basics.

The middle-range theory is constructed eclectic, ie, it takes on theoretical bonds from the rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism to, and therefore forms a bridge between the two theories. Within the Historical institutionalism itself a rational- economic theory strand have (among others represented by Paul Pierson and Mark Pollack ) and a socio- culturalist approach (eg represented by Simon Bulmer ) emerged.

The Historical institutionalism is the explanation of institutions in general, but is used particularly in the field of European research to explain the origin and development of the European Union.

• 4.1 Primary Sources
• 4.2 Secondary Literature

Neo - institutionalism

In response to the "old institutionalism " - below which institutions investigated administratively, legally and politically above all - won the Behavioralism in the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S. science policy importance. Behavioralistische researchers have argued that one must, in order to analyze policies and policy outcomes, rather than focus on the formal structures of the informal practices, behavior and distribution of power. Individual behavior and collective decisions could be explained solely with methodological individualism.

However, according to critics of the behavioralistische approach was not able to elaborate comparisons of different political systems suitable because the analysis of the behavior alone would grab too short.

For this reason, just explain differences between different systems and to identify common challenges, at the end of the 1980s developed the 1970er/Anfang a "neo- institutionalism " out who could come up especially with a broader concept of institutions. Under the motto " institution do matter" argued, inter alia, March and Olsen, that the "institution" not only formal institutions are to be counted, but also standards, processes and conventions that are part of the political structure and as these for the basic understanding of politics were essential.

Below the approach of neo- institutionalism developed independently and without theoretical connection, three more strands, but sometimes strongly differ in their ontology and epistemology: the rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and the Historical institutionalism. For this reason, it turns out to be obvious, take up the proposal by Simon Bulmer and look at the term "neo- institutionalism " as a kind of umbrella term for a plurality of theoretical approaches.

Development of historical institutionalism

The historical institutionalism was said Peter Hall, in response to the highly popular during the 1960s and 1970s ( behaviorist ) theories and the structural- group approach.

Of these two approaches of historical institutionalism borrows, but tries to go about this: From the group theory has been adopted that conflicts between different population groups as political, that is, as part of the policy must be perceived. The historical institutionalism tries takes better explain why similar processes provide different policy results across countries, for which the group theories are not in a position, as they would give institutions as such no meaning.

From the structural- approach, the assumption was taken that institutions fundamental part of the social order of society are, the state does not hold have about the Rolles of a neutral observer, but a complex constituted of interacting institutions, conflicts, processes, collective behavior and differences influencing the policy outcomes. Institutions are substantially wider defined within this approach, as mentioned above.

In addition to this institutionalist aspect emphasizes the theory of historical institutionalism, that in order to understand the policy decisions of today's actors, they must be viewed in historical time course of the emergence of institutions as development steps would build on each other (path dependency).

This aspect, which is an important variable in the institutional analysis in historical institutionalism, also constitutes the major difference to the " neighboring" theories of rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism of. Both theories measure of the historical development of institutions to no meaning. Also, both theories do not take the asymmetric distribution of power in the development and design of institutions in the view, which would restrict the decision alternatives for the actors themselves also. Both theoretical approaches are characterized by a one-dimensional chain of causality: either the structure is as in rational choice institutionalism viewed from the perspective of the actors or, as in sociological institutionalism from the perspective of the institutions. Here the historical institutionalism tries to take an intermediary position between the two, to see structure and action as mutually acting on each other parts.

Emphasizes the rational choice institutionalism, institutions that would arise due to aggregated, individual and conscious decisions of the actors. This negates the historical institutionalism by referring to unpredictable consequences and short time horizons in the establishment of institutions.

The sociological institutionalism sees that individual actions are determined by institutions, but what happens on the follow conscious or unconscious norms. Decisions would therefore not be generated from long-term strategies, but results represent endogenous ( internalized ) conventions, norms and tradition of institutionalized environment.

Within the historical institutionalism, two other spin-offs have developed: on the one hand the rational -economic approach, which is represented mainly by Paul Pierson and Mark Pollack. On the other side there is the sociological approach, calling in some sociological explanations, known here primarily by Simon Bulmer.

Rationalist -economic historical institutionalism

Paul Pierson describes in his essay, " The Path to European Integration " his assumptions of a deductive argumentative, rational -economic variant of historical institutionalism, which he runs out of the critique of liberal intergovernmentalism by Andrew Moravcsik. This would, in the case of the analysis of the European Union, only the "big negotiations " (grand bargains ) considered the contracts and not the independent existence of supranational institutions between these contract negotiations. Right here but elementary policy decisions would be taken without the national actors would give this much attention.

To explain the asymmetrical power relationship Pierson used the coming out of economics and the new institutional economics model of the principal agents ( German and principal-agent theory). Principals are the Member States, which would agents ( supranational institutions ) delegate power under strict supervision in the case of the European Union. Here Pierson reaches the critical point of the freedom of choice between the two sides and was committed to the theories of intergovernmentalism and neo- functionalism apart: Neo- functionalist authors note at this point the resulting autonomy of institutions out intergovernmentalists on the national actors, the continue innehätten supervision. Pierson examined for this strike a balance: The side of intergouvernementalistischer mentioned transfer of power and responsibilities to the institutions is to understand the institutions, however, would develop over time a " life of its own ."

Due to this autonomy of the institutions of control problems ( " gaps" ) would arise, ie ( significant ) differences in the institutional and political preferences of the Member States on the functioning of the institutions.

These control problems would arise in the course of time between decision and implementation. This historical aspect is, as already described above, the unique feature of Historical Institutionalism, because, as Pierson, political scientists would usually analyze snapshots and do not see policy decisions in a historical context.

Pierson therefore deals in detail with the question of why these control problems would arise, and why, even if the agents (Member States) this were aware could not be closed.

As a first control deficit Pierson calls the automatically created autonomy through the creation of supranational institutions that is necessary so that nation-states make joint decisions and can enable efficient, collective decision-making. These institutions, as cited Pierson, would get because of the resources made ​​available to a player quality, developed their own interests, which differed from those of their founders and not served (more) solely as passive instruments. The "political game" now encompasses more players and more interests have to be weighed.

Pierson goes on to say that these institutions when they are created once, tried to enlarge their discretion and autonomy. In the context of the European Union Pierson shows this for the example of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. The Commission and the Parliament possessed on the agenda of the settings property and could thus significantly affect policy decisions. The Commission also writes Pierson the privilege of the process managing to, that is, it is not only to influence the situation, the topics, but also the processes in the system of the European Union between Member States and institutions to determine, which could delay, for example, policy decisions clearly.

As a third point explains Pierson, that unpredictable consequences for this kind could control failures led what would be mainly due to the high density issues (high issue density). This density of topics leads to two effects: on the one hand a thematic, content overload ( thematic overload ) and secondly to known from the neo- functionalist spillover effects ( spill-over ).

The example of the decision-making of the European Union explains Pierson that this put high demands on the Member States because of the growing importance and complexity of the Union. Time and information scarcity before shared the supranational actors, so that Member States fulfill their role as gate-keeper of national sovereignty could not meet in full. This is the case, would be but in which content reached on most especially in the times between the major contract negotiations. Due to the high complexity and interconnection of topics with each other it is difficult to consider them in isolation. Have decisions to one subject often have consequences in other topics will spring up which is originally unintended by the founders of the institution, decision-making scope expanded as transmission and effects ( spill -over effects ) would arise.

The fourth reason for the development of control failures Paul Pierson names the change of preferences of the Member States and thus contradicts the classical intergouvernementalistischen argument, view the preferences of the Member States as fixed. Preferences could be classically change by change of government, but also for example by new information.

Pierson explains that intergovernmentalists in these control failures see no problems since that could close it by learning principals or competition would find other forms of decision making. The Pierson contends that these arguments come from the economy and are not applicable in politics. Furthermore, he argues that the principals of these control deficiencies be well aware of, but they could not close due to three barriers: the resistance of the supranational institutions against reforms, the institutional obstacles within the institutions and the so-called sunk costs, ie, the expenditure already incurred and the high exit costs associated with it.

This includes Pierson and highlights the advantages of his interpretation of the historical institutionalism, in particular in relation to the neo- functionalism and intergovernmentalism the. The historical institutionalism saw political control between principals and agents is not a zero-sum game, as in Neo - functionalism, but as a growing development of rules and procedures that would be all political actors impose conditions. In contrast to the intergovernmentalism of Historical institutionalism institutions do not consider developments at points, but over time and can much better explain the growing autonomy of the institutions as the basis of the control problems. Without a doubt, the Member States are performing in the position of power.

Mark Pollack adds, in his essay "The New Institutionalism and EC Governance: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Analysis" the remarks Paul Pierson, among others, from the point of why agents (Member States) would be aware also be used for the emergence of this kind of control problems. Among other things, when they realized that these other political majorities in the principals ( supranational institutions ) they were contrary or when the agenda setting by the principals agents majority would bring benefits. Furthermore, he adds Pierson's approach to the adoption of the "lock -in ", that is, agents would be the principals close the demands and needs by itself over time.

Melanie Morisse Schilbach criticized Pierson's approach, the strong rationalist design of the principals -agents model, while Pierson himself claims that he neither particularly "rational" nor would argue "non rational". They also criticized the fact that the preferences of agents according to Pierson could change only by external sources, but not from internal sources such as learning, socialization or experience.

Furthermore, it is criticized that the rationalist- economic Historical institutionalism change of supranational institutions could not explain, because this completely ausklammere the individual actors and would be subject to the basis of which a structural determinism.

Sociological Historical institutionalism

Simon Bulmer is regarded as one of the representatives of the sociological variant of Historical Institutionalism. This he described in approaches already in his essay " The Case of Merger Control" and carried out further details in the article " New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market " from. Unlike Pierson Bulmer argues much more inductive and emphasizes that the Historical institutionalism possessed no own teleology, but serves only as an analysis model. However, whether the theory is universally forecast capable doubts Bulmer; only in smaller subject areas, particularly in the area of ​​standards and rules that could make predictions the theory.

Bulmer understood, in contrast to the rationalistic scholars like Pierson or Pollack, EU member states and supranational institutions not as the ratio of pro-and antagonists, but rather as an " entangled mesh " and understands his approach considerably wider. To this network de 'EU Governance " to understand are four dimensions helpful: Systemic Change (systemic change), subsystemischer change of governance structures ( subsystemic change of governance structres ), policy development (policy evolution ) and the role of values and norms (role of values ​​and norms ).

In terms of systemic change Bulmer writes that the Historical institutionalism Member States see ateleologisch neither a winner ( intergovernmentalism ), nor as pronounced loser ( neo- functionalism ), but developments. So could the Historical institutionalism much better explain the delegation of power, function and change of institutions, particularly in the periods between major contract negotiations.

Also the Historical institutionalism could better compare because of the historical perspective subsystematische changes institutional structures or the outcome ability before and after changes. Bulmer leads here to the example of the comparison of the European Community with the European Union (after ratification of the Single European Act and the creation of the European single market ).

With regard to the policy development of the Historical institutionalism help in the sense that Bulmer Policy -Making sees as repetitive and sequential. It is easier to understand projects such as the creation of the European Single Market Based on the principle of path dependency theory, subject whose foundations already in the Treaty of Rome. This is also a learning process on the part of the Member States, might be established, particularly with respect to the reaction and implementation of new policies, but also by the European Court of Justice, who developed progressive legal standards in the interplay between the EU institutions and Member States; as an example the Cassis de Dijon decision shall specify. This proves the Historical institutionalism that the policy development could not be separated from the public administration.

As a further advantage of the Historical institutionalism in the area of ​​Policy Evolution Bulmer sees the ability of the approach to explain why policy-making principle should not run in the interests of the Member States within the supranational institution. Lindberg and Campbell citing explains Bulmer that institutions are not per se neutral arenas, there would not have been all stakeholders ( from the consumer to the member state as such ) have equal access to these institutions and the institutions possess a life of its own and therefore the processes of policy could affect Making.

A fourth point performs Bulmer, by referring to the essay " Rediscovering Institutions" by James March and Johan P. Olsen, the resulting institutions through norms emphasize again the individual players would be affected by the. So is a European culture difficult to identify the institutions of the European Union, however, would characterize their actions and work of an institutional culture, which in turn would support and stability to the European Union very fluid political system.

Bulmer points out that the Historical institutionalism is no " grand theory " is, but would be useful to both the "big contracts " how to analyze the everyday politics, for example in the European Union and evaluate.

At Simon Bulmer approach criticized Melanie Morisse - Schilbach that this could not declare macro - social change. The sociological approach show more on processes, rather than to explain them comprehensively.

Criticism and further developments

The Historical institutionalism has said Peters, Pierre and Desmon, developed in the last two decades, a very well known and reception are access of institutional analysis in comparative politics, particularly in the field of European research takes this appeal.

Numerous other researchers have developed and refined so that it now offers a rich and detailed set of methods in order to explain institutional change theory. De facto, however, the empirical studies are still small in number, there are some examples of the applications to institutions in Latin America, Asia and most recently Africa.

The criticisms of the theory are versatile, the scientific discourse in relation to the Historical institutionalism is still not complete. As a common and widespread theory is that the Historical institutionalism of highly structurally conservative political systems go out. The theory can explain particularly continuity and stability in the example of the European Union and no change of policy and polity. The theory can not describe conflicts in the times that work superficially to be stable and path-dependent.

Likewise, it is criticized that the Historical institutionalism has been developed based on a very small number of cases and the described knowledge on these grounds was not valid.