Reductionism
Reductionism is the philosophical doctrine that a system through its individual components (' elements ') is completely determined. This includes the complete reducibility of theories on observation sentences, of concepts to things and of legitimate contexts causal- deterministic events.
Reductionism can be represented as a general science program or remain restricted to a specific scope. A reductionism in the first sense is the ideal of unified science obliged accordingly all phenomena of the world, must be explained by the basic science that is seen in the microphysics, in principle. A reductionism in the second sense can be represented between different scientific areas, such as between psychology and neurobiology, between chemistry and physics or ethics and behavior descriptions, but also, for example, between politics and economics.
- 5.1 Multiple realizations
- 5.2 puzzling phenomena
- 5.3 Pluralist Criticism
- 5.4 Epistemological alternatives
- 5.5 Lack of reflection of categories and category errors
- 5.6 special position of psychology and other social sciences
Unified science and reductionism
The idea of a unified science requires a general reductionism. Scientific ideal here is the reduction of all individual sciences to a fundamental science. First and only one such continuous reduction shall bar the desired unity of science. From her turn an all-encompassing and unified view is expected to reality or reality.
A general reductionism requires a series of reductive individual theses: It is assumed that the chemical can be reduced in principle to physics, biology and chemistry to psychology to (neuro ) biology and social contexts on the (social) psychology. In addition, it is assumed that reduction relationships are transitive: if A is a science has been reduced to B, and B has, then A is also reduced to C to C. These beliefs make up the thesis that even allow social relationships reduce to physics in principle.
The scientific reductionism unit received its classic formulation in the published 1958 by Paul Oppenheim and Hilary Putnam essay The Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis. Oppenheim and Putnam assumed that the unit science is a realistic goal of scientific research. See Today's reductionists in the unified science but rather an ideal that could indeed be realized theoretically, from the human research but can be practically never reached.
Emergence, materialism and dualism
It is wrong to equate materialism with the general reductionism and dualism with the antireductionism. Although the dualism is certainly set to a antireductionism - an immaterial entity can not be reduced to a material - but many philosophers try to formulate a non-reductive materialism. The popularity of positions who want to combine a antireductionism with a materialism has increased enormously by the anti-reductionist arguments described below in the last decades. In addition, there are philosophical positions that extend beyond the alternative materialism - want to position dualism. Examples of neutral monism and pluralism of the term, such as the Nelson Goodman.
A term which has achieved an increasing attention in the debate about a non-reductive materialism is " emergence". It should however be noted that this term is used in today's debates with two different meanings. In a weak sense, a property is emergent if it is the result of a complex configuration. In this sense, about the ability of a robot is emergent to be able to recognize complex visual patterns. For the Reduktionismusdebatte this Emergenzbegriff is uninteresting because there is nothing against the principle reducibility of weak emergent property.
Retrieved from " emergence" in a strong sense one speaks, if a system has a property that can not be derived from the properties of the system components in principle. A so -understood Emergenzbegriff as he V.A. was developed by CD Broad, the possibility of reduction seems to exclude in principle. If the system property A does not in principle be explained by the system X, Y, and Z, then also appears to be no way to survive, to reduce A to these system properties.
A controversial question is the extent to which it allows the emergenztheoretische concept to formulate a non-reductive materialism. For a non-reductive materialists, the following statement seems to offer: A is indeed a material property, but can not be reduced, since A is emergent. Against such emergenztheoretischen materialism is, however, often argued that it is incomprehensible how they could call A a material property that if A is not in principle be derived from the basic physical properties.
As reductions in work
The main theme of epistemological debates is the methodology of the reduction of theories. If you have a true theory A successfully reduced to a theory B, then one has explained the phenomena described in A reductive. The classical model of theory reduction was formulated by Ernest Nagel in the book The Structure of Science ( 1961). Nagel made the proposal to provide the following requirement for a successful reduction:
Nail reduction: A theory A is then reduced to a theory B if all laws can be derived from A by the laws of B.
There are popular science historical examples of such laws leads. Thus, for about Galileo's law from the laws of Newtonian mechanics are derived. However, the Nagelsche definition seems to be inappropriate when it comes to reductions of theories that use different vocabularies due to emergent phenomena.
If you want to reduce about the whole phenomena that are observable in the use of water, the chemical theory of H2O, so you have to look nail all known from the everyday laws on water can be derived from chemical laws, so for example the experience that water sea level boils at 100 ° C. However, the term occurs " cook " in the chemical theory does not, which is why a derivation of the law of the chemical theory seems impossible. After nail is needed for such cases bridge principles that connect with the vocabulary of the theory of experience. How about cooking with specific molecular motions would have to be identified.
In the classical approach of nail much criticism has been voiced. It seems rigid treatment, as they were required by nail, rarely give so that is increasingly sought after liberal reduction definitions. It is also disputed whether it might not also give formulations that do justice to the phenomenon of multiple realization ( see below). Finally, nail the status of the bridge principles - of which this theory can be formulated? - Has always remained unclear.
Arguments for reductionism
History of Science
Reductionism is mostly motivated by the fact that people show impressed by the declaration success of modern science. It is an inductive argument for reductionism formulated with reference to this declaration success: As have been shown in so many theories that a reduction is possible in principle, one should assume that reductions are possible even in the hitherto unexplained areas. From a reductionist perspective, one can also point out that the history of science has shown that theory areas that have reduction deprived principle, were finally abolished. Classic examples are the belief in witchcraft or astrology.
For a reasoning of reductionism in science history miscellaneous can be argued. Firstly, it is possible to doubt that has really been shown for many theories that a reduction is possible. Been carried out are namely reductions so far only for very limited areas. Moreover, one can doubt that the induction is compelling: if a theory A let reduce, so this should not demand just that B also let reduce. Finally, theories about different phenomenon areas are often constructed in a very different, so that the induction argument ultimately seems like a very uncertain analogy.
Causality
In the philosophy of science, therefore, most of the arguments for reductionism do not relate to the history of science, but on considerations of causality. The classic argument points out that there are causes at different levels for an event. An example: If a person takes a headache tablet, so you can specify different causes for this event, such as: 1) the sensation of headache - that would be a mental explanation, 2 ) biological processes that triggered certain muscle contractions or 3) microphysical processes, cause the other microphysical processes which realize the tablets swallowing.
Now reductionists argue that this diversity of causes is problematic: It is highly implausible that the swallowing of the tablet have the same three independent causes. Finally, there is in every action such a variety of causes and it would be a miracle if all these actions constantly have several independent causes. It is much more plausible that we have here is ultimately to do with a Cause: The headaches are nothing more than a biological process and the biological process in turn nothing but a microphysical process. If one now but accepted this solution of the problem of multiple causes, one must also accept reductionism, because the headaches are indeed ultimately identified with a microphysical process here.
Supervenience
Even if the notion of supervenience was originally used from a antireductionist motivation, but it is now often the reductionist argument. The idea of supervenience is the following:
A supervenes on B if A can not be changed without that B changes. Supervenienzbeziehungen can be illustrated by simple examples discuss: The fact that a person has hair on his head, can not change, without changing at the same time something on the microphysical level. Therefore, this fact supervenes on the microphysical - but not vice versa. Well agree with some anti-reductionists reductionists agree that everything supervenes on the microphysics: Political, biological or psychological facts can not be changed without simultaneously changing microphysical facts.
Now it is argued that these can be Supervenienzbeziehungen make understandable only in the context of a reductionist theory. Without the reductionism it is completely baffling that everything supervenes on the microphysical facts. Can be seen, however, to the reductionism that there is a very simple explanation for that A supervenes on B: A is nothing other than B.
Arguments against reductionism
During the reductionism over much of the 20th century, the orthodox position in the philosophy of science, anti-reductionist positions are becoming increasingly popular for about 30 years. This has to do with the fact that the sciences have not unified in the 20th century, but continued to diversify. Secondly, the new antireductionism is closely related to the development of the philosophy of mind and the problems that occur in the reductive explanation of consciousness.
Multiple realizations
The essay Special Sciences - The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis of the cognitive scientist and philosopher Jerry Fodor in 1974 is one of the most influential reduktionismuskritischen texts. According to Fodor's thesis is special sciences such as psychology or economics can in principle not be reduced to the microphysics, as the laws and properties that are described by the individual sciences, can not be play by the laws and properties of physics.
Fodor argues that as very different objects have the property of being a cash - gold, dollars, shells, etc. Even if these objects therefore have an economic common characteristic that distinguishes it from all other objects, it is unlikely that gold, dollars and shells have a physical property that sets them apart from all other objects. But this means that this economic property is just not to be reduced to a physical property. In philosophy, one also speaks of a multiple realization of the property.
Fodor argues also that the individual sciences describe laws that can not be reduced to physical laws. Fodor's example is " Gresham's Law": If there are simultaneously two currencies, one of which is more valuable than the other, the more valuable currency is pushed out of the payments and savings. Since currencies are now implemented multiple, it seems plausible that - depending on the implementation - on the microphysical level quite different laws are involved. However, this means that even single scientific laws can not be reduced, and thus the individual sciences are irreducible.
Mysterious phenomena
In addition to the multiple realization there is another argumentative strand, which is directed against reductionism. Many anti-reductionists refer to phenomena that are in principle not to be described from the perspective of the natural sciences. The existence of such phenomena would make the reductionists even bigger problems than the multiple realizations. Various realized objects, such as currencies, can be at least by a science describe and provide no challenge for a naturalistic position dar. In contrast to the mentioned phenomena in principle be extracted from a scientific access.
Some examples of phenomena that are held by anti-reductionists scientifically undetectable:
I. Awareness: The awareness and the spirit is often seen as a phenomenon that basically defies a purely scientific description. One reason for this is that mental states have the property to be experienced in a certain way. If one stands out with some kind of needle in the finger, so run not only complex biological processes, but it also does hurt. Now, however, seem to make the biological processes in any way to understand why someone is experiencing pain.
II Moral Properties: actions have moral properties. Now, the fact that an action is legitimate or ethically reprehensible or well, in no way result from a scientific description. The reason is that moral concepts are normative, while scientific descriptions are generally regarded as descriptive. The immediate transition and the equation of normative to descriptive statements is rejected naturalistic fallacy.
III. Aesthetic Features: For aesthetic and moral qualities the reasoning situation is similar. The scientific description knows no aesthetic vocabulary, and therefore a reduction implausible here.
In particular, the thesis that consciousness is not reductively explainable often leads to a general rejection of materialism. The concrete within this project the anti-materialist positions are varied. For a classic Substanzdualismen be represented. On the other hand, there are also various anti-materialist positions that also distance themselves from substance dualism. These include various forms of pluralism, neutral monism, aspect or property dualism and relativism.
Pluralist criticism
While the previous two objections have described individual phenomena, which are to be irreducible, the pluralistic criticism is generally aligned. A pluralist states that people have very different approaches to the world and there is no reason to assume that these approaches can all reduce to one another. Also pluralists admit that there are reductions, but they argue that reductionism is based on a one-sided favoring or absoluteness of the physical description of the world. Within the pluralism can be distinguished two streams. Firstly, there is an anti- realistic aligned flow, which stated that it was hopeless to look behind the various descriptions of the world nor a description independent " suchness " of the world. As its most important representatives Nelson Goodman can be viewed. On the other hand, there are also realistic pluralists such as John Dupré, which combine a pluralistic ontology with their position.
Epistemological alternatives
In contrast to the disorderly pluralism and simple double aspect doctrine were higher standing, multi-digit relational concepts (meta- relations) developed ( explication ). The combination of certain frames of reference in physics or in the psychology of perception are simple examples. Are more complicated strategies of contextual and relational thinking, connect the statements in a mutually complementary manner, even contradictory appearing and summarize categorical fundamentally different statements.
Defined by Niels Bohr complementarity principle and which goes back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz distinction of perspectives ( perspectivism ) can be seen as meta- relations. Be required to have the ability and the willingness to be able to perspective ( the reference system ) Switch - phenomenon adequately. These strategies that new forms of non- reductionist thinking can be developed beyond the enduring and intractable appearing controversy between the belief systems of the monist and the dualist.
Lack of reflection of categories and category errors
The recent discussion about reductionism is mainly influenced by the Anglo-American analytic philosophy, while the basic determination of categories and reference systems is largely ignored. This new location features a quote by Nicolai Hartmann, whose broad category theory also highlights the errors of categorical transgression. " Each special area of beings has just his own, but his proper categories that can in no way be replaced by other categories and also in turn are never transferable to other areas being readily ".
Basically, the question remains whether the philosophical discussions to reductionist should not be linked more closely with the science and methodology of the empirical disciplines. How far is the distance to the current research strategies, show the spread in the philosophical literature, often very simplistic " didactic examples ". The expertise of the disciplines concerned and their relevant criteria are needed to justify definitions and reductions and to a category mistake to better recognize.
Special position of psychology and other social sciences
If in biology, a moderate reduction or a micro- reduction is desired, in small steps, then it comes to the return of biological laws on laws of chemistry and physics. In a corresponding experiment in the field of psychology, there is a fundamental difficulty that no strict laws (in the sense of causal explanation, nomology ) must be produced in empirical psychology. What is meant here by the aforementioned "liberal reduction definitions " remains unclear. In the repetition of a psychological experiment, because of the experience page and subjective attitude of the participants ( subjects behavior) no complete consistency condition ( ceteris paribus principle) be maintained and because of frequent individual exceptions ( singular relationships ) not even laws; rather than predictions only statistical relations and statistically reasonable expectations are possible according to popular opinion.
According to the conception of physicalism ( naturalism ) in the form of reductive materialism and eliminative form the neurophysiological features a working ultimately by the laws of physics system. Reduction here means sentences about mental brain functions are replaced by sets on neural brain functions or they are derived from these ( " naturalization of consciousness "). Can the language of the contents of experience are generally translated without loss of information in a neurophysiological language? (see Bishop Norbert qualitative reductionism.
Reductionist tendencies of the reverse kind Usually reductions only be described as " down run " from top to bottom in the direction of fundamental physical laws; there are scientific statements about "higher" functions usually less structured and are replaced by simpler categorical sentences.
For the reverse direction of view often reductionist tendencies can be noticed from empirical facts, research controversies and theories in philosophical representations in the simplification ( abstraction). Thus, there are theoretical concepts of physiology and biology, which form very complex set of morphological and functional relations that seem to be while these conceptual and categorical distinctions in some philosophical and psychological statements disappeared. The psycho- neuro- physiological system as a whole of an emotion is so complex - and today's attempts at comprehensive theory education far exceeding - that an adequate description is not yet in sight. The other hand, how easy are the vocabularies and principles of most philosophical- anthropological and psychological experience exposition of " Emotion". The linguistic analysis derived comparison of the first-person perspective and the third -person perspective reduces the psychological and neurophysiological complex process of interactive self-perception and perception of others, both of which also include emotional and motivational aspects, cognitive to the methodical more accessible functions and so on a comparatively simple philosophical and cognitive schema.
Reduktionismusdebatten in public
The term " reductionism " plays a role not only in the epistemological debate. He is also often used in public debate, but there has a rather vague meaning. Usually the term is here connotes negative and is not distinguished from the concept of scientism. For such a term usually use the accusation is in the foreground that scientific descriptions would be given in an illegitimate way to arts, humanities or social science descriptions of preference.
This critical use of the Reduktionismusbegriffes often stands in the tradition of cultural criticism, philosophy, such as the Frankfurt School. With Max Weber's concept of disenchantment of the world, it is argued that the progressive natural sciences acquired more and more areas of human life and the world as non- scientific ways of describing devalued. Reductionism is understood as a dogma " imperialist " methodology science.
Klaus Holz Kamp (1972 ) saw in the conventional psychological research an individualistic narrowing and at the same time a reductionist elimination of the " specifically human, ie social life level of the live-action ". The way the " modern psychology " insulating man from his socio-historical conditions of life. In an anthropological reductionism leads Gerd Jüttemann (1991 ) the enduring crisis of psychology back. The alleged presuppositions border often desirable in the reflection of our own human image and its implications rather than subject- appropriate application of methods and reflexivity of the procedure.
Even if the Reduktionismusbegriff in public is usually a negative connotation, various scientists and philosophers are trying increasingly to occupy him positively. Prominent examples are the biologist Richard Dawkins and the philosopher Daniel Dennett. They argue that anti-reductionist intuitions are motivated by outdated metaphysical and theological prejudices. Within a materialistic world view could be welcomed reductions only.