Negative vote weight

Negative voting weight (also inverse success value ) indicates an effect in elections, in which impact the vote against the will of voters; So either vote for a party that mean for this loss of deputies mandates, or voices that are not submitted on a party and bring in more of these seats. It contradicts the principle of electoral equality, according to which every vote should count the same amount, and hurt the claim that the voice must not explicitly impact against the will of voters.

In Germany, the effect of negative voting weight after a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court of 3 July 2008 with the constitutional principle of equality and immediacy of choice is not compatible.

4.1 Description
4.2 Table View

6.1 Regulatory Control actions 6.1.1 Abstract judicial review in 1995/96
6.1.2 Standard control suits 2011

6.2.1 tests by the German Bundestag
6.2.2 Constitutional Judicial review of the 1998 election
6.2.3 Constitutional Judicial review of the 2002 Bundestag election
6.2.4 Constitutional Judicial review of the 2005 Bundestag elections

7.1 Election of the German Bundestag to 1998
7.2 Election of the German Bundestag 2002
7.3 Election of the German Bundestag 2005

Importance of elections to the German Bundestag

In the federal elections until 2009, was first determined how many seats a party under nationwide after the second vote distribution. In the second step, these seats are allocated depending on the second vote results in the individual federal states to the countries. Finally, it is examined individually in each country, how many seats the party has already received there by direct mandates ( in constituencies ). The remaining mandates conferred on the party in this State shall be allocated based on the respective national list of the party.

This can lead to the phenomenon of overhang seats: If a party get in a state of more direct seats than it is entitled after the second vote results, it nevertheless retains all direct mandates. The on the number of remedies available by the second votes Result mandates called overhang mandates. Possible compensatory seats for the other parties do not exist.

This can be through the following scenario come to a negative voting weight: Suppose that one party receives in the province of A is an overhang mandate. Would she now gain additional second votes in this state that can lead to the total number of remedies available by the second votes Result seats would remain unchanged, but changes their distribution between the federal states. The additional second votes so can have the consequence that the party but in another state B receives a mandate after the second vote results in the state A, a mandate more, but less. With the newly gained in country A mandate, however, the overhang mandate would be eliminated, so that the party could send out of the country A has no additional seats in the Bundestag. However, in State B, they would get a mandate less, insofar as it receives no overhang seats there. The party had thus lost a total of a mandate despite more second votes.

Federal Constitutional Court judgment in 2008

On the part of the legislature, there was no major effort to fix this system error. After an appropriate action, the Federal Constitutional Court, the existing federal election law in its judgment of 3 July 2008 due to the possibility of negative voting weight unconstitutional. It is contrary to the principles of equality and immediacy of choice:

" An electoral system that is designed, or at any rate permitted in typical constellations that an increase in votes leads to mandate losses, or that the nomination of a party total of more mandates are achieved when it accounts for even less, or to a competing proposal more votes, leads to arbitrary results and lets the democratic competition for a consensus among the electorate appear absurd. "

The legislature was given the task to change the electoral law until June 30, 2011 so that this effect is no longer possible in the future and the principles of electoral law no longer violated. On 30 October 2011, ie well after a specified period by the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundestag subsequently adopted with the votes of the CDU, CSU and FDP electoral reform, which should remove the negative voting power in elections widely.

Since this objective had not been achieved from the viewpoint of the SPD and the Greens by the new rules, the opposition filed a constitutional complaint. Also the club More Democracy announced a civil action against the electoral reform and called on interested parties to participate. Until 12 December 2011, almost 3,000 were filed in this way collected complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court. The complainants considered that the effect of negative voting weight could occur in a constitutionally unacceptable risk even under application of the amended federal election law.

Federal Constitutional Court judgment in 2012

Together with the dispute between organs and the judicial review procedure negotiated by the Federal Constitutional Court on 5 June 2012 orally on the constitutional complaint. On 25 July 2012, the court upheld the objections of the plaintiffs and declared the new rules adopted by the CDU and FDP unconstitutional. Also, the 2011 amended federal election law violates " the principles of equality and immediacy of choice and equal opportunities of the parties [ ... ] because it allows the effect of negative voting weight. " Even the choice of equal rights and equal opportunities of the parties is violated by balancing loose overhang mandates, what " the basic character of the general election as proportional representation cancels. "

Occurrence in the current federal election law

Also, which came into force in May 2013 revision of the allocation of seats is not free of negative voting weight. This can occur when the distribution on the basis of fixed number of seats per country a party by additional voices an extra seat gains at the expense of another party and thereby the number of compensatory seats is reduced or reversed accordingly fewer votes for a party lead to additional compensation mandates would. 2009 had 7000 votes The Left in Hamburg conducted by applying the current allocation process more for Party in the distribution at the country level to the fact that this party won an extra seat and the CDU would have lost a seat. This No Longer seat for the CDU would have led at the federal level in addition to four cut correspond compensation mandates. Thus, the Bundestag would be reduced from 671 to 666 seats and the Left would have had only 84 instead of 85 seats.

Other occurrence

In referendums, it is possible that a negative voting weight occurs when they are subject to a participation quorum. Votes against the bill can then cause the quorum in the first exceeded and the submission is accepted. Be considered far as quorums in referendums at all useful to you is this - in order to avoid a negative votes weight - now increasingly an approval quorum to.

A negative voting weight sometimes occurs in other election procedures. Most other types of negative voting weights, however, are less frequent and have less impact on the mandate of the award as essential for the federal election law type. Negative voting power is currently available outside of Germany, for example, in parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic and in state elections in most Austrian provinces.

Negative voting weights can be both independent of the seat allocation process and result directly in connection with the method according to Hare and Niemeyer. Highly susceptible to negative voting weights for example, systems with compensation mandates awarded in some state elections. Its cause is usually in the Hare - Niemeyer - specific Alabama paradox.

Also specific to the Hare- Niemeyer method ( or for the deviation from the allocation of seats according to d' Hondt ) is the ability of the blocking clause paradox. This may get fewer seats a party when she pushes with a greater number of votes to another party, the restrictive clause. This paradox can occur at forgiving mandates especially in a relatively small number.

It also appears in run-off elections and instant runoff voting.

Generalization

The Federal Constitutional Court used the concept of negative voting weight in 2012 in a general sense. Thus, the negative voting weight is present even when the number of seats a party unconstitutional correlated as expected with the amounts attributable to a competing party votes.

A seat allocation procedure that allows for the nomination of a party total of more mandates are achieved when more votes attributable to a competing proposal is contrary to the meaning and purpose of a democratic election, according to the Federal Constitutional Court. The votes have an impact against the will of voters.

General Example

Description

With a federal election with 5.98 million valid votes a party P1 receive a total of 250,000 second votes, of which 106,000 in State A and State B 144.000 (A and B are the only provinces). In country A, the party achieved through the first votes 11 directly elected seats in country B 6, for a total of 17

Because of the statutory seat total number of 598 seats in the German Bundestag ( 598 seats * 250,000 votes / 5.98 million votes = 25 seats ) result for P1 25 seats, including 11 seats ( Ideal claim: 10,60 ) for country A and 14 seats (14, 40) for country B. In country A are already occupied all of the party of the seats allocated by the direct mandates. In country B, the party has won only 6 direct mandates, the difference of 8 seats will be filled by the moving up of candidates from the country list B. In the final analysis, the party gets 25 seats.

Suppose that P1 with otherwise equal number of votes in country A 5000 second votes have received less (so 101,000 second votes and 5.975 million total votes), arises from the number of 245,000 achieved second votes in this case, a claim of 25 seats ( Ideal claim: 24, 52). Calculated separately by country, however, arise only 10 seats (10,11) for country A 14 seats ( 14.41 ) for country B, a total of 24 seats. The difference of one seat would be offset by an additional 15 seats for country B, occupied by a candidate from the country list B. In addition, the party would receive in country A is an overhang mandate, because regardless of the second votes distribution 11 candidates were given a direct mandate. In the final analysis, the party receives 11 15 = 26 seats.

P1 would be represented with 5,000 fewer second votes with 26 instead of 25 seats in the Bundestag. There is a disproportion of 5.77 % of the ratio of votes to the number of mandates: while in the case of the 25 seats 10,000 second votes were required for a seat, it was in the other case only 9423.1 ( disproportion: 1 - ( 245,000 / 26 ) / ( 250000 /25) = 5.77 %).

( This example is neglected to simplify the provision of federal election law that a party who obtains an absolute majority of the second votes, automatically gets the majority of seats. )

Table display

The party gets paradoxically one more seat in Parliament if 5000 voters vote less for them.

Options for change

Since the described negative voting weight can occur independently of the seat allocation process, the change took place in March 2008 in the Federal election law of Hare - Niemeyer method for method according Sainte-Laguë/Schepers is no improvement. Also compensatory seats solve the problem, because at least one interested party receives no compensation mandates regularly.

The negative voting weight can be avoided if the emergence of internal overhang seats is prevented. Four different strategies you could achieve this without changing the current federal election law fundamentally:

In 1996, the Parliamentary Group of Alliance 90/The Greens a bill before, among other things, the accounting system described above under # 1 converts to exclude a negative voting weight:

" According to § 7 paragraph 3 Federal election law, the following paragraph 4 is added: (4 ) Do the one or more national lists a party overhang mandates, so the distribution of amounts attributable to other state lists this list seats connection is made again. In this distribution, the number of constituency seats will be deducted which have arisen in the countries in which overhang mandates have occurred. The remaining seats are distributed taking into account the constituency seats obtained in the other countries in accordance with the method according to § 7 paragraph 3 of the Land lists. As far as this again overhang mandates occur, the process is repeated until no overhang seats can occur. "

This internal overhang mandates should be neutralized and so negative voting weights can be prevented. The Bundestag rejected by a vote of parliament for the CDU / CSU, SPD and FDP from the design and relied on the reduction of the number of seats to 598 and a new constituency blank. The bill also provided for the elimination of the possibility of excluding the Connection list, internal overhang mandates would therefore no longer have been possible.

Legal Political Discussion

The phenomenon of negative voting weight has been rather neglected in the public debate. Before the 2002 elections, the news magazines Der Spiegel and Focus have reported on the subject of negative voting weight.

If successful, value distortion often lack a sharp causal attribution surplus mandates and negative voting weights as they interact often cumulative. 1996 a busy Reform Commission of the Bundestag election with problems - among others with overhang mandates - and obtained the opinion of experts as the professors Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz, Wolfgang Loewer and Markus Heintzen. The Interior Ministry has developed in this context, including the so-called compensation model I, which provides for a settlement similar to the above-mentioned change in Option 1.

Many of the so dealt mathematician and legal scholars criticize the negative voting weight sharp and consider it as a defect that with the requirement of equality, freedom and immediacy (transparency) of an election is incompatible:

The electoral equality is violated by their opinion that the success value of a voice is lower - namely negative - as the success value if you had not given voice.
Freedom of choice is violated because the voters in his election decision is no longer free if he could harm his voice to the desired party. This could confuse voters and a disincentive to vote for the party.
Finally, they look at the immediacy of the election were not given because the votes can be counted for a party not for their benefit but at their expense by the defect of the necessary intervening mathematical calculation procedure. The will of the electorate will no longer be directly converted into mandates for a party, but distorted. A voter should not vote for the party to express their consent.

Also in many proportional representation method, a negative voting weight occur. However, the blur per party is usually limited to no more than a mandate. In addition, most other methods are less susceptible than that of the general election law. According to this law, even a minority of voters reach the majority of Bundestag seats.

Standard control suits

Abstract judicial review in 1995/96

1995 allowed the government of Lower Saxony Check the part of the Federal Electoral Act by the Federal Constitutional Court and was explicitly the effect of negative voting weights before. In their opinion, generated overhang mandates and negative voting weights a success value distortion in cumulative causality, which is so contrary to equality that § 6 and § 7 BWahlG were unconstitutional and void in essential parts. She referred to the case-law of the Court and the character of the Bundestag as unitaristisches Parliament, which is why at least three options for change offered to meet the equality requirements of Article 38 of the Basic Law. She underlined the above-mentioned change option 1 The result of the consultation of the Federal Returning Officer in this case supported the critical findings in the application of Lower Saxony.

The court confirmed with the votes of the judges Jentsch, cemetery, Kruis and winter by a stalemate decision, the Federal Electoral Law. They pointed to the freedom of the legislature and that this could lead to systemic success value distortions. However, the standards currently established in the law are not nearly exhaustive, and it is possible to allow even other inequalities.

After the judge Graßhof, Hassemer, Limbach and summer considers that the electoral system is the extent of the judicial review application was unconstitutional and violated the election equality. Certainly the legislature had a margin considered useful designs, but only within the strict electoral equality " need alone does not establish any entitlement ". They point out that the above bill of Alliance 90/The Greens completely solve the problems by overhang seats. Because of the requirement of judicial self-restraint, the court did not indeed specify which legislative measures have to take the Parliament. However, the legislature had to take one of them to be the constitutional justice.

Standard control suits 2011

In response to the scrutiny of an election complaint of 2005, the German Bundestag decided in September 2011 with the votes of the CDU / CSU and FDP to reform the federal election law. It was the first time in the history of the Federal Republic that the federal election law was decided solely by the votes of the ruling coalition and not by consensus of all parties. The electoral reform was extremely controversial in advance, as they objected to by the Federal Constitutional Court grievances not always eliminated by the opposition and the Federal Constitutional Court, but would rather continue writing and voting rights complicate unnecessarily. Both SPD, the Greens and the Left saw their rights violated and filed a judicial review.

Selection tests due to negative voting weight

Audits by the German Bundestag

With reference to the negative voting weight election protests were at the German Bundestag regularly inserted, most recently to the federal elections in 1998, 2002 and 2005, the Bundestag always decided -. Prepared as in the electoral committee - the rejection of the objection, as the provisions of the Federal Electoral Act have been complied with and the decision on the unconstitutionality of provisions of federal election law is left to the Federal Constitutional Court.

Constitutional Judicial review of the 1998 election

The Federal Constitutional Court rejected two 2001 including the negative voting weight Leader on the Verification of complaints. Reasons, however, were not called in this A Limine decisions nor in the writing of the rapporteur.

Constitutional Judicial review of the 2002 Bundestag election

A Verification complaint to the aforementioned objection for the parliamentary election in 2002 was exceptionally long pending before the Federal Constitutional Court. In this process, as in 2004, the then Rapporteur of the Court, Judge Jentsch, incidentally, the possible emergence of negative voting weights as constitutionally still acceptable. This view is not supported by curiam in this form. Only after the decision of 3 July 2008 in the scrutiny procedure to the next general election (2005), the Federal Constitutional Court decided with reference to the judgment.

Constitutional Judicial review of the 2005 federal election

As part of the verification of the 2005 federal election three more complaints were raised. In two of these proceedings, the Federal Constitutional Court negotiated on April 16, 2008 On July 3, 2008, the second Senate gave its judgment. According to the judges of the "negative voting weight " is not compatible with the principle of equality and immediacy of choice. Thus, the Federal Constitutional Court declared for the first time in a scrutiny procedure regulation of the Federal Electoral Act to be unconstitutional, so a need for new legislation came into being.

Occurrence in federal elections

Election to the German Bundestag to 1998

In the history of federal elections, the occurrence of negative voting weight in the national elections in 1990, 1994 and 2002 is demonstrated (see links). There are also other examples:

Next, there are several cases in which a party would get less mandates, if they would have received more votes. This applies to:

The Schleswig-Holstein CDU 1957 (88.833 votes more then two seats less)
The CDU Saarland 1961 (10.828 more, then a mandate less)
The SPD Schleswig -Holstein 1980 (7.809 more votes, then a mandate less)
The SPD Bremen 1983 (4.083 more votes, then a mandate less)
The SPD Hamburg 1983 (8.199 more votes, then a mandate less)
The CDU Mecklenburg- Vorpommern 1990 (13.545 votes more and at the same time in Thuringia 1,000 more votes, then a mandate less)
The CDU Saxony- Anhalt 1990 (6.314 votes more and at the same time in Thuringia 1,000 more votes, then a mandate less)
The CDU Thuringia 1990 (66.693 votes more, then a mandate less)
The SPD Bremen 1994 (1.042 more votes, then a mandate less)
The SPD Brandenburg 1994 (73.403 votes more, then a mandate less)
The SPD Hamburg 1998 (16.651 votes more, then a mandate less)
The SPD Mecklenburg -Vorpommern 1998 (6.628 more votes, then a mandate less) and
The SPD Brandenburg 1998 (4.015 more votes, then a mandate less)

Election to the German Bundestag 2002

In the 2002 elections the SPD was lost too much a seat that would otherwise have gone to Bremer SPD - state list of candidate Cornelia Wiedemeyer 50,000 for second votes in Brandenburg.

Calculation of total votes cast for the 2002 elections

That is, the total base number of seats for the SPD remains These 247 seats will now be awarded according to the level reached by countries votes of the SPD, despite lower absolute number of votes at 247:

Calculation seats for the SPD for the 2002 elections

Thus, although retained a total of 247 seats for the SPD, the 50,000 votes less worry in Brandenburg for a shift of the 10th Brandenburg mandate to Bremen. This is, considered not represent a problem

Overview of the overhang seats ( TM )

Only by the fact that the Brandenburg SPD ten direct mandates (and thus a mandate more than you deserve now after the second votes ) won, creates an overhang mandate, while an additional list mandate originated in Bremen. This combination brings the SPD 252 seats in the Bundestag rather than just a 251.

Also would the SPD overall mandate more if the Brandenburg SPD had received only 549 votes less. Then the SPD in Brandenburg had a seat share of 9.4491 and 2.4497 in Bremen, ie in Brandenburg 9 seats (plus one overhang mandate ) - previously 10, as share 9.46 - and in Bremen 3 - before 2 because share of 2.45. It may happen that a relatively small number of "too many " votes does a mandate.

A similar example is when the SPD would receive less 55,000 second votes in Berlin. Here it was not even completely excluded that this be achieved through the Verification still could have occurred. Multiple choice exam complaints had to be the goal of the second votes of voters of constituencies 86 and 87 underscore ( Berlin PDS constituencies ). In the process of early 2005, the votes were re- counted in Berlin. However, the counting was that not enough SPD votes could be removed to bring the SPD mandate a profit.

Election to the German Bundestag 2005

Also for the 2005 federal election resulted again overhang mandates and negative voting weights. The volatile nature received this through a by-election in parliament constituency Dresden I on October 2, 2005 at the Free State of Saxony, where another overhang mandate (out of four in Saxony ) was born.

It is noteworthy that in isolated form the effect of the state of Saxony and the distribution of seats could be observed by the by-election in a constituency of overhang relevant state, quasi under laboratory conditions: in Dresden was "allowed " the CDU win no more than 41 226 second votes, otherwise you would a number of overhang seats were lost because of Saxony would have received a mandate proportional representation at the expense of North Rhine- Westphalia more.

In this context it is also critically evaluated, that could be advertised by the specificity of the post-election situation in concrete terms for the non-submission of second votes. Ahead of the Dresdner election this culminated in a joint poster campaign of the CDU and FDP, were explicitly required by both parties in the primary vote for the CDU and second votes for the FDP. It can be seen that the predictability of negative voting weights in conjunction with a special election still more far-reaching problems in respect of equal treatment of both parties and all voters posing as already in an election at a polling day.

In the election in the constituency Dresden I then a massive vote splitting was observed. In this case, the CDU was able to stay below the critical second votes brand, so she could keep the mandate of the provisional allocation of seats.

Overall, in the general election of 2005 around 6.5 million votes and 27 parliamentary seats were affected by negative voting weight.

Federal Constitutional Court of Germany Leveling seat Electoral system of Germany Verfassungsbeschwerde Paul Kirchhof Klaus Winter Winfried Hassemer Jutta Limbach Per curiam decision Christian Democratic Union (Germany) Bavaria

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