Prudence

Prudence ( phronesis Greek φρόνησις reason, lat prudentia ) is the ability to appropriate action in a particular case, taking into account all relevant situational factors, individual targets for action and moral insights. Since Plato, wisdom is one of the four cardinal virtues. Kant holds for a pragmatic knowledge of the transportation of own bliss relevant means by which the term rather the importance of " reasonableness " takes.

Wisdom is to be distinguished in two directions: in contrast to the General directed knowledge (Greek episteme ), the wisdom depends on each particular case with the intention to achieve the good, wholesome and Reasonable in ethical terms. On the other side it is bounded from their binding to the moral life of shrewdness, cunning, guile and cunning. Although the latter work by the same means, but only have a practical benefit or personal gain to the target. Therefore, they are regarded as less valuable forms of competence.

History of wisdom teaching

Overview

The wisdom was since the beginnings of Western philosophy as a significant virtue, even initially considered the most important of the virtues. In particular, Plato saw as a prerequisite for every virtue. Fundamental to the theory of the wisdom of Aristotle considerations, which was later modified by the Stoics were. In the High Middle Ages, the building on Aristotle's wisdom teachings of Thomas Aquinas was primarily that was increasingly modified in the early modern period. A significant devaluation they learned at the empiricists and finally in Kant in the 20th century popularized Josef Pieper the Western Wisdom teaching, while philosophically next was largely ignored. A Renaissance she learned recently in connection with the attempts to re- establish virtue ethics as an alternative to Kantian ethics of duty.

Plato

Plato said in his dialogues of Wisdom ( σοφία, sophía ) and wisdom ( φρόνησις, phronesis ). However, the translations of the latter term will vary depending on the interpretation of the dialogues. Schleiermacher translated eg phronesis with " reasonableness ". In his Politeia Plato distinguished three faculties of the soul of man: desire, affect asset and reason. These are the virtues associated with the prudence ( σωφροσύνη, sophrosyne ), bravery ( ἀνδρεία, andreia ) and wisdom. Meet the three parts of the soul their tasks virtuous, there is justice ( δικαιοσύνη, Dikaiosyne ):

" You remember it well, I replied that we determined from the very essence of justice, prudence, courage, and wisdom after the establishment of three faculties of the soul. "

Later, Aristotle should distinguish the wisdom of wisdom. As a result, the wisdom was assigned to the cardinal virtues instead of wisdom. In the Phaedo Plato Socrates dialogue can be argued that without phronesis - the bravery, justice or prudence would have no value:

" [ 69a ] ... best O Simmias, that us so this is not only not the right exchange to obtain virtue, replace desire to pleasure and displeasure against reluctance and fear against fear and larger towards smaller, like coin; but that, and the only right coin against which one must reverse all this, [ 69b ] the rationality and only everything that is sold with this and for this and purchased, in truth alone bravery ( ἀνδρεία ) and Prudence ( σωφροσύνη ) [ 69c ] is justice ( δικαιοσύνη ), and at all true virtue now with rationality ( φρόνησις ), lust and fear and all the rest of the way there may now be or not to be there; but this, apart from the rationality against each exchanged, such a virtue then is always only a silhouette and indeed slavish, which has no soundness and truth to be the truth just cleaning the like but everything, and prudence and justice and courage and rationality itself cleanings are. "

In some cases it is assumed that Plato had determined Charmides dialogue prudence in four individual aspects as deliberation, prudence, Sichselbsterkennen and finally as knowledge about knowledge.

Aristotle criticized a " Socratic- Platonic intellectualism, who believes that he can return the phenomenon of Wilenssschwäche or indecision seemed to be a epistemic ignorance." According to Aristotle, involves the Socratic- Platonic - term phronesis that phronesis " as the highest form of knowledge [ ... ] in a practical syllogism responsible for both top as well as for the subsets [ is ]; Hence it is that in this idea actually a knowledge of the good directly to the level of action, by hitting ' can '.

Aristotle

Decisive for the later development of the wisdom teachings of Aristotle were the remarks in his ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics is in the foreground.

Aristotle uses the term phronesis ambiguous both in the Eudemischen ethics as well as in the Nicomachean Ethics. On the one hand, the term for a knowledge in a broad sense, on the other hand for " a certain ability for orientation own and others' actions ." Only phronesis in its second meaning corresponds to wisdom.

The translation of phronesis, however, varies and is in both German and English and French controversial. Applies likely the translation with "Wisdom " (corresponding to Engl. Prudence and French ) to be. The translation of " moral insight" or " wisdom " seems less appropriate as Aristotle ascribes also preventive animals phronesis. The same applies to the English alternatives to prudence as thought, practical wisdom, practical intelligence, wisdom.

Aristotle treated phronesis in the sense of wisdom in detail in the Nicomachean Ethics Book VI, 5 and VI, 8-13. He saw phronesis systematically as Dianoetic, that is virtue in mind, as " moral- practical judgment ".

Phronesis was from some one hand qualifies as a "meta- virtue ", others criticized the lack of a " Metatugend " in the wisdom teachings of Aristotle. In the first case emphasizes that the role of wisdom in the Aristotelian thinking is, " to provide virtually ever - and - ever," the determination of what is brave, just, etc.. To speak from virtues, lead by Aristotle not in ethics. From the opposite point of view considered, Aristotle would not have considered the situational conflicting demands of virtues. It lacks provides " both a character virtue second stage, a Metatugend, [ ... ] as well as a charge of virtue conflicts judgment ".

For Aristotle, phronesis is neither a science ( ἐπιστήμη, episteme ) is still a manufacturing - making ( ποίησις, poiesis ). She was a third:

"So it only remains that it is one of the action-guiding, true and based on reasoning attitude [( hexis meta Logou ) ] in the range of the human good and the bad. " "

For Aristotle, wisdom is by definition to " the good life in the whole " (NE VI 5, 1140a 27f. ) Aligned. Although the virtues of prudence require that ensures that you reach the goals. "But the wisdom is therefore not superior to the wisdom and the better part of the soul ."

" Phronesis in Aristotle called the optimal form of practical reason and consequently the full-fledged self-orientation skills in thinking, acting and in a person's life. " It does not consist in the observance wise rules, but the fact that a person walks with himself, " weighs, the peculiarity of the situation is and thus can judge when is the right time and the right place is to be active in a certain way. "

The reference is to the individuals highlighted (NE VI 8, 1141 B 16) as essential for the phronesis:

" The wisdom concerns not only the general, but also needs to know the individual. Because she is acting, and the actor relates to the individual. "

Phronesis admit it even in statecraft and in the leadership of the household, the economy. Primarily going but then spoken of her, when it comes to going to the individual 's own person. Since phronesis go to the particular, she needed the experience. Experience needed time. That's why young people might lack experience are not smart (NE VI 9).

Phronesis is the morally indifferent deinotēs ( agility, "neutral cunning ", " cleverness ", " ingenuity " ) to distinguish. "You is peculiar to be able to do that and achieve what leads to the made ​​goals " (NE VI 12, 1144A ). Be the objective bad, was cunning skill (also: " cunning "). Phronesis in need of fluency, but lie only if the goal is good. Klug could only be one who is at once virtuous (NE VI 12, 1144A 36). At the same time there is no virtue that does not also wise was (NE VI 12, 1144b ).

The virtue of prudence is threatened by the passions and therefore requires the support of the virtues of character.

Stoa

Phronesis - conception of Stoicism differs from the Aristotelian. Phronesis of the Stoics is not " the Aristotelian virtue of pragmatic self-orientation, but the Socratic- Platonic top form of intellectual activity ," speak so some historians of philosophy of a " process of mechanization of Wisdom" because of the Stoic influence (such as the patristic ).

From the wisdom therefore was with the Stoics " a universal trans- situational, ie, third -personal ' knowledge ( episteme ) about what is good and evil. " The Wisdom " as a mediator between the divine world order and human self-realization " will functionalized: The way to set up his actions so that it is consistent with the plan of salvation in the world. The task of wisdom will mainly seen in the "liberation of handlungsinitiierenden emotions ".

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas undertook a synthesis of Aristotelian wisdom teachings with Christian philosophy. He counted the wisdom ( prudentia ) as Aristotle to the dianoetic virtues ( virtutes intellectuales ). Prudence does not relate to the last destinations (such as wisdom, sapientia ), but on the way to the goal. It refers " as a practical reason to the field of concrete reality of human action " and is defined according to:

Among the cardinal virtues of prudence a prominent position take one. It is " genitrix virtutum ," the bringer forth of the virtues: Without wisdom no virtue. The primacy of the wisdom has it that the " good intention " or not enough " good opinion " for a good action.

Aristotle distinguishes präzisierend Thomas Aquinas three phases of Wisdom:

• The consilium - the consideration and weighing the options for action;
• The iudicium - this was due to the reflection judgment about what to do;
• The praecipium or the applicatio ad operandum - the " implementation of the judgment in a concrete action decision and thus in a doing ".

As integral parts of prudence Thomas Aquinas leads the memoria ("` his faithful ' memory' ), intellectus, docilitas, solertia, ratio, providentia ( foresight ), circumspectio and cautio to.

Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas calls as part virtues of prudentia the well- consulting unit ( eubulia ), the "right judgment " or " reasonableness " ( synesis ) and the acumen ( gnome ).

In contrast to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas does not the " with the ethical virtues given morality ideals of a community of values ​​" from, but on the synderesis on the conscience. For Thomas thereby the wisdom of a practical wisdom ( sapientia practica ), " one, although autonomous, use the wisdom in the field of practical thought and action. "

For Thomas Aquinas, the belief that the wisdom is in some respects itself

Hume

For Hume, the wisdom is only a " natural ability ", whose job it was to adapt our actions to the general habits and customs.

Kant

Kant rejects any of the happiness ( eudaimonia ) oriented from ethics. Bliss is not a principle of morality more for him. The wisdom loses his moral function and becomes a " private matter ". Is the autonomy of the highest principle, it is no longer about the " optimal realization of specific targets, but to justify determination of goals ." Wisdom is suspect as mere luck technology.

Kant defines wisdom as

" The skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being "

The purely technical part of the wisdom which eventually becomes the Weberian instrumental rationality.

Quotes

"Wisdom: Lets see true good in every situation and select proper means for its attainment; it draws directly the judgment of conscience. "

"For the blessing of happiness only the unfortunate confess; the lucky ones lead back all their successes to intelligence and ability. "

" This practice is now the minds wisdom, and if it happens to outwitting the other, called cunning, also comfortable when their purposes are very slight, cunning, even if they are linked to the detriment of others, mischievousness. In contrast, he says the only theoretical use mind rough road, in the high degrees but then ingenuity, insight, sagacity, penetration; his lack contrast, dullness, stupidity, etc Pinselhaftigkeit "

" The wisdom makes sense ready to capture in every situation of our true good and to choose the right means to achieve it. It controls the other virtues, by giving them control and measure. "