Tractatus logico-philosophicus

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Tractatus or short (the original German title is: logical- philosophical treatise ) is the first major work of the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein ( 1889-1951 ). Written during the First World War, the factory was completed in 1918. It was published with the support of Bertrand Russell, first in 1921 in Wilhelm Ostwald's annals of natural philosophy. These Wittgenstein not to read version contained gross errors. A revised, bilingual edition ( German / English) appeared in 1922, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. in London and is considered the official version. The English translation was by CK Ogden and Frank Ramsey. A second, bilingual edition appeared in 1933. 1929 Wittgenstein put the Tractatus ( the Latin reminiscent of Spinoza's Tractatus theologico - politicus title went to GE Moore back ) as a doctoral thesis at Trinity College, Cambridge before.

As indicated in the title of the book, it contains on the one hand a logical theory, on the other hand Wittgenstein puts it as a philosophical method dar. " The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or rather - not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts: for to draw a limit to thinking, we should be able to think both sides of this border. " ( preface). Wittgenstein's main concern is to clean up the philosophy of nonsense and confusion, because" most sentences and questions that have been written about philosophical things are, are not false but nonsensical. We can therefore questions of this kind did not answer, but only state their senselessness. most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand logic of our language. " ( 4003 )

"In detail " "not at all claim to novelty, and so I also give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought before me have another thought. " Rises Wittgenstein ( Foreword )

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus follows the modus mathematicus, which seemed appropriate at that time, especially the analytic philosophers ( Frege, Russell, Whitehead, silt, etc.). Succinct, precise definitions of terms and logical inferences, but also the introduction of formal notations from mathematical logic give the text the appearance of the utmost generality and finality. The striking numbering system of the individual sentences and paragraphs is intended to indicate the logical weight of the sentences, according to Wittgenstein. Eben This numbering system that goes back to Wittgenstein, has experienced great success in the academic world and dissemination. Wittgenstein defined in the colloquial language commonly used terms such as sentence, fact, fact, or even the world in the Tractatus accurate and designs with them a meaning and language theory.

Content

Sections 1-3

World and reality

In the description of the world and reality Wittgenstein draws on the following terms: fact, fact, object, shape, logical space. The following rates were used to explain these terms:

• "The world is the totality of facts, not of things. " (1.1 )
• " What is the case, the fact is the existence of atomic facts. " ( 2)
• " The fact is a combination of objects. ( Entities, things ). " ( 2.01)
• " The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. " ( 2:06 )
• " The way of how things hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the facts. " ( 2032 )
• " The shape is the ability of the structure. " ( 2033 )

The world is, according to Wittgenstein does not list them constituting Direction things or objects, but appears in their connection ( assembly ): . These same things can be connected in different ways to form different situations Some can be a necklace in the window, adorn the neck of a woman or be the subject of an auction. In each of the three example cases, the necklace is connected in different ways with the things around them and thus part of any other facts. Not all of these situations may exist simultaneously, but only one at the expense of the other, and this itself is the reality: the one actually existing, and therefore not existing facts. All at all possible situations but in which a thing or object can occur are the shape ( 2.0141 ).

The " necklace " is an illustrative image, because what Wittgenstein "things" ( or objects ) are actually, is not precisely specified in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein merely sets out the requirement that they " simply" and atomically (ie himself " not assembled ", no matters ) must be ( cf. 2:02, 2021 ). Taking all existing and not existing facts are the reality. " The whole of reality is the world. " ( 2063 ).

Image, thought, movement, elementary proposition

After such importing ontology Wittgenstein comes to the topic that interests him primarily: Language and their meaning. It represents a realistic theory of meaning, ie sentences ( Wittgenstein limited to descriptive sentences, interrogative sentences, imperative sentences, etc. are not covered. ) Are true by something them as same world.

As we think, we imagine (according to 2.1) facts in "pictures" before, in which "thoughts" constellate (3). What Wittgenstein here with " image " means will become clearer as you would expect as the " entity" or " mosaic " as something put together. Through the language "sentence" is this composition " perceptible " (3.1 ). The reference to reality is for Wittgenstein in the same composition or structure of fact - image - idea - set.

Facts fall into situations ( 2), matters in items ( 2.01) - in the language available for the objects then " name " ( 3.22), the facts correspond to " elementary propositions " ( 3:21 & 4.0311 ), the facts " sets ", which consequently are composed of elementary propositions (5).

"Loud or character" (words ) form Actual - reportedly in the of them presented the idea - "possible situations " (3.11) in the mind of the thinker ( 2221 ). Since "fact" always " existing connection " means, even imagining her or thought, and its expression must be in the language set composed ( disassembled) to be. As the facts of simple objects or "things", so it is of expressing elementary set of (Thing ) " name " composed ( 3202 ); the " configuration " but " in the sentence symbols correspond to the configurations of objects in ... situation (s). " ( 3:21; " punctuation " is not meant here in the sense of punctuation, but "The sign by which we express the idea, I call the punctuation mark. " )

The " name means the item. The object is its meaning " ( 3203 ). Each object has its name, which - like its subject in the facts - only with other makes sense in the elementary proposition. It must name to type thoughts, configure elementary propositions. Always corresponds to the name " mosaic " of the facts ( the objects they represent ); is this will be true elementary proposition by ( 2.222 ). Truth therefore derives from the equality of two patterns: from fact ( existing situation ) and sentence.

Ambiguity

The world divides into facts (1.2), the facts disintegrate in turn existing situations ( 2), facts, existing and non- existing, fall into things or objects ( 2.01). Items are determined twice: on the one hand as a primitive sign or significance of the "names" that make up the language composed ( 3203 ), on the other hand not as indivisible matter or " substance of the world " ( 2021 ). Similarly ambiguous beings are determined: on the one hand as " reality," the other as "world". "Reality" and " world " will be used by Wittgenstein in particular, their intuitive understanding almost contradictory way. "Reality" is determined as the " existence " ( one ) "and" (this ) " non-existence of" ( other ) " facts " ( 2:06 ); " World ", however, is the totality of (only ) the existing facts ( 2.04). "Reality" thus updates from the always thought along the possible, while " world" ( only ) there is Realized, namely the " totality of the factual circumstances " ( 2.04) or facts (1.1). The difference paves 2,063 then suddenly one: " The whole of reality is the world." The inconsistency is lying is never canceled.

Section 4

Saying and showing, limits of language

In sentence 4.0312 Wittgenstein formulates his central thesis: " My basic idea is that the ' logical constants ' are not represented. The fact that the logic of the facts can not be represented " strings like " and "," or "," not "," if ... then " are, in other words no name in terms of the Tractatus: they do not stand for things ." Represented " nothing more than allow the representation. Thinking can be according to Wittgenstein only what is configured, but not the "Configuration " in itself, regardless of the configured logical formed: "The sentence can not represent logical form, it is reflected in it. What is reflected in the language, they can not represent. What expresses itself in language, we can not express through them. The set shows the logical form of reality. He has it. " ( 4121 ) Wittgenstein is here in explicit contrast to Bertrand Russell. That logical constants such as " and", " or", " if ... then " do not stand for something, evidenced by the fact that they converted readily into one another, ultimately, all of which can be represented by the Sheffer stroke ( cf. 3.3441 ). Moreover, Wittgenstein's ontology catch: If the complex situation, which is expressed by ( elementary propositions ) 'a' and 'b', that is, that the elementary propositions are true, then because a and b exist. It is not necessary, as Russell supposed, beyond even the need to ( and therefore " acquaintance " ) be stated a relation between the facts "and".

The logic, ie the structure of a fact, their shape, Wittgenstein calls the " limit" of the world (cf. 5.61 ), hence the limit of Recordable. In terms of logic, nothing verifiable can be presented: " This way you can not say, " There are objects ," as one says: " There are books ." Nor: " There are 100 objects ," or " There are objects ". [ ... ] Wherever the word ' object ' [ ... ] is properly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name. [ ... ] Wherever it is different, so used as the actual concept-word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions arise. "(Cf. 4.1272 )

The sentence " shows " its meaning ( cf. 4.022 ) the combination of its elementary propositions is their " truth function" ( cf. 5). Therefore, there can be no meaningful sentences about what makes sentences: Compounds; because any such rules would have to make sense already be justified by what he really only wants to be identified: the logic of something for which he must include as a sensible set from the outset. " We can not illogical to think, because we would otherwise have to think illogically. " ( 3:03 )

Meaningful and meaningless sentences

Wittgenstein distinguishes between three types of sentences: meaningful, meaningless and nonsensical. A meaningful sentence is a sentence which reflects a state of affairs or a fact; his mind is in the presented conditions: "You can say almost: instead, this set has this and this meaning; this set, this and this situation dar. " (see 4031 ) A nonsense phrase is either tautological (eg ," It is raining or it is not raining. " ) or - vice versa - contradictory ( " Olaf is a married bachelor "or" You draw a five -sided square " ); he is not a picture of a fact, so it has no sense, " the tautology can be the reality all - infinite - logical space; the contradiction fills the whole logical space and leaves the reality is no point. " ( 4463 )

Sections 5-6

Nonsensical sentences

As absurd the Tractatus means all records that are neither meaningful nor meaningless. A sentence such as " What I write herewith is wrong," the only on itself and on nothing but him in the world relates to (a reference to the paradox of Epimenides ), never recovered due to its importance. A sentence is nonsensical if one of its components, names or elementary proposition, no meaning, no distinct from him Sachliches that he ( his part only ) maps, faces ( 5.4733 ): " The name means the item. The object is its meaning " ( 3203 ). So, for example, gives and "Love your neighbor as yourself," a " nonsense " because it depends on something in this set does not depend on reality. "It is clear that ethics can not pronounce. " ( 6421 ) Ethical sentences are rules; the being-so they can hurt ( do not agree with them ), without thereby lose content. Sentences, on whose validity the reality has no influence, are according to the Tractatus "nonsense" view. This is true not only ethical, but also on philosophical phrases, ultimately the Tractatus itself: " My propositions serve as elucidations in that it: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical ... " ( 6:54 ). Philosophical statements are, in other words nothing before this choice; because ". everything happening and being-so is accidental ," The philosophical version of this, however, what "it makes non- random " describes something that "does not lie in the world " can; " Because otherwise this would be randomly. It must lie outside the world "( 6:41 ). Sense can but - according to the use made of the Tractatus of this word - give only facts or assembled from them facts in the world.

The general form

In the Tractatus two basic conceptions are, in principle, set out what a sentence: First, it is an image of a matter, on the other hand he is " a truth-function of elementary propositions " (5); Elementary propositions are operations ( these correspond to the connectives of the logic) linked. All sets can be generated with the help of elementary propositions and their link through operations after Wittgenstein. Therefore, Wittgenstein gives in sentence 6, the general form, so the general form of truth-function of:

Represents a set of variables are linked in what elementary propositions. So, for example, for (P, Q, R) are ( cf. 5.501 ). accurately represents the combination of elementary propositions by a connective, which itself is fully functional, such connectives are called Sheffer operators. Wittgenstein designated thereby the Peirce - operator or NOR. Wittgenstein omitted when specifying the general truth-function of quantifiers; can instead be public ( and therefore existence) by a ( possibly infinite ) combination of all elementary propositions and all relevant items of the individuals range, which is intended to encompass the totality represent.

Wittgenstein's notation of a truth function is p, for example, a truth-function of two elementary propositions and q is the following ( cf. 5.101 ) or

This is to be understood that the character representing the last column of the truth table in the first bracket. F or '' stands for false, W to be true. Of course, the order of the assignments must be set. The full truth table would be:

Thus corresponds precisely to the logical implication, ie.

The general truth-function is thus probably better understood so: You get the proposition p by successively associates the elementary propositions, which are specified by each of the logical NOR.

Psychology

As for the contents of human consciousness, is 5.542 states: " It is clear, however, that ' A believes that p ', 'A thinks that p ', 'A says p' says of the form ' > p

p < ) Composite, but refer solely on objective, ie transferable into sentences, " mental images " ( composed of objects facts or facts ). You can not extent beyond that Imagined About This bidding, have Peace of mind ( much of it Miscellaneous ) to the object. For if the soul of a fact as its contents, they would also need to be mapped, thus composed of objects or situations, be. " A composite soul " but " would be ... no soul. " ( 5.5421 ) because they could be dismantled or destroyed like everything Composite in this case, die; the soul is but ( according to Plato ) easy, so not assembled, therefore immortal. What Wittgenstein follows: " The thinking, representing subject does not exist" ( 5631 ) - in the same sense about where it ethics or aesthetics do not like ( space-occupying, composite and countable ) trees or houses " are ". Our mind, by one or the other actually imagine, is not it conditionally, can not be determined therefrom. A border runs for Wittgenstein therefore not between the inner and the outer world, which are both in their linguistic constitution on the same level, but between sense and nonsense: what can imagine, and what a non- presentation differs from one idea.

Ethics and mysticism

Wittgenstein wrote in October 1919 to Ludwig von Ficker that the meaning of the Tractatus was an ethical, and that it is to be regarded as a two part work, the ethical part has not been written, because it would just be nonsense. On the ethics in the Tractatus he writes: "Therefore, there can be no ethical propositions. Sentences can not express higher. " ( 6:42 ) A sentence can not formulate what carries it, and hence" world " only represent, but not on or sue. Also Wittgenstein comes to God, solipsism and mysticism to speak, he writes: ( 6:44 ) " Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is. " This mystery can not be explained by sets ( cf. 6.522 ) since these only imagine what is possible, but not why it is possible.

The ladder analogy

Towards the end of the book borrowed from Wittgenstein Arthur Schopenhauer an analogy, he compares the Tractatus with a ladder, which had to be " thrown away " after being on her " ascended " is. If philosophy is to grasp the condition of true and false, it can be truly called neither to the one nor the other, so to speak, is " not of this world." " My propositions serve as elucidations in that it: anyone who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has used them - to them -. Climb up beyond them" ( 6:54 )

Section 7

The last section of the Tractatus consists only of a concise and much-quoted sentence: " Whereof one can not speak, thereof one must be silent. " What is not meant that certain truths are better left unmentioned, but that's what makes talking or thinking, can not be the subject matter - which philosophical question par excellence is in question.

Interpretation and implications of the Tractatus

Wittgenstein himself thought he had solved the Tractatus all philosophical problems and withdrew about logically, at least for some years, from philosophy back.

Meanwhile, the work became primarily the interest of the Vienna Circle, including Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. The group spent several months trying to work through the work sentence by sentence, and finally persuaded silt Wittgenstein, with the county to discuss the work. While Carnap praised the fact that the work of important insights vermittele, he criticized the last sentences of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein then said Schlick that he could not imagine that Carnap 's intention and the meaning of the Tractatus misunderstood so.

More recent interpretations bring the Tractatus with Søren Kierkegaard in connection to Wittgenstein admired. Kierkegaard was convinced that certain things could not be expressed in ordinary language, and that they would be manifested indirectly. As a representative of the newer Tractatus interpretations argue, for example, Cora Diamond and the American philosopher James F. Conant (born 1958 ), Wittgenstein sets must actually be seen as senseless, and the basic intention of the Tractatus would actually show is that the trial to draw a line between sense and nonsense, self- completed with nonsense. A German -language book in which this interpretation of the Tractatus is presented, is Wittgenstein's ladder of Logi Gunnarsson.

In addition to the considerable influence that the Tractatus had on (especially analytic ) philosophy of the 20th century, also influences on the non- philosophical literature and the arts can be detected. In the novel Nervous fish by Heinrich Steinfest example, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is in a way the Bible of the main character, the Chief Inspector Lukastik. Umberto Eco quotes in his novel The Name of the Rose set 6:54 in Middle High German Translation: "He Muoz gelîchesame the ladder abewerfen he sô to ir ufgestigen ". The Finnish jazz composer and writer Mauri Antero Numminen and Austrian composer Baldwin Sulzer have even tried the Tractatus to set to music: one of parody and only the main records citing the other much more serious and the recourse to the - Appreciated by Wittgenstein - "Vienna School ".