The Will to Believe

The Will to Believe is a religious philosophy essay by William James, in which he tries to justify belief in God by pragmatist argument. James held this first as a lecturer at Yale and at Brown University, then published it in 1896 in the magazine New World, then in 1898 in the anthology of his lectures The Will to Believe and other essays in popular philosophy.

Content

James begins with a distinction between live and dead hypotheses. Alive are only those hypotheses that they actually can possibly accept for a particular person. Thus Islam Christianity is for most Westerners a dead hypothesis, on the other hand a living. Then James meets three distinctions of different options: Genuine elections ( living options) are choices between two live hypotheses, all others are fake elections. Compelling elections (forced options) are those elections in which we can not remain undecided, all others are preventable elections. Urgent elections ( momentous options) are options that affect the taking or failure to take a one-time opportunity. James wants to show that the choice between theism and agnosticism is a real, compelling and urgent choice; it was at least a real choice, it presupposes it.

James first deals with Pascal's wager, according to the decision of faith as a bet could be taken, in which faith offers the better profit prospects in God. James criticizes the fact that we would have to find as a reward strategy of God implausible:

" [ ... ] And if we were ourselves in the place of the Deity, We Should probably take Particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern from Their infinite reward. "

Since, therefore, seems the idea of ​​a rewarding God so nonsensical, Pascal's wager is already a dead hypothesis. Since this argument also endangering scientific thought, it is not only stupid, but also disgusting. Although Pascal's argument was weak, but it still shows that the choice between belief and agnosticism is imperative and urgent, because they affecting our emotions and our actions in morally relevant way, and the decision to morally right action is always necessary immediately.

All real, compelling and urgent elections that can not be decided on the basis of intellectual considerations, may be decided ( by the passional nature ) according to James from the gut. In these elections, it is namely already a gut decision not to decide and leave open the question. In such a situation, two epistemic principles are relevant: We are epistemically obliged to learn as much, so to know the truth, and as well as possible to avoid errors, ie to believe falsehoods. These two laws are materially different and our choice of a preference for one of the two is needed to lead our whole intellectual life in different directions.

In many areas it is advisable to avoid mistake to give priority: in science, but also, for example, in court hearings. But scientific decisions are also usually not mandatory or strongly: For our practical lives, they have no relevance at first, the man should be here in a neutral, assessed position. Moral decisions, however, are often strongly and would have even without rational proof of correctness to be made. Even in the social field, we often choose out without much consideration from the abdomen. This is important, because if we think about whether someone likes us, is the assumption that this is so, also commonly cause this person to us which it actually likes. So here is true in the first place by only by faith in a set of this set.

The "religious hypothesis " consists in the fact that, firstly, perfection is something eternal and that we are better served secondly, if we believe in the first part. James points out to the fact that the choice between acceptance and non-acceptance of the hypothesis compelling and urgent is here, as long as the hypothesis is true, we will immediately and permanently benefit from our faith. Skepticism premises now in religious matters of error prevention absolute priority over the knowledge of truth and reject the religion for lack of sufficient evidence. James rejects this view from simply because he knew of no evidence, why it is better to hope to run out of fear instead of in a trap. A rule that deters from finding a whole class of truths, is irrational; but this was given when the maxims of the science would be extended to religious beliefs. So as long as we have a real choice in matters of faith is it acceptable and correct to decide for faith.