Occasionalism

The occasionalism occasionalism or as doctrine of occasional causes ( from Latin occasio, opportunity, occasion ), but today practically has a dualistic response to the mind-body problem, which was represented in particular in the 17th century, not more followers.

Theory

The central thesis of occasionalism are:

The occasionalism, whose main representative was Nicolas Malebranche says that mental states of a person are immaterial and therefore can have no influence on the material world. Every interaction between physical and mental sphere is given only apparently according to this view; about when people eat ( physically ) when they feel hungry (mentally ), flee ( physically ) or if they are afraid of something (mentally ). Instead of a direct causality take Occasionalists that rather God the mental state registered and then takes a physical act. Similarly, the process runs about God as mediator if material conditions apparently act directly on the mind; if such a person is pricked with a needle, so does God then that person feel pain (→ figure ).

Here, the Occasionalists, particularly Arnold Geulincx relied on the principle:

" Quod nescis, quomodo fiat, id non FACIS. "

"If you do not know how something happens, you do not bewirkst it."

Background

Arnold Geulincx developed the occasionalism as a solution of the problems ' caused the interactionist dualism of René Descartes. Descartes had assumed that the intangible mind and the material body have a causal influence on each other. Descartes, however, had to explain problems, as such an interaction might look like. The Occasionalists, including Geraud de Cordemoy and John Clauberg, just denied this interaction. As a precursor to this view is valid because of his conception of causality Al -Ghazali. The term " occasionalism " was proposed by Geraud de Cordemoy and Louis de La Forge ( 1632-1666 ).

Criticism

David Hume criticized the theory okkasionalistische sharp. Occasionalists would those declarations ex machina use by the will of Deus in all positions, on which most people fell only " upon the occurrence of extraordinary phenomena, such as earthquakes, plagues, and all manner of monstrous ":

"They make the mind and intelligence [ God ] will not be the last and original cause of all things, but for the direct and sole cause of every event which appears in nature. They claim that the usual causes listed things in reality are merely occasions and that the true and direct principle of every effect any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being is not [ ... ]. "

This position, in which, for Hume both purely physical causality as well as mind-body interaction, and even purely mental causation will each explained " by a special act of the will " of God, he criticized as pantheistic as well as a view that the power and wisdom of the Godhead resize. Philosophically, he rejected her because she was " too bold ", "no persuasion " and have to " lead the ordinary life and experience so distant conclusions. "

Following Hume and the later occasionalism - criticism is usually assumed today that the mind-body problem though disappear by the occasionalism, however, leads to new problems: Even if you hold fast to the existence of a theistic God as understood, it does not seem plausible that every time God had to intervene to secure a connection between the mental and physical.