The Extended Mind

The extended mind (English: Extended Mind ) is the philosophical and cognitive scientific theory that cognitive architecture and thus cognitive processes and states of the body boundaries extend into the world. This hypothesis was put forward by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in the paper " The Extended Mind" in 1998. In English, the thesis of the extended mind is also referred to as "wide computationalism " or " environmentalism ".

The active externalism, (engl.: active externalism ) or vehicle externalism, (engl.: vehicle externalism ) is a consequence of the thesis of the extended mind, which was not initially distinguished by Clark and Chalmers of this, but in opposition to it on the content of a mental phenomenon relates.

• 5.1 Remember something and remember something
• 5.2 Problem Solving
• 5.3 Perceiving

• 6.1 External Awareness
• 6.2 New Frontier of Cognitive
• 6.3 In cases where persons in the environment?

• 7.1 externalism
• 7.2 functionalism
• 7.3 New Artificial Intelligence

• 8.1 The coupling Constitution fallacy
• 8.3 Cognitive bound to the nervous system
• 8.4 Low connection bandwidth

Definition

Inspired by Hilary Putnam Clark and Chalmers take the thesis of the extended spirit as follows:

"Cognitive processes Is not (all) in the head! "

Thus aimed primarily at the local determination of internalism. After this mental phenomena in the brain of the subject takes place, which has these phenomena. Proponents of an expanded spirit, however, say the one that cognitive systems over the entire body of the being and the environment inside can extend as long as external components have a suitable coupling with the core system. Secondly, this is often combined with the claim that such couplings are actually present in the world and therefore there is also external cognition. This would, for example, the cognitive core system, at least temporarily, in the body of that nature, (technical) tools or social communities extend into.

Clark and Chalmers does not claim that this theory corresponds to the common sense. Therefore, the extended mind is also to be no analysis of our current cognitive concept. Rather, it is for him to claim that cognition should be considered not only as an internal phenomenon. This would, depending on the purpose statement, deeper, more uniform and useful explanations come about.

In the English debate Andy Clark, Susan Hurley, Richard Menary, Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, Robert A. Wilson and Alva Noë among the main representatives of the extended mind, but also David Chalmers expresses itself in the foreword to Clark's book Supersizing the Mind (2008 ) the thesis a positive move. As a critic can be particularly Frederick Adams, Kenneth Aizawa and Robert Rupert call.

In German-speaking countries, however, there is no intensive discussion about the thesis of the extended mind. Exceptions are the philosophers Holger Lyre and Sven Walter.

The parity principle

In the article "The Extended Mind", Clark and Chalmers set to the following principle, which has since been named "parity principle" ( parity principle):

The Parity Principle:

"If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process Which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in Recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then did part of the world is ( so we claimsoft ) part of the cogntive process. "

The parity principle:

After the parity principle, then is not the body boundary crucial when it comes to whether a process is cognitive. Rather, it is the function of a process. Thus, it is the principle of parity to a functionalist principle.

The parity principle, as such, no argument for the extended mind is, but sets the logical way ahead already. It seems most critics do not in principle impossible that cognitive processes can extend beyond the boundaries of the central nervous system also. That this is possible in theory, the following example shows. So Daniel C. Dennett says in his essay published in 1978 " Where Am I? " a hypothetical story is the fact that his brain is removed from the head and re- coupled to the body. It would at least be to cognition outside of the body as well should also be added to most critics of the extended mind. However, this is only a theoretical possibility.

Target from the parity principle, however, be concluded that cognition actually sometimes extends into the world, an external process is needed at least that he would be in the body of a being who would be a cognitive process that being. The question of whether such a process is locate in the world or not, splits the critics and proponents of an expanded mind.

So say, for example, Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa that the psychological and functional differences between internal and external processes are fundamental to ever apply the principle of parity can.

Evolutionary argument

The fact that there are processes that meet the demands of the parity principle, seems - Mark Rowlands According - to show an evolutionary view:

It would therefore be reasonable to assume that mechanisms have evolved in certain beings in the course of evolution, which are designed to change the environment so that the body of this creature has less himself. Examples of this can be spiders and their webs, beavers and their dams, and of course people and their artifacts call. This principle formulated Mark Rowlands as follows:

The Barking Dog Principle:

" If it is neccessary for on organism to be able to perform a givenName adaptive task T, then it is disadvantageous for Selectively did organism to develop internal mechanisms Sufficient for the performance of T When it is possible for the organism to perform T by way of combination of internal mechanisms and manipulation of the external environment. "

The principle of the dog barking:

If this principle is true, it is also likely that have developed in the evolution of organisms that outsource cognitive architecture in this way to the environment and therefore use an effective hybrid combination of internal and external processes to deal with cognitive tasks. This would, however, only one argument for external cognition, if we define cognitive processes as those who help beings in solving specific tasks. However, such a definition is not necessarily correct.

External conditions

The following states are used as external cognitive states in question:

Beliefs

The classic example of external mental states represent beliefs dar. So Clark and Chalmers describe the fictional suffering from Alzheimer's Otto, who used a notebook as an external memory. So Otto writes new information into his notebook, like healthy people store newly acquired information in the brain. Similar to the neural process of remembering can win Otto when needed information from his notebook and processed. Will he, for example, the Museum of Modern Art, Otto consulted his notebook, in which he has the address entered above.

On the obvious objection that Otto initially has only the belief that the desired information can be found in your notebook responds Clark, that this would make the explanation unnecessarily complicated, since otherwise one could even healthy people initially assume only the belief that the required information stored in their brain.

Wishes

But not only beliefs, but also wishes to be drawn from representatives of the extended mind as external conditions into consideration. Thus, for example, writes David Chalmers in the preface to Andy Clark book " Supersizing the Mind" that he uses his iPhone to his favorite meals to remember in a particular restaurant. With him, so the notes would play in the mobile phone the same roles as it would otherwise do neurally realized desires.

State carrier

As external intentional states already were external memories, such as notebooks, or memory triggers, for example, nodes in handkerchiefs proposed. Another question is whether only made ​​by the cognitive nature of changes in the environment or even without the actions of the essence of existing things in the environment, such as landmarks or books can be external cognitive states.

Also interesting is the idea that in certain cases the cognitive states of a system could be extended to other beings. This would be the case for example when Otto whenever you need his wife call you when he needs to know that he has forgotten due to his illness, or if the waiter would remember certain restaurants, which courts have David Chalmers particularly liked.

External processes

External cognitive processes - by Mark Rowlands - Action loops which are necessary for the execution of cognitive tasks and involve the manipulation of external information-bearing structures.

Remember something and remember something

If there are external desires and beliefs, they must be outsourced from cognitive beings in the environment and can be read in case of need from this. This outsourcing is consequently an external process of self- something - memorizing. The reading, however, a process of remembering, which consists, for example, that the affected cognitive beings in the calendar to look up their own projects to find out or a certain conspicuous landmark searched to find the right way.

Problem solving

Another type of external mental processes is problem solving. This is characterized in that new desires or beliefs are generated by manipulation of the environment. It is epistemic (as opposed to pragmatic ) acts whose goal is new knowledge or expectations.

The best-known example of such epistemic actions is the video game Tetris, with which Clark and Chalmers take the thesis of the extended mind. Thus, they argue that the internal Proberotieren of the stones in the head, the external rotation by pressing buttons and the internal rotation by a neural implant are equivalent epistemic actions. These should therefore be considered all cognitive processes. This example was preceded by research of David Kirsh and Paul Maglio, which found in experiments with Tetris that many rotations have not targeted but rather epistemic character. This leads to the definition of an epistemic act whose primary function is to improve cognition by the following factors:

As further examples of epistemic actions are written arithmetic or rearranging the letters in Scrabble mentioned.

Perceive

The perception is considered by some representatives of the enlarged mind as an external process. This approach, however, has less to do with manipulation of the environment to do with epistemic actions. The chain of perception, as a model of perception that includes not only the elements of stimulus, transduction, processing, perception and recognition also includes the element of action.

This is found in the visual perception, for example, in the permanent saccades, which manages to bring through many different fixations the impression always consciously perceive a complete picture, although we can only a small portion of the surrounding scene actually fix.

Consequences

The thesis of the extended mind has far -reaching consequences:

External awareness

Unclear is the relationship between consciousness and external mental states. It seems possible to have consciousness outside the body, as long as the brain, is outside the body. This would be the case for example, when some parts of or the whole central nervous system, removed from the body, and would be re- coupled to it. In practice, however locate many proponents of an expanded mind phenomenal consciousness exclusively in the brain and thus see external processes and states from the outset as unconsciously. In contrast, among other things, Alva Noë and J. Kevin O'Regan, the thesis that coupling of the cognitive system with the outside world leads to external consciousness.

This seems possible, for example, if - would be explained purely functionalist awareness - especially phenomenal. If this were the case, then the parity principle could apply here too and awareness processes in the environment would at least not be excluded. Whether a purely functionalist explanation of consciousness is possible, but is highly controversial.

Also in parapsychology, there are theories that are similar to the extended mind. So, for example, claims Rupert Sheldrake with the idea of morphic fields that can localize not only in his body the consciousness of a being. In this way he hopes to various phenomena such as telepathy to explain.

New Frontier of Cognitive

Since the extended mind discards the boundary of the body as the limit of the Spirit, conditions are needed to determine when external processes and states are cognitive. One criterion is the parity principle, which requires that processes that would if they were held in the body clearly regarded as cognitive, also outside the body are cognitive.

For external beliefs Clark and Chalmers ask the following conditions ::

• The information must be constant and easily accessible.
• The information must have been already processed once.
• Recorded information must be approved immediately.

Neither these conditions nor the principle of parity seem to establish clear rules for determining whether a state is cognitive or not. So it appears as a fuzzy boundary would include the mental, the extended mind.

This is contested by critics who think that a clear definition of the term " cognition " is required. So they think that the proponents of an expanded mind can only show that cognition can be external, even if they have defined the term " cognition ".

In cases where people in the environment?

Another consequence of the extended mind seems to be that extend with the cognitive processes and states, but also individuals beyond the body in the world. If the thesis of the extended mind true, robs you an Alzheimer's patient his memories, if you take away him his notebook. Natural cognitive beings should therefore no longer be regarded as purely biological, but as a combination of biological and external components. This seems to have social, moral and legal ramifications obvious. For example, when it comes to change, or even just to browse organizer, calculator or notepads other people.

Another implication of the extended mind is that even the beings themselves can no longer be clearly distinguished from the rest of the world through a blurry boundary of the mental. It is also possible that overlap the cognitive architectures and states of different nature or that, legally speaking, the cognitive architecture of a being belonging to another. This would be given, for example, if in the course of neuro-enhancement would be a direct access to the brain possible to knowledge databases.

Relation to other theories

A special relationship has the thesis of the extended mind on the following theories:

Externalism

The spirit has advanced as a logical consequence the active externalism or vehicle - externalism. During the externalism claims that the mental states of a system depend on this system not only of the internal states, can the thesis of active externalism expressed as follows:

This continues the active externalism from, especially ascribed to Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, semantic externalism, since in this the difference brings about no change in the behavior of a system in the mental content. Also, the active externalism makes a statement about the location of a mental phenomenon, while the semantic externalism only makes a statement about the content of such a phenomenon.

Together, both versions of externalism that they are directed against the internalism.

This can be seen, among other things, that for both variants a Twin Earth thought experiment can be made, in which the internal factors of a system remain the same, but the mental content changes:

While the semantic externalism, for example, the composition of water is different and therefore no longer concerns the thought of water to H2O, the active externalism, the difference would be an entry in the notebook of suffering from Alzheimer's Otto. This entry could, for example, ensure that Otto does not have the true belief that the Museum of Modern Art is located in the 53th street, but that it is in the 51st street.

However, despite all their differences, both theories are compatible. There is nothing against intentional states outside the brain, which are individuated externally.

Functionalism

The parity principle does - as well as functionalism - use the argument of the multiple realizability of mental states. So it is not important how or exactly where mental phenomena are realized as long as their function remains the same. Because of this similarity, the following relationship seems to be at least plausible:

This could have two types of consequences. You could see as an advocate of functionalism, the parity principle as a logical consequence of functionalism and thus try to make the extended mind plausible, at least as a possibility. On the other hand, critics of functionalism could prove the parity principle as unintuitive weakness of functionalism and thus find an argument against this.

But whether external processes can have the same function as internal, depends primarily on how to determine input and output functions. So we can, for example, the suffering from Alzheimer's Otto using his notebook as an external memory, consider two different ways:

This limit of perception and action appears to be for Chalmers, the greatest threat to the thesis of the extended mind.

New Artificial Intelligence

The extended mind is also associated with more recent developments in cognitive science. Especially the Embodiment thesis, closely linked with their Enaktivismus and Dynamizismus who understands cognitive systems as a particular class of dynamical systems appear to ensure that the intuitive boundary between the cognitive system and the outside world seems to be not more clearly defined. In particular, the consideration is to be found in these theories again that cognitive systems are located and are in complex interactions with the environment. This is necessary for the extended mind, because only with the environment interacting materialized systems have causal contact with external factors in order to make them accessible for your own functions.

The other way it can be said that Embodiment and Enaktivismus not necessarily have to go hand in hand with the extended mind, since they are initially only theories about causal and non- mereological relationships. Also the Dynamizismus does not necessarily contain the accuracy of the extended mind.

The extended mind is compatible with both connectionism and classical Artificial Intelligence.

Criticism

Main critics of the thesis of the extended spirit are Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, which indicate potential problems of this thesis, among other things in her 2008 book "The Bounds of Cognition".

The coupling Constitution fallacy

Here, they are subject to the representatives of the extended mind following fallacy:

So is a process or a state which is strongly coupled with a cognitive system, not necessarily constitutive of this system. For the external conditions which come into question for the proponents of an expanded mind as cognitive, applies to Adams and Aizawa, that while there is a strong causal relation to cognitive systems, but that this does not mean that they should be regarded as cognitively.

Furthermore, critics argue that external states intrinsic content, as an important key feature of the mind, is missing. Thus, for example, candidates often external cognition language of meaning. It receives its meaning apparently by public use and social practice. The meaning of words and sentences would therefore not intrinsic. Similarly, according to Adams and Aizawa also for other external conditions. Thus they write:

"Whatever is responsible for non -derived representations Seems to find a place only in brains. "

While it is therefore logical and nomological possible that external conditions have intrinsic content, as this appears, Adams and Aizawa According to contingently not to be the case. Since intrinsic content but is a feature of the cognitive, there would be no external cognitive processes and states.

This criticism is vulnerable in many places. On the one hand it is not clear what intrinsic content should be at all. Furthermore, the assertion seems that such a brain and can occur only in the brain, to be unfounded. Last, of course, raises the question of whether intrinsic content is really necessary for cognitive states.

Cognitive bound to the nervous system

A similar argument as that of the intrinsic content is also from Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa. They derive from the fact that we have so far found only in cognition nervous systems, from that cognition takes place only in those. A cognitive system that extends beyond borders of the nervous system also, that is not possible. So it is with this criticism to an empirically based rejection of the thesis of multiple realizability.

Low connection bandwidth

Another objection, to respond to the Clark and Chalmers been to The extended mind is that external conditions can not be attributed to the cognitive system, because they are less accessible than internal states. An analogy makes this clear objection. So we would have little trouble even to count the contents of external data memory the contents of the computer, as long as that access is almost as fast. The situation is different, however, if we wanted the memory of a computer relieve the fact that the content of some files we print on paper and scan them if necessary.

However, proponents of an expanded mind you will reply that the connection between the suffering from Alzheimer's Otto and his notebook is significantly better than that between a computer and printed files. So we would, for example, a person who has a slow access to their own internal memories due to an accident but you know, not even those memories, as long as it is accessed again with sufficient reliability and unassisted.

But even if critics can not be convinced by this argument, it is far from clear that neural processes are faster than epistemic actions in the outside world. So noted, for example, Kirsh and Maglio, that while playing Tetris direct manipulation of the game faster than vonstattengeht a mental rotation.